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CHAPTER V' 
TACTICS 
INTRODUCTION 
1. SOVIET TACTICS PRIOR TO 1942 
At the beginning of the Russo-German War, June 
1941, the Red Army tactical doctrines, which had 
developed from a mixture of Western European 
practice and original thinking, were still largely 
theoretical and untried. It is true that Red Army 
leaders had made careful studies of World War I, 
the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars, and the first 
year of World War II. As early as 1933, Red Army 
officers had formulated basic concepts of tank and 
moto-mechanized warfare. At Nomonhan and in 
the Finnish War, they gained experience in the 
strengths and weaknesses of armor. The critical 
importance of small-unit infantry tactics, the neces-
sity of coordination and flexibility in maneuver and 
fire power, and the methods of artillery-infantry-
tank rupture of a powerful fortified position also 
had been clarified in the Finnish War. But these 
lessons were not fully digested, even by higher offi-
cers. Rapid mobilization between 1937 and 1941 
had brought great numbers of inexperienced leaders 
into service. The tactical modernization of the Red 
Army had just begun when the Germans invaded 
the U. S. S. R. 
In 1941, command was concentrated in the in-
fantry staff, although artillery was receiving con-
tinually increasing responsibility. The basic op-
erational unit was the powerful infantry division, 
nearly 18,000 strong, with two regiments of artillery 
and a battalion of tanks. Except in the Far East, 
the corps was the highest organized command struc-
ture. 
Full emphasis upon combat intelligence was not 
yet evident, although notable beginnings had been 
made in the development of aerial phototopography, 
special maps, and photographic ground reconnais-
sance; and sound ranging was in an advanced stage. 
Schemes of maneuver and combat dispositions in the 
offensive were conventional, featuring a predomi-
nance of frontal terrain objectives and deeply eche-
loned infantry assault forces. 
Sound defensive doctrines existed. These showed 
thorough appreciation of the importance of depth? 
all-around security, successive obstacle systems cov-
ered by fire, and the employmerit of artillery in 
counterpreparation and antitank action. Staff 
work was detailed and slow, with written orders be-
ing employed as low as the regiment. Coordina-
tion presented a notable weakness; commanders 
overstressed personal leadership to the detriment of 
control. Supporting arms were not fully exploited. 
Signal planning and techniques-especially the em-
ployment of radio-were deficient. 
In infantry tactics, the concepts of fire, maneuver, 
infiltration, and encirclement were beginning to 
crystallize. Mixed teams of infantry, engineers, and 
direct-fire artillery for special missions were not 
yet in evidence. However, rapidly prepared field 
fortifications, excellent camouflage, and the mass 
use of specialized snipers were standard practices. 
Throughout the years prior to World War II, the 
Red Army concentrated attention on artillery tac-
tics and techniques. By 1941, considerable progress 
had been made in analyzing artillery capabilities; 
developing observation and fire direction; employ-
ing destruction fire, barrages, and concentrations; 
and in handling artillery organizations. Four ar-
tillery divisions existed. The lack of heavy mor-
tars and of massed mortar fire was an important 
deficiency. 
Large-scale employment of armor was still in its 
infancy, with experimental tank divisions being the 
most powerful mechanized units. Technical equip-
ment was not fully developed, while the roles of in-
fantry, engineers, and supporting fire power in ar-
mored operations were incompletely understood. 
In contrast, large horse cavalry units had not been 
neglected; a powerful cavalry arm, coordinated with 
artillery and armor, existed at the beginning of the 
war. 
The Finnish War provided excellent experience 
in winter operations and in the assault of fortified 
positions. 
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The first phase of the Russo-German War, June 
to November 1941, was a costly delaying action by 
the initial protective forces of the U. S. S. R. It 
revealed the tactical weaknesses of the prewar army; 
at the same time, new techniques were improvised. 
Deep obstacle systems justified themselves thor-
oughly, as did artillery-especially in the new role 
of direct fire. Combat in encirclement and parti-
san warfare proved effective. 
By November 1941, the mobilized reserves of the 
U. S. S. R. were ready, and could be thrown in for 
powerful counterattacks at Tikhvin, Rostov, and 
Moscow. Between November 1941 and May 1942, 
the Russians engaged in a winter-spring offensive 
which nearly broke the German lines, but at great 
cost. The soundness of husbanding reserves for 
counteroperations at the critical time and the effec-
tiveness of infiltrating ski units and large-scale cav-
alry raids were fully proved. Yet many weaknesses 
were evident. At Rostov (November 1941), the 
absence of motorized infantry, self-propelled artil-
lery, and motorized bridging equipment prevented 
the Red Army from annihilating the encircled Ger-
man forces. On the Central Front (January-April 
1942), lack of air cover led to the destruction of the 
cavalry supply lines and nullified the offensive. At 
Kharkov (May 1942), inadequate flank protection 
for the advancing mechanized salient produced dis-
aster. 
2. NEW TACTICAL DOCTRINES 
The High Command of the Red Army studied the 
reverses of 1941 and 1942 assiduously. By the au-
tumn of 1942, it had assimilated the combat lessons 
of the war, formulated radically new combat regula. 
tions for the arms and the staffs, developed new 
organizations, and begun mass production of fully 
modern equipment. 
As a result of this tactical evaluation~ command 
responsibilities were specifically divided between 
the commander and staff of combined arms, and the 
chiefs of arms and services. The Commander be-
came responsible for plans of maneuver and direct 
control of critical phases of an operation. His staff 
assumed the function of coordination, while the 
chiefs of arms and services were charged with de-
tailed planning and control of their particular ele-
ments. The army became the basic planning and 
command group; army group and even several 
headquarters coordinated major operations. Un-
compromising thoroughness of reconnaissance was 
required, both by combined and specialized arms. 
V-2 
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Operation procedures were developed for system-
atically disseminating intelligence directly to using 
agencies. New tactical schemes were brought for-
ward: converging double envelopment, parallel pur-
suit, and centralized and decentralized defense. The 
major development in staff work was the required 
employment of precise tables of combat coordina-
tion, which assured continuous, systematic coopera-
tion of all arms. Such cooperation was further 
aided by advances in tactical signal communications, 
including the formation of special command, staff, 
cooperation, and other nets. 
Reserves were committed in concentrated blows to 
exploit successes. The maneuverability of infantry 
was now organized and exploited to the utmo·st; the 
employment of small, mixed teams with heavy fire 
power facilitated infiltration, encirclement, and 
hasty defense. Deep echelon systems were replaced 
by wide frontal formations which promoted better 
lateral control and more flexible maneuverability. 
Artillery became the main striking force of the Red 
Army. The new concept of the "artillery and air 
offensive" embodied the responsibility of the ar-
tillery to coordinate all supporting fire power and 
to provide overwhelming fire power in anticipation 
of infantry requirements. To achieve this goal, 
large numbers of artillery organizations-artillery 
divisions, mortar divisions, antiaircraft artillery di-
visions, artillery brigades, etc-were formed. Di-
rect fire became a normal function of all types of 
artillery. In general, artillery was used with great 
aggressiveness. 
To implement deep mechanized operations, two 
basic types of mobile corps were created: the tank 
corps and the mechanized corps. * The tank corps, 
operating with infantry, had a high proportion of 
tanks and great shock power suitable for penetra-
tions. The mechanized corps, with a large motor-
ized infantry component and fewer tanks, was best 
fitted for exploitation. In addition, some ordinary 
infantry was motorized for special operations; shut-
tling by motor increased the mobility of still other 
units. The cavalry corps, aided by strong armor 
and artillery, retained a major role in special op-
erations. 
Engineers operated in immediate conjunction with 
assault waves, not only breaking gaps through mine-
fields and obstacles, but also providing immediate 
*The Red Army "tank corps" has no U. S. equivalent, but 
approxiJlIatf'~ a U. S. armored division. The "mechanized 
corps" resembles the German Panzer Grenadier Division and 
incorporates both armored and motorized infantry with tanks. 
(See ch. III.) 
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defense of newly won positions. Balanced, power-
ful tactical antiaircraft gun units (12.7-mm, 37-mm, 
and 8S-mm), operating in close coordination with 
friendly fighter aircraft, helped prevent repetition 
of earlier disasters from hostile air action. 
In special operations, the technique of river cross-
ings especially was perfected. Crossings on a wide 
front, powerful artillery suppo~t~ use of improvised 
as well as table-of-organization equipment, and 
rapid construction of timber bridges were character-
IStIC. Tactical surprises such as underwater bridges 
were introduced. Defensive and offensive fighting 
in cities received careful attention. The Soviets 
clearly realized the importance of detailed recon-
naissance, direct-fire artillery, and aggressive and 
rapid action by infantry well equipped with sub-
machine guns and grenades. 
3. TRENDS SINCE STALINGRAD 
The basic tactics of the present Red Army were for-
mulated in 1942 and were revealed for the first 
time in the victory of Stalingrad. 
Following the Stalingrad campaign, modifications 
of Soviet tactics were governed by the need of de-
stroying deep, bitterly defended German positions, 
and by the availability of increasing quantities of 
modern materiel and well trained officers. Conse-
quently, heavy mine-clearing, bridging, and flame-
throwing tanks have been introduced; assault engi-
neer-pioneer brigades have been developed; artil-
TM 30-430 
lery has been reinforced by superheavy equipment; 
and mobile corps have been provided with stronger 
echelons of self-propelled artillery, mortars, and 
rockets. As a result of these measures, operations 
even against powerful positions can progress rapidly. 
At the same time, mobility and flexibility of control 
have increased. Greater motorization and the use of 
ducks and amphibious tanks have speeded opera-
tions. Partial decentralization of control from army 
to infantry corps, has facilitated more rapid re-
actions to unexpected situations. 
A number of future trends are foreseeable at 
present. Undoubtedly, the main patterns of cur-
rent Soviet tactics will continue. But even more 
aggressive tactics may be promoted by light, power-
ful weapons for the infantry-particularly of the 
recoilless type-with such conservative motoriza-
tion as will not reduce maneuverability. Also, im-
provements in engineer equipment may facilitate 
rapid exploitation by mechanized forces. The con-
tinuous dominating role of artillery will probably 
be maintained, especially by coordinated employ-
ment of very long range weapons (V -type) and self-
propelled types. The trend toward decentralization 
of operating control to units of moderate size, such 
as corps, will probably continue. The tendency to-
ward concentrating GHQ units (tanks, artillery, en-
gineers, etc.) into large, specialized organizations 
for commitment in main efforts will, most likely, be 
maintained. 
P ART I. EXERCISE OF COMMAND: COMBINED ARMS 
Section I. THE COMMANDER, THE 
STAFF, AND THE CHIEFS OF ARMS 
AND SERVICES 
1. COMMAND 
The command doctrine of the Red Army is char-
acterized by specific definition of the responsibilities 
of the Commander of Combined Arms, his Chief of 
Staff, the staff, the chiefs of arms and services, and 
command liaison officers. The Commander of Com-
bined Arms is the senior officer of the primary mo-
bile arm-infantry, tanks, or cavalry-in the for-
mation. * He is responsible not only for over-all 
*The Red Army "formation" (Soyedinenye) has no exact 
U. S. equivalelit but approximates a large-scale combat team, 
being a division, brigade, or comparable organization of nor-
mal, reduced, or reinforced strength. A stable, tactical group-
ing of necessary arms anG minimum services, a Red Army 
formation is deSigned to execute one phase of a large opera-
tion, such as a penetration, an exploitation, a delaying action, 
or a counterattack. Hereafter "formation" is used in the 
Soviet sense. 
success or failure, but also for direct personal con-
trol of reconnaissance and operations in critical 
areas and phases of combat. The initial scheme of 
maneuver and the employment of reserves are es-
pecially his responsibilities. 
The Chief of Staff, second in command, is re-
sponsible for all secondary and routine operations. 
The staff assists him in over-all planning, reconnais-
sance, coordination, combat security, signal com-
munications, and supply control of operations. The 
chiefs of arms and services are charged with the de-
tailed planning and supervision of the operations of 
all elements of their arms or services within the 
combat team. They command those elements of 
their arms or services which are not attached to 
subordinate units. 
Command liaison officers are senior officers, often 
members of the staff or chiefs of arms and services, 
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who represent the Commander in controlling opera-
tions along axes of secondary effort (fig. 1). 
2. STAFF OPERATIONS 
Contrary to U. S. practice, the staff in the Red Army 
is an advisory body to the Chief of Staff and not to 
the Commander. With data supplied by the staff, 
the Chief of Staff prepares the estimate of the situa-
tion and makes conclusions and recommendations 
for the approval of the Commander. 
One of the fundamental functions of the staff, 
repeated 1 y stressed in Soviet doctrine, is to organize 
and assure uninterrupted coordination between all 
arms and services throughout all combat phases. 
The staff, chiefs of arms, and commanders of sub-
ordinate and reserve units participate in developing 
coordination, their basic objective being to provide 
continuous and effective artillery, mortar, aviation, 
engineer, and other support for the infantry and 
tanks. 
The staff of a Red Army formation of combined 
arms, down to corps level, consists of the following 
sections: Operations, Intelligence, Signal Com-
munications, Statistical Control, Rear Services, 
Topographic and Headquarters Administration. 
(No Topographic Section is found in the division.) 
Occasionally Training and other special sections are 
added. 
a. Operations Section. The Operations Sec-
tion is the senior section of the staff. Its chief is 
concurrently deputy to the Chief of Staff. He is 
fully informed of the situation at all times; he per-
sonally prepares field orders and the more import-
ant combat reports. 
The Operations Section secures and compiles data 
on the situation, estimates the comparative strength 
of friendly and opposing forces, and prepares field 
orders, operations, summaries, and situation maps. 
It plans coordination between arms, and is therefore 
responsible for all liaison with other units, and for 
the coding service. It directs combat training. It 
is specifically charged with ensuring operational 
security by organizing antitank, antiaircraft, and 
antigas defense; traffic control and camouflage dis-
cipline; and defense of the rear echelon and the 
command post. 
In the Operations Section, the first assistant is 
deputy to the chief of the section and is charged with 
controlling the operations of the subordinate units. 
The second assistant organizes coordination with 
higher headquarters and adjacent units, as well as 
within his own staff. The third assistant is respon-
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sible for all matters pertaining to combat security 
and training. In formations without a chief of the 
air arm, an air subsection is generally maintained 
in the Operations Section. A meteorological sub-
section may also be maintained. 
The Operations Section directly controls the staff 
coding service and the headquarters commandant. 
h. Intelligence Section. The Intelligence Sec-
tion is charged with the planning and preparation 
of orders, and to some extent with the conduct of 
operations pertaining to the collection, evaluation, 
interpretation, and dissemination of information of 
the enemy. Its primary function is to keep the 
Commander, and all others concerned, informed re-
garding the enemy's situation and capabilities. It 
usually includes subsections or teams for order-of-
battle studies and prisoner-of-war interrogation. 
All intelligence is reported by the chief of the sec-
tion to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Opera-
tions Section. 
c· Signal Section. The Signal Section organ-
izes and maintains all necessary signal communi-
cations, and allots signal equipment to troops. It 
assigns radio frequencies and prescribes signal pro· 
cedure. In cooperation with the Operations Sec-
tion, it prepares radio-signal charts and systems of 
transmission, and organizes a time-signal service. 
It also plans, installs, and supervises the aircraft 
warning net; organizes postal and air mail services; 
and operates the message center. Furthermore, it 
conducts signal reconnaissance--particularly inter-
ception of communications and survey of locally 
available facilities. It submits signal summaries as 
necessary. The Chief of the Signal Section also 
commands the signal troops of the formation. 
tl. Topographic Section. The Topographic 
Section gathers and analyzes all terrain data. It or-
ganizes geodetic, topographic, and photogrammetric 
services. providing troops with maps and catalogues 
of benchmarks. The work of the Topographic Sec-
tion is closely linked with the parallel duties of the 
artillery staff, which takes over all topographic 
functions on divisional and lower levels. 
e. Rear Services. Since 1944, the Rear Serv-
ices, Statistical Control, and Headquarters Admin-
istration Sections have normally been removed from 
the staff, and placed under the Deputy Commander 
for Rear Services. 
The Rear Services Section organizes, maintains, 
and provides for the security of rear echelon in-
stallations and lines of supply and evacuation. It 
provides transportation facilities for the timely de-
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livery of supplies in accordance with the polities of 
the Commander and instructions of the Chief of 
Staff. It coordinates transportation, supply, and 
evacuation requirements of the arms and services; 
prepares summaries; and regulates traffic. It re-
quests from higher headquarters the additional fa-
cilities necessary for efficient operation of its in-
stallations, and allots these facilities to subordinate 
units as required. 
The Statistical Control Section deals with per-
sonnel matters, tables of organization and equip-
ment, strength reports, and replacements. It keeps 
records of all personnel, animals, equipment, casual-
ties, captured equipment, and prisoners of war. 
The Headquarters Administration Section keeps 
records, provides quarters and food for headquarters 
personnel, and controls military police and all ad-
ministrative matters pertaining to the formation. 
3. CHIEFS OF ARMS AND SERVICES 
The chiefs of arms and services in a formation of 
combined arms have administrative and planning 
responsibility for all organic and attached units of 
their arms or services. 
They command all such units not attached to sub-
ordinate organizations. As command liaison offi-
cers, they generally supervise the performance of 
key missions within the scope of their arm or serv-
ice. As assistants to the Chief of Staff, they advise 
the Commander on matters pertaining to tactical and 
technical employment of the arms and services. 
Each l:hief of an arm or service develops operations, 
reconnaissance, and rear-area plans for his arm or 
service. In accordance with the requirements and 
within the limits set by the commander, each ini-
tiates requisitions for the procurement of equipment 
and supplies for his particular arm or service within 
the formation. 
In addition to the responsibilities which are com-
mon to the chief of every arm or service, certain 
other responsibilities are specifically allocated. The 
Chief of Artillery is responsible for the organization 
of antitank and antiaircraft defense and for the pro-
curement and distribution of all ammunition. The 
Chief of the Signal Service is responsible for the 
designation of coordination signals. Together with 
the Chief of Staff, he must be present at the announce-
ment of the command decision. Together with the 
Chief of Artillery and the Chief of the Air Service, 
he establishes the aircraft warning service. The 
Chief of Engineers is responsible for camouflage and, 
together with the Chief of Artillery, for antitank de-
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fense. The Chief Chemical Officer is responsible 
for the defense of the entire formation against 
chemical warfare. 
4. LIAISON 
Liaison is handled by the liaison officers' service 
organized by the Chief of Operations under instruc-
tions of the Chief of Staff. In divisional and corps 
headquarters, officer personnel of the Operations 
and the Intelligence Sections are as a rule assigned 
to this task. Liaison duties are divided between 
"command liaison officers" and "liaison officers." 
a. Command liaison officer. A command 
liaison officer is dispatched from a higher com-
mander of his headquarters to a subordinate unit. 
He must be a responsible senior officer (often the 
commander of an arm or a service) authorized by 
the Commander to supervise the execution of a 
combat mission. He is appointed and briefed per-
sonnally by the Commander or the Chief of Staff. 
The principal duties of a command liaison officer 
are to transmit his commander's orders to the sub-
ordinate unit, and to inform his commander of the 
actual situation, condition, and requirements of the 
unit. He must be thoroughly familiar with the 
mission and plan of operations and subsequent 
plans of his commander, which are fully described 
in the card given him personally by the Commander 
or the Chief of Staff. 
Whenever necessary, the command liaison officer 
visits the troops to check on the execution of orders; 
he reports his findings both to his chief of staff and 
to the commander of the subordinate unit. If the 
decision of the subordinate commander is obviously 
inexpedient and threatens to disrupt the general plan 
of action, the command liaison officer must report 
this decision to his own commander before it is 
carried out. 
h. Liaison officer. A liaison officer is an offi-
cer of a subordinate. unit dispatched to a higher 
or a cooperating headquarters. He is dispatched 
by the Chief of the Operations Section, either for 
a definite period of time during a battle, for pur-
poses of exchanging information and of intercom-
munication, or from time to time to carry out 
individual assignments. He remains with the Op. 
erations Section of the higher unit and is subordi-
nate to its chief. He also reports to the Chief 
Signal Officer. 
c. Lateral and support liaison. Liaison be-
tween adjacent units {lateral liaison) is maintained 
as a rule by direct communication. Between a 
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battalion headquarters and a right flank battalion 
a direct telephone line is used, while contact with 
other battalions passes through the regimental 
headquarters. 
Liaison between supporting and supported units, 
if established, is the function of the supporting unit. 
Field artillery habitually establishes liaison with 
supported units for the primary purpose of obtain-
ing information as to the needs for supporting fire. 
For example, liaison is established by direct-support 
artillery battalions with the supported infantry bat-
talions and also with the infantry regiment. 
Section II. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 
1. OBJECTIVES 
The elements of intelligence essential to a command 
decision in the offensive are, according to Red Army 
doctrine, the enemy combat dispositions and feas-
ible approaches to the deep flanks and to the rear 
of the enemy main body. On the defensive, the 
Soviets consider it fundamentally vital to know the 
possible approaches to the main battle position, the 
direction of the enemy main effort, and the location 
and composition of his reserves. In every type of 
operation, precise determination of critical orienta-
tion points is essential for combat coordination. 
2. RESPONSIBILITY 
a. The Commander. On the basis of personal 
reconnaissance of the general situation, supported 
by information supplied by higher headquarters, 
the Commander initiates reconnaissance by advis-
ing his staff, through the Chief of Staff, as to what 
information is required, when it is desired, and what 
units may be employed. During the subsequent 
preparation for battle and during the course of 
battle, the Commander conducts command recon-
naissance and gives additional missions to the re-
connaissance agencies. The Commander is also 
responsible for the continuous training and co-
ordinated employment of the Intelligence Staff and 
intelligence agencies, and for cooper~tion between 
staff sections. 
h. The Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff is 
responsible for carrying out the Commander's orders 
and for initiating necessary reconnaissance in the 
absence of instructions from the Commander. He 
develops the essential elements of information desig-
nated by the Commander, translates these into re-
connaissance missions, combines these missions with 
the directives of the higher headquarters, and per-
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son ally assigns them to the Chief of the Intelligence 
Section. The Chief of Staff designates time limits 
for reporting information. He insists on continu-
ous exchange of information between Intelligence 
and other staff sections. All intelligence plans and 
summaries are signed by the Chief of Staff. 
c. Chief of the Intelligence Section. The 
Chief of the Intelligence Section presents on de-
mand the enemy situation, together with his evalua-
tion of enemy capabilities and the validity of each 
source of information. He supervises the work and 
training of the Intelligence Staff. He is personally 
responsible for dissemination of intelligence to in-
terested officers and headquarters, and for notifying 
the higher and neighboring headquarters of the 
composition, time schedules, and zones of action of 
his reconnaissance units. Jointly with the Chief 
Signal Officer, he prescribes the signal codes for 
reconnaissance units. 
d. Intelligence Staff. The Intelligence Staff, 
under the supervision of the Chief of Intelligence, 
formulates the intelligence and observation plans, 
and evaluates, collates, and disseminates the result-
ing information in periodic and special intelligence 
summaries. The staff also insures maintenance of 
contact and exchange of information with subordi-
nate units, and it is responsible, with the cooperation 
of the Operations Staff, for the establishment and 
functioning of observation and listening posts. 
INTELLIGENCE PLANS. In drawing up all intel-
ligence plans, the following general steps are 
applied: 
Determination of objectives which would 
yield required information. 
Disposition of reconnaissance units accord-
ing to the principle of concentration of 
forces on salient problems. 
Assignment of single specific tasks to each 
reconnaissance unit (further tasks may be 
assigned after the completion of the initial 
one) . 
Installation and maintenance of communica-
tions with the reconnaissance units. 
Maintenance of a reconnaissance reserve to 
replace missing units and to retain opera-
tional flexibility of the intelligence plan. 
The intelligence plan, an operational document of 
headquarters, is approved by the Chief of Staff and 
is not disseminated. Intelligence plans of the spe-
cialized arms and services vary in detail. Every 
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intelligence plan, however, must indicate the fol-
lowing: 
The mission of the formation. 
All available information on the enemy. 
Nature, source, and schedule deadline of 
required information. 
The composition of each reconnaissance unit, 
its mission, and its zone of action. 
Time limits for reports, the route back, and 
the area where prisoners have to be cap-
tured. 
Means of communication with reconnaissance 
units. 
Order of relief of-reconnaissance units. 
The composition, strength, and possible 
tasks of the reconnaissance reserve. 
The observation plan is prepared by the Opera-
tions and Intelligence Staffs. It shows the location 
of each observation post with the sector of respon-
sibility and dead areas. In terrain and weather 
which are unfavorable for observation, the obser-
vation plan is augmented by a "listening plan." 
The Intelligence Staff coordinates its combined 
intelligence plan and the intelligence plans of sub-
ordinate headquarters in accordance with directives 
from higher echelons. For example, the Intelli-
gence Staff Section of an army coordinates the in-
telligence plan of the army and its subordinate units 
(infantry divisions and units of specialized arms 
and services attached to the army) with the intel-
ligence plan of the army group. The chief of in-
telligence of each arm and service coordinates the 
intelligence plans of his own and all subordinate 
staffs with the plan of the formation of which he 
is a part, and with the directives of the next higher 
echelon of his arm or service. For example, the 
chief of intelligence of army engineers coordinates 
the intelligence plans of all engineer units of the 
army in accordance with the directives of the chief 
of engineer intelligence of the army group. This 
plan is then submitted to the Intelligence Staff of 
the army which modifies it in accordance with the 
combined intelligence plan (fig. 2) . 
COMMUNICATIONS. The establishment of signal 
communications with reconnaissance elements is the 
responsibility of intelligence staffs. Each intel-
ligence observation post must have wire communica-
tions with the command post. Radio communica-
tions are established with mobile reconnaissance 
units. In the event of prolonged operations over a 
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sector considerably removed from the command 
post, a forward information collection station is 
established, with reliable wire or radio communi-
cations with the command post. Wide use is made 
of intelligence liaison officers for the collection of 
information and control of reconnaissance patrols. 
e. Information collecting agencies. Intelli-
gence is obtained from higher echelons and from 
neighboring units; raw information is collected in 
the lower echelons through ground reconnaissance, 
air reconnaissance, technical reconnaissance, and 
special agents. 
Ground reconnaissance is carried out by specially 
trained troops which are organic to all units down 
to regiments of combined and specialized arms. Air 
reconnaissance is carried out by observation squad-
rons and by combat aviation. Technical reconnais-
sance-such as sound and flash ranging, radio lo-
cation, and ground photography-is carried out by 
technical troops and by specialized arms and serv-
ices. Special agents, operating in rear areas of the 
enemy, are controlled by armies and higher eche-
Ions; these agents collect information which is 
usually related with strategic tasks. 
In addition to collecting essential elements of in-
formation which are ordered by the Commander or 
the Chief of Staff, the agencies are continuously re-
sponsible for the following: 
Location of concentration areas and the 
number and type of troops which occupy 
them. 
Location of antitank and antipersonnel ob-
stacles and minefields. 
Location of firing points and sectors covered 
by them. 
The system of defense. 
Information on routes and system of supply 
and evacuation. 
Location of flanks and weakly held sectors. 
Capture of prisoners and documents disclos-
ing the groupment and intentions of the 
enemy (sectors in which the prisoners are 
to be captured are often designated by the 
Commander) . 
Information on the condition of terrain and 
road nets which would influence the em-
ployment of technical equipment and 
armor. 
Information indicating probable directions 
of attack, counterattack, and withdrawal. 
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determine the size of the reconnaissance and sup-
porting units. Red Army doctrine emphasizes that 
in organizing reconnaissance in· force too much im-
portance cannot be given to the selection of person-
nel; to thorough planning and coordination of the 
operation; and to detailed rehearsal in daylight and 
at night under conditions similar to those of the 
1 Nov 45 
The establishment of continuous observation is a 
responsibility of all headquarters. During offensive 
operations and reconnaissance in force, command 
observation is mandatory. Observation posts must 
be selected by staff officers, and these posts must have 
independent wire communications with the com-
mand post. An observation diagram showing the 
Figure 5. Plan 0/ reconnaissance in force. 
actual operation by both the reconnaissance and the 
supporting units. Reconnaissance in force must be 
undertaken only if othe~ methods do not produce the 
required results. In addition, the terrain must be 
favorable for surprise, and sufficient time must be 
allowed for thorough preparation and rehearsal. 
Success depends on surprise and originality of action 
rather than on the number of troops employed (figs. 
Sand 6). 
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location, sector of responsibility, and field of vision 
of each observation post is prepared jointly by the 
Intelligence and Operations Staffs. Each observa-
tion post is required to keep a journal and to submit 
an observation report (fig. 7). 
At night and when the terrain and weather inter-
fere with effective observation, observation recon· 
naissance is augmented· by listening reconnaissance. 
Listening posts are selected as carefully as the ohser-
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Figure 6. Execution 0/ reconnaissance in jorce. 
Figure 7. Obse/'1Jation plan. 
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vation posts. They are manned by trained person-
nel who are required to keep a journal and to submit 
a report at the end of their tour. 
b. Reconnaissance by specialized arms and 
services. The general principles of infantry re-
connaissance discussed above hold true for the intel-
ligence and reconnaissance activity of the other arms 
and services. However, each arm and service has 
special forms and techniques of reconnaissance. 
Reconnaissance is initiated by the chiefs of branches, 
and coordinated and controlled by their intelligence 
staffs. Reconnaissance units of specialized arms 
and services operate either independently or with 
reconnaissance units of combined arms. Their ob-
jectives are to determine the quality and strength of 
the technical forces of the enemy, and the factors 
which may affect the employment of friendly tech-
nical troops. 
ARTILLERY RECONNAISSANCE. Artillery recon-
naissance is an integral and specialized part of 
combined reconnaissance. It demands exceptional 
accuracy, timeliness, and continuity. The objectives 
of artillery reconnaissance are the location and anal-
ysis of targets, evaluation of terrain, and the location 
and activity of friendly front lines. Artillery intel-
ligence agencies are grouped into three categories: 
troop, instrumental, and air. 
Troop reconnaissance is a primary responsibility 
of commanders and intelligence sections of artillery 
regiments, groupments, battalions, and batteries. 
Paired battalion observation posts are fully equipped 
with accurate optical instruments. When equipment 
is available, artillery observation posts augment their 
orientation and panoramic sketches with panoramic 
photographs. In addition to observation, artillery 
employs scouting parties which infiltrate behind 
enemy lines to observe targets and control fire. 
Instrumental reconnaissance is conducted by a 
group of small, highly specialized units equipped 
with accurate optical, photographic, sound.ranging, 
meteorological, and other instruments. Sound-
ranging batteries, normally operating in pairs, may 
be employed either in support of large artillery for-
mations, or attached to counterbattery or counter-
mortar groupments. One battery, deployed behind 
the firing line, reconnoiters targets such as medium 
and heavy mortars, and infantry and antitank guns. 
The other battery, deployed on the flanks of the fir-
ing positions, reconnoiters deep targets. The photo-
grammetric battery, attached to army and higher 
echelon artillery staffs, develops and interprets 
V-14 
1 Nov 45 
aerial photographs and coordinates them with 
ground survey data. It controls friendly cam-
ouflage through photographic interpretation; takes, 
develops, and interprets ground photographs; and 
prepares and disseminates map substitutes. At least 
one artillery meteorological post is attached to each 
artillery regiment, groupment, separate battalion, 
and sound-ranging post. It provides the firing bat-
talions and sound-ranging posts with current, local 
meteorological data by ground measurements and 
radiosonde. 
Red Army artillery air reconnaissance closely ap-
proximates standard U. S. practice. Both artillery 
and combat aircraft are used. Outstanding empha-
sis is placed on comprehensive briefing of flying 
personnel, including visits to key ground observa-
tion posts, and on extensive use of air liaison officers. 
ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE. Staff procedure in 
the planning and conduct of engineer reconnaissance 
is the same as that for reconnaissance of combined 
arms except that the regimental engineer, rather than 
a staff officer, is personally responsible for the estab-
lishment of observation posts. 
Engineer reconnaissance has a two-fold purpose: 
to reconnoiter terrain with a view to facilitating the 
movement and employment of friendly troops; and 
to determine the location and nature of enemy engi-
neer construction, with a view to disclosing his sys-
tem of defense. Specific objectives of the first task 
include the following: 
Quantity and condition of local resources 
available for use by engineers. 
Condition and capacity of roads and bridges. 
Supply of drinking water. 
Type of soil. 
Possible location of observation posts, de-
fensive constructions, and means for cam-
ouflage. 
Specific objectives of the second task include: 
The location, type, and camouflage of enemy 
defensive installation. 
Demolitions, antipersonnel~ and antitank ob-
stacles and minefields. 
Nature of engineer construction in progress. 
Safe avenues of approach to enemy positions. 
Engineer reconnaissance is conducted by recon-
naissance patrols, by observation, by interpretation 
of ground and air photographs, by study of topo-
graphic, geological, and hydrographic maps, and by 
interrogation of prisoners. 
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ARMORED AND MOTORIZED RECONNAISSANCE. In 
all armored and motorized units it is mandatory 
that command reconnaissance be mede of all areas 
in which armor may be employed; also, a group of 
engineers must accompany each armored patrol. 
Because the employment of armored and motorized 
units is affected by terrain, especially in winter, the 
attention of intelligence staffs and reconnaissance 
units is concentrated on terrain, soil, roads, and 
bridges which are likely to be used during approach, 
deployment, and battle. In this connection, friendly 
as well as enemy minefields and antitank obstacles 
receive special attention. During the course of bat-
tle, or on the march, mobile observation posts are 
established with radio communications to the com-
mand post. Communications between the command 
posts and armored reconnaissance patrols are almost 
exclusively by radio. In preparation for a break-
through of a fortified position, foot reconnaissance 
patrols of armored units operate independently or as 
parts of combined reconnaissance. 
SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE. Signal intelligence is 
charged with gathering information about the enemy 
and about existing military or civil signal communi-
cations in the region of prospective operations. Sig-
nal headquarters of armies and higher echelons are 
provided with technical means for collecting signal 
intelligence of the enemy, including radio-intercept 
and radio-direction-finding units. In static situa-
tions, lower echelons monitor enemy radio nets, and 
signal patrols endeavor to tap enemy wire nets. 
Utilization of local signal equipment is considered 
in every signal plan, and it is the responsibility of 
the intelligence section of the signal staff to organize 
reconnaissance of existing facilities for signal com-
munications. Specific objectives of this type of 
reconnaissance are centers of communications, tele-
phone and telegraph lines, and other equipment. 
Estimates are made of equipment and time needed 
to make it usable; extent of demolitions and sabotage 
are determined; and measures are formulated to pro-
tect signal equipment from enemy agents and the 
local population. In connection with signal liaison 
service, signal reconnaissance investigates the con-
dition of existing landing strips and possible sites 
for new ones. 
AIR RECONNAISSANCE. The two principal func-
tions of air reconnaissance are aerial photography 
and obsenation. Air observation is carried out by 
special observation planes and by combat planes. It 
is organized by the air arm commander either inde-
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pendently or at the request of ground units. Obser-
vation missions are often coupled with photographic 
mISSIOns. Communications are established so that 
radio messages from air observers are received 
simultaneously by the air intelligence staff, the air-
drome of the observation squadron, and headquar-
ters of all supported formations down to and includ-
ing corps. Some of the objectives of air observation 
include: 
Areas where the enemy is retreating. 
Directions of enemy attack or withdrawal. 
Phase lines reached by friendly troops. 
Signs of regrouping of the enemy in his rear 
areas. 
Control of friendly camouflage. 
The work of air photoreconnaissance is closely 
integrated with photo-interpretation and topographic 
serVIces. Results of photoreconnaissance are inter-
preted and entered on topographic maps at the head-
quarters of each reconnaissance squadron. This in-
formation is then sent to the topographic service of 
the army group, where it is evaluated and repro-
duced on maps and map substitutes for the use of 
ground formations and units. Special overlays con-
taining a specific type of 1nformation-such as 
enemy defenses, artillery positions, or command 
posts-are prepared for the use of the general and 
special staffs. Ground photo-panoramas are supple-
mented with vertical and oblique stereopairs. Ar-
tillery units are given special distribution which, in 
major operations, includes firing battalions. 
SPECIAL SERVICE RECONNAISSANCE. In addition 
to the reconnaissance agencies of the arms and serv-
ices, the Red Army employs several specialized serv-
ices which perform reconnaissance tasks beyond the 
scope of technical units of combat troops. The re-
connaissance parties of these special services check 
existing topographical, hydrographical, geological, 
meteorological, and soil survey data with actual con-
ditions; and prepare, reproduce, and disseminate the 
resulting intelligence by means of standard and 
special maps, studies, and surveys. For example, 
the photogrammetric service develops and interprets 
aerial photographs and coordinates them with 
ground survey data. The military topographic serv-
ice prepares, reproduces, and disseminates standard 
and special maps such as tank, mortar, visibility, 
river-crossing, and mountain march maps. The 
hydro-meteorological service prepares hydrographic 
maps and long-range weather forecasts. The geo-
logical service makes soil surveys. 
V-IS 
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4. EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED PERSONNEL 
AND MATERIEL 
a. Prisoners of war. In Soviet reconnais-
sance, the capture of prisoners plays such a promi-
nent part that commanders often specify in their 
reconnaissance directives the sectors from which 
prisoners are to be taken. Detailed instructions for 
processing prisoners are found in all handbooks 
issued to the various arms and services. 
Standard operating procedure for handling prison-
ers of war is as follows: Prisoners are grouped ac-
cording to their unit, officers being separated from 
enlisted men. Prisoners are conducted as soon as 
possible to the next higher headquarters, where each 
prisoner is interrogated alone; each echelon limits 
interrogations to subjec~ of immediate interest. 
Results of each interrogation are entered on a spe-
cial form which accompanies each prisoner, and 
results of interrogations are forwarded to the next 
higher headquarters regardless of the final destina-
tion of the prisoners. Whenever possible, the in-
terrogating officer is of the same arm or service as 
the prisoner; in regimental and higher echelons, 
prisoners of a particular arm or service are ques-
tioned by the chief of the intelligence section of the 
corresponding arm or service. 
h. Captured documents. All Red Army re-
connaissance personnel are impressed with the 
importance of documents found in areas occupied 
or recently vacated by the enemy. Document exploi-
tation in the lower echelons follows the same pro-
cedure as that applied to the interrogation of 
prisoners. Each headquarters extracts applicable 
information immediately and then forwards the 
documents to the next higher echelon. At the army 
level and higher, thorough classification and study 
of the documents are made by a special staff of the 
Information Section of the Intelligence Staff. 
c. Captured materiel. Captured enemy arms 
and equipment are collected by the headquarters 
section of the formation or by a special detail ap-
pointed by the Commander. The collected materiel 
is studied by the technical intelligence sections of the 
army and higher echelons. Primary tests, such as 
armor penetration, are undertaken in the forward 
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area by locally available technical officers. All per-
sonnel are taught to report the performance and 
employment of new enemy weapons and equipment. 
d. Reports. Reports from intelligence agencies 
are collected through the intelligence channels, but 
intelligence is generally disseminated through the 
operations sections of the various staffs. 
Reconnaissance reports are submitted by each re-
connaissance unit, and must indicate the following: 
Addressee (surname of the Commander 
only) , location of the reconnaissance unit, 
and time of the message. 
Information on the strength, location, and 
activities of the enemy. 
Information on the terrain. 
Other pertinent information such as casual-
ties and prisoners. 
Future action of the patrol, number of the 
message, and signature. 
Observation reports are submitted by the com-
mander of each observation post. They include the 
number of the post; names of the observers; and 
the time, date, azimuth, and range of each significant 
item observed. Reports may be given as a summary, 
as a plane or panoramic sketch, or as a combination 
of the two (figs. 8 and 9) . 
Intelligence summaries may be periodic or special. 
They are authenticated by the Intelligence Officer 
and by the Chief of Staff, and disseminated to the 
higher, subordinate, and neighboring headquarters. 
Intelligence summaries must include the following: 
General nature of enemy activities. 
Disposition of the enemy from right to left, 
accompanied by sources and time of the 
information. 
Enemy air activity. 
Information on the enemy rear areas as dis-
closed by air reconnaissance, prisoner-of-
war statements, and other reports. 
Conclusions as to the significance of the 
enemy's actions. 
A list of items of information which should 
be verified or clarified, and the means by 
which this could be accomplished. 
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Figure 8. Observation report. 
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Figure 9. Observation report combined with panoramic sketch. 
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Section III. BASIC TYPES OF 
TACTICAL PLANS 
In Soviet practice, the forms of maneuver and 
organization of operations consistently follow Ii lim-
ited number of hasic patterns; the infantry offen~ive, 
the tank and mechanized offensive, the meeting en-
gagement, the pursuit, the centralized and decentral-
ized defense, the mobile defense of mechanized 
forces, the withdrawal, and the disengagement from 
encirclement. 
1. mE INFANTRY on'ENSIVE 
The Soviet infantry offensive is made by infantry 
supported by artillery, tanks, engineers, and aviation 
as the situatiotI demands. It is generally in the 
form of simultaneous attacks on a broad front with 
concentrations of artillery and, particularly, tanks 
in the break-through area. The attack seeks to 
penetrate the enemy defenses in two or more sectors 
and converge on a limited objective; its mission is to 
encircle or envelop enemy groupings and destroy 
them hy simultaneous attacks from all directions. 
This scheme of maneuver is fundamental for the of· 
fensive operations of units of every size from the 
platoon to the army group_ 
A typical plan of attack (fig. 10) is formulated in 
the following manner: 
Mi.'sian; To destroy enemy forces which are 
guarding tbe approaches to communica-
tion center X_ 
F orees availtlble: Nth Infantry- Di-I.ision. 
Ellemy forces; Two infantry regiments and 
two artillery regiments. 
Plan of maneU'ller; lst Regiment to advance 
to Ohjective A through breach made by the 
neighhoring division. 2d Rf'giment, us-
ing the same breach, to advance to Objec-
tive B, leaving one battalioll to deal with 
points of resistance C and D. lst Bat-
talion, 3d Regiment to penetrate enemy 
defenses and join 2d Reghneut at Objective 
C. Provide flank security for 2d Regi-
ment. 3d Battalion, 3d Regiment to pen-
etrate enemy defenses and join 2d Regi-
ment at Objective E, 2d Battalion, 3d 
Regiment to penetrate enemy defenses and 
join 1st Regiment at Objective A, 
SOVlet offensive theory stresses the importance of 
combined or coordinated operations. Supporting 
arms are usually uude-r the senior commander of 
that ann until such time as the predetermined phase 
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in the combat plan directs subordination of the sup-
porting arms directly under the command of the 
supported unit. Coordinated attacks are planned 
and rehearsea with the utmost care, and great atten-
tion is given to the smallest details. Daring and 
initiative on the part of small!"r unit commanders is 
imperative. 
In the offensive, a given situation may call for 
certain types of specially trained troops, In cases 
where columns of tanks make an assault of a fortif1€'d 
position, spe<:ial detachments .of combat engineers, 
thoroughly trained for their particular assignment, 
may be used to facilitate the assault or may even be 
assigned a combat mission such as seizing and se-
curing bridges and water crossings. 
Soviet tactical practice prescribes the use of liTI(~, 
wedge, inverted wedge, or echeloned arrangement of 
forces in the attack. Except for special operations, 
such as assault ot a fortified position, columns will 
1I0t be u:>cd. Normally, in preparation for a pene-
tration, attacking forces are placed well forward, 
while mobile units used for the purpDse of exploita-
tion of a penetration afe brought up from the rear, 
To utilize maximum shOCK power, the Red Army 
normally limits the uncommitted reserves to one-
ninth of the infantry combat strength_ On difficult 
terrain this may be increased up to one-sixth. 
Offensive operations are accomplished in five dis-
tinct phases: 
a. Concentration of forces. This phase is 
characterized by intensive r~onnaissance and ob-
servation, secret concentration and l'egroupment, 
elaborate rehearsals, and deception. Detailed recon-
naissance is conducted by units which are alreadv 
in line, and is combined with command reconnai~­
sauce by units designated for the break· through, 
In the final stages of preparation, reconnaissance in 
force is conducted in several sectors, At times, re-
connaissance is staged to resemble a major offensive 
ill order to deceive the enemy as to the real direc-
tion of attack and to throw him off balance. 
ConccntratiDn and rf'.{7oupment of forces is ac· 
complished with great secrecy. Elaborate precau-
tions are taken to prepare in advance camouflaged 
dispersal areas for troops, especially armor and ar-
tillery. Units are grouped according to the tactical 
plan, and further suhdivided into teams, one team for 
each ohjective. These teams stage day and night 
rehearsals over ground which has been specially pre-
pared to resemble that of the contemplated break4 
flu-ough. Artillery fire is rigidly controlled and is 
limjted to the minimum consistent with antiaircraft 
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Figure 10. The coordinated attack-Soviet tactical concept. 
and counter battery defense requirements. Fire is 
conducted only by duty and roving batteries. 
Meanwhile staffs, often augmented by special 
teams from General Headquarters (Stavka Gl.avnogo 
V-20 
Komanduishchego) , prepare field orders, artillery 
fire plans, tables of combat coordination, and other 
necessary papers. If the Commander judges that 
the troops and staffs are not sufficiently well prepared 
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for the operation, he prescribes a special trammg 
schedule which may extend over the preparatory 
period. Soviet preparation for an assault of pre-
pared positions is deliberate, extending from several 
days to 6 or 10 weeks depending on the caliber of 
enemy resistance and the state of preparedness of the 
assault troops. 
h. Fire preparation. In the second phase, the 
air forces seek to isolate the enemy by destroying his 
communication lines. Artillery undertakes the de-
struction of located fire positions. Finally, every 
available weapon, centralized under one command, 
concentrates a brief but extremely violent barrage 
immediately preceding the assault. 
c. The assault. In the assault phase of the 
break-through or penetration, artillery is allotted to 
the various assault teams for direct support. Move-
ment of units and fire of supporting arms are con-
trolled on the initiative of local commanders. Ar-
tillery must observe the movement of supported units, 
executing firing missions on the request of assault 
team commanders or according to tables of combat 
coordination. 
In order to maintain continuous control, the over-
all commander must observe the movement of units, 
especially in the decisive direction. Command liai-
son officers are delegated to supervise the execution 
of the assault in secondary directions and to transmit 
changes in combat plans which necessitate changes 
in tables of combat coordination. 
d. Securing the offensive. After the objec-
tive in the enemy's rear has been reached, the at-
tacking units consolidate their positions, secure their 
flanks against counterattacks, and prepare for the 
exploitation of the penetration. For example, in an 
attack made by tanks, combat engineers are used 
for the special purpose of protecting the tanks from 
counterattack by throwing out contact and controlled 
mines at the moment the assault is stalled or other-
wise stopped for consolidation or regrouping. After 
regrouping or repelling a counterattack, the tanks 
continue the attack, passing over the areas covered 
by controlled mines. The mines are picked up and 
the operation is repeated at the next forward limit 
of the advance. 
e. Exploitation. Mobile formations pas s 
through the gap in parallel columns, pursuing the 
enemy. Motorized light artillery, engineers, and 
infantry from the assault units are attached to them 
as needed and available. The remaining infantry 
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units attack encircled enemy forces, continuing also 
to provide flank security. Air and artillery units 
reinforce the fire of self-propelled and mobile artil-
lery on call from mobile formations striking in the 
enemy rear. On call from the infantry, they destroy 
encircled enemy remnants. Calculated risks are 
taken to secure bridgeheads and commanding ter-
rain and to prevent the enemy from organizing a 
defense on intermediate positions. 
2. THE TANK OFFENSIVE 
A frontal attack by tank forces, normally a tank 
corps, differs from the coordinated assault of infan-
try with supporting arms. Tanks attack in deeply 
echeloned formation on a narrow sector, using their 
fire and shock power to achieve penetration. Re-
sistance is by-passed in order to avoid full deploy-
ment and protracted local combat. Infantry and 
artillery mop up enemy strong points and provide 
flank security for the tank unit against enemy coun-
terattack. The tank forces are assigned specific 
terrain objectives in the enemy rear rather than 
mission-type orders. 
The tank forces themselves cannot hold territory, 
but must rely upon the following infantry and, some-
times, cavalry. Tank units destroy enemy rear instal-
lations and supply lines, and attempt to encircle and 
destroy the enemy by coordinating their penetration 
with adjacent units in a wide turning maneuver or 
by a double envelopment by two converging tank 
penetrations (fig. II). 
3. MEETING ENGAGEMENT 
In general, Soviet and U. S. doctrines as to meeting 
engagements are virtually identical (fig. 12). Spe-
cifically, however, certain differences may be noted. 
According to Soviet doctrine, speed of maneuver, 
seizure of favorable terrain, and quick deployment 
of main forces and artillery upon contact are essen-
tial. Aggressive reconnaissance, ground and air, is 
continual throughout the operation. Usually, a 
strong advance guard is utilized. An attack upon 
the flank is sought. The fullest use of artillery at 
the earliest possible moment is made. The advance 
guard uses its organic artillery support to stall the 
forward movement of the enemy in order to enable 
the artillery of the main forces to be brought to bear 
on enemy firing positions. In one case in an op-
eration northwest of Orel, artillery was brought into 
direct fire action from the march. 
Soviet doctrine states that the speed of deployment 
by artillery units decides the outcome of the battle. 
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Figure 11. Bobruisk encirclement by large tank unit. 
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Figure 12. Meeting engagement, showing scheme of deployment of the point, advance party, and main body when 
contact with enemy occurs. 
4. PURSUIT 
The Red Army, as a general rule, pursues the enemy 
in a double parallel column, usually by mechanized 
units closely followed by infantry. Great care must 
be taken by the Commander in organizing for the 
pursuit; his planning should be detailed, but speed 
in this is essential. 
A typical pursuit plan (fig. 13) includes the fol-
lowing elements: 
Mission: To destroy retreating groups and 
advancing reinforcements of the enemy, 
and to leave small groups to block ave-
nues of escape of by-passed enemy garri-
sons. 
Forces available: Two tank brigades and 
one motorized brigade with supporting 
units. 
Enemy forces: Advancing reinforcements, 
retreating groups, and by-passed garrisons. 
Plan of maneuver: Group to advance in two 
parallel columns, a tank and a motorized 
brigade on the right, and a tank brigade on 
the left. Right column to exploit the 
break-through along the road T-R, to en-
velop S from south and southwest, to block 
advance of reinforcements from the north. 
Left column to exploit the break-through 
along the road I-L-S, to assist in the cap-
ture of S. The group to continue the ad-
vance to O. 
The Soviets seek decisive combat with the main 
retreating forces, avoiding direct contact with enemy 
rear guards or other special units charged with the 
mission of slowing down the pursuit. When strong-
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Figure 13. Pursuit. 
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points are found to be impeding forward progress 
of the pur~uing forces, these points are by-passed 
and detachments of assault troops are assigned to 
surround and to destroy them. 
Extensive use is made of engineers to facilitate the 
forward movement of the pursuing forces. Engi-
neers clear enemy mines and other obstacles from 
the avenues of approach and mobilize the local popu-
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lery, and antiaircraft-so as to be able to withstand. 
absorb, or shatter mass attacks by enemy infantry 
supported by tanks, artillery, and aviation. 
The use of reserves in the Soviet defense varies, 
depending on the type of defense, terrain, and ob-
jective. Usually the Soviets concentrate the over-
whelming bulk of a unit's strength on the main line 
of resistance. The reserve is limited to appro xi-
Figure 14. Centralized defense for destroying the attacking enemy, using massed artillery and counterattacks. 
lation for constructing and rebuilding rpads and 
bridges. 
5. DEFENSE 
The strength of Red Army defensive tactics lies in 
the determination of the troops, coordination of all 
types of fire with all systems of antitank and anti-
personnel fortifications and obstacles, skillful or-
ganization of the ground, and decisive counter-
attacks. 
The defense should be deep-antitank, antiartil-
mately one-ninth of the total combat strength. In 
certain situations, however, when decisive results can 
be gained, an extremely large mobile reserve is 
maintained. A tank corps, for instance, may act as 
a reserve for an infantry division. Such a tank unit 
is kept concealed well in the rear, with careful prepa-
ration made to facilitate its rapid commitment on 
the flank of the attacking force. 
Depending on the situation, the Commander's ob-
j ective, and available forces, the defense may be 
either centralized or decentralized. 
V-25 
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a. Centralized defense. The centralized type 
of defense seeks, by employing obstacles or by 
maneuver, to channelize the enemy attack in a given 
direction in order to gain a more favorable position 
for a decisive counterattack with heavily armored 
units and concentrations of massed artillery (fig. 
14). Dummy positions and false fortifications are 
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takes position for close all· around protection. Fa-
vorable terrain is sought for the development and 
fortification of strongpoints and islands of resist-
ance. Each unit uses its assigned artillery and other 
organic weapons for its own protection. In decen-
tralized defense, strongpoints and islands of resist-
ance frequently will be surrounded or cut off from 
Figure 15. Decentralized defense for denying terrain to superior enemy forces by strongpoints with close·in, all· 
around defense. 
used extensively. A favorite Soviet maneuver is to 
allow the enemy to penetrate deeply into the lines 
and trap him in a fire sack. The counterattack takes 
the form of a large-scale ambush on the deep flank, 
the counterattacking units being supported by 
massed, registered artillery. The counterattack is 
under the direct control of the over-all troop com-
mander. The mission of this type of defense is 
destruction of the enemy. 
h. Decentralized defense. The objectives of 
decentralized defense are to deny the enemy use of 
terrain, to divide his attacking forces, and to destroy 
him by numerous local counterattacks on the initia-
tive of the local ground commander (fig. 15). In 
this type of defense each unit down to the smallest 
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other friendly troops. Only on specific orders from 
the senior troop commander is the position aban-
doned. This particular type of defense is especially 
effective against tanks and mechanized units. 
c. Defense hy cavalry and mechanized 
forces. Mobile forces may assume either decen-
tralized or centralized defensive positions. But, in 
order to retain the advantages of their mobility, they 
usually adopt more elastic tactics, particularly in 
terrain affording good concealment. 
Avenues of approach are covered frontally by 
artillery and infantry (dismounted cavalry) road 
blocks. Other small groups, usually including self-
propelled tank destroyers, prepare flanking positions 
to ambush enemy mechanized units. Finally, a pow-
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erful mobile reserve is held out with the mission of 
counterattacking the deep flank or rear of the forces 
stopped by the road block. 
In general, this type of defense seeks to trap and 
destroy advancing enemy columns successively. In 
the face of a coordinated attack which threatens to 
destroy the road block and expose the rear of the 
mobile reserve, a withdrawal is executed to the next 
favorable position. 
6. WITHDRAWALS 
Retrograde movements are not heavily stressed in 
Red Army tactics; regulations state that a disengage-
ment will be undertaken only on direct order from 
higher authority. The techniques of retrograde 
movement employed in day and night operations are 
virtually identical with those of the U. S. Army. 
7. DISENGAGEMENT FROM ENCIRCLEMENT 
In 1941 and 1942, the Red Army suffered heavy 
casualties due to encirclements of large units by Ger-
man forces. As a result, specific procedures in dis-
engagement from encirclement were incorporated in 
Red Army tactics. 
When any unit is in danger of encirclement, the 
Commander designates troops to secure the flanks 
and rear, and then counterattacks in order to stall 
the enemy. Additional tactical measures to be taken 
include holding fa:vorable terrain along the enemy 
approach routes, designating strong detachments 
with antitank weapons to threaten enemy flanks, co-
ordinating his efforts with adjacent friendly units, 
closely supervising the expenditure of ammunition 
and other supplies, and locating and holding terrain 
favorable for supply by air. 
When encircled, the Commander insures all-
around defense, making especially sure that his 
forces are not under direct artillery fire. He is 
careful to conserve his strength, and makes sure that 
the hostile force does not destroy him by dividing 
his forces. He places the artillery at the most stra-
tegic positions, guarding approaches, vulnerable 
areas, and sectors of probable attacks. He insures 
signal communication with higher headquarters. 
The Soviets emphasize that even though a unit is 
encircled, the Commander is required to accomplish 
his mission. The disengagement from encirclement 
is undertaken only on specific orders from higher 
authority. 
Disengagement from encirclement aims at the 
penetration of a given sector of the enemy circle 
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and the retirement of the unit under great pressure 
from a numerically superior hostile force. Periods 
of impaired visibility-night, fog, rain, snow-
storms-are the most favorable periods for this 
maneuver. Prior to undertaking the operation, the 
Commander should determine the general situation 
and disposition of neighboring friendly units and 
partisan detachments. By aggressive use of recon-
naissance he determines enemy strength and group-
ings. He insures great secrecy in making prepara-
tions for the disengagement. Planning must be 
detailed and thorough, since disengagement from 
encirclement is considered the most difficult of oper-
ations. The more direct the maneuver, the fewer 
are the casualties. 
The general rules for an assault are followed in a 
daytime attempt to break out of encirclement. Ar-
tillery fire in preparation for the assault is excep-
tionally heavy. At night, however, the technique 
differs. The advance to the line of departure is 
made under the strictest secrecy. A large portion 
of the artillery moves in the infantry column; the 
chief offensive weapons are the bayonet and hand 
grenades. Rifle fire is used only when resistance is 
encountered. 
Having made the penetration, the general rules 
covering retirement prevail. Counterattacks by 
rear-guard units, security against parallel pursuit, 
and, if possible, tank attacks at the enemy rear, are 
prescribed. 
The Soviets recognize that disengagements from 
encirclement are unsuccessful in many cases. When 
all hope of success has been abandoned, an order may 
be issued by competent authority to infiltrate through 
the enemy lines by small units, taking care that no 
materiel falls into enemy hands. Surrenders en 
masse or by individuals, except when wounded, are 
expressly forbidden. Infiltration parties are in-
structed to join or form partisan detachments in the 
enemy rear. 
Section IV. TACTICAL STAFF 
DOCUMENTS 
1. GENERAL 
Translation of broad command decisions into spe-
cific, coordinated troop actions requires the prepara-
tion of a large series of staff documents. In Red 
Army practice, such paper work is concentrated pri-
marily in the army; it is also especially necessary 
for the efficient performance of the technical arms 
and services, such as artillery (fig. 16). In con-
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trast, documentation in infantry and cavalry units 
is held to a minimum. Those arms never issue for-
mal written orders below divisional level, but make 
maximum use of oral orders, overlays, and frag-
mentary orders. 
Tactical field documents are divided into two 
classes: those disseminated for action or informa-
tion, and those prepared for the use of the issuing 
headquarters only. The first class includes field 
orders, fragmentary and warning orders, adminis-
trative orders, summaries (intelligence, rear services, 
signal, operational I , instructions, replies, and in-
quiries. 
The second class includes orders and summaries 
of higher headquarters; general, special, and pre-
liminary orders and directives pertaining to the 
work of the headquarters itself; copies of field or-
ders and summaries of subordinate headquarters; 
and journals with attached documents and copies of 
conversations. A journal of field operations is kept 
separately. 
2. FIELD ORDERS 
U. S. Army and Soviet field orders are basically 
similar. The Soviet field order consists of the fol-
lowing: 
Disposition and activities of enemy forces. 
Missions of own unit and of adjoining units, 
and boundaries. 
Command decision. 
Special missions of principal subordinate 
units. 
Missions and attachments of arms, services, 
and special units which are controlled by 
the Commander. 
Location of the service area. 
Location and order of displacement of the 
command post, axis of signal communica-
tion. 
Time sequence of reports in relation to each 
phase of combat. 
The field order is authenticated by the Chief of Staff 
and may be countersigned by the Commander. 
Tables of combat coordination constitute the basic 
annexes to the Soviet field order. They contain 
time and space schedules for active cooperation be-
tween each arm during the various phases of combat 
operations; critical reference points for assembly 
areas and control of fire; schedules for forward dis-
placement of artillery units; and coordination of 
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signal communications between the arms. For ex-
ample, an offensive of an infantry division may be 
supported by additional artillery and tanks. The 
tables of combat coordination for such an operation 
would show which artillery and tank units would 
operate under centralized control and which would 
be attached to an infantry unit for direct support 
during the first and subsequent phases. The tables 
would indicate whether the phase lines are deter-
mined by time schedule or by terrain features, and 
would designate the signals to be used for the start 
of each phase. 
The plan of coordination between artillery and 
aviation, one of the most important tables of combat 
coordination, anticipates immediate infantry require-
ments and includes the organization of a unified sys-
tem of fire preparation, support, and security of in-
fantry maneuver. The artillery-aviation plan is de-
veloped according to time, space, and targets by the 
staffs of artillery and aviation. It is signed by the 
Chief of Staff, Chief of Artillery, and Chief of the 
Air Arm, and is confirmed by the commanders of the 
cooperating units (fig. 17). 
3. SPECIALIZED PLANS AND ORDERS 
The staff of the chief of each arm prepares specific 
plans and field orders which are forwarded to the 
lower echelon of that arm, after approval by the 
Commander of Combined Arms. 
The artillery order is based on the artillery fire 
plan developed under the direction of the highest 
artillery commander engaged in the offensive opera-
tion (army or army group). Consisting of a bI ief 
text and annexed operational documents, it includes: 
Information of the enemy. 
Missions and boundaries of neighboring 
units. 
Mission of the supported unit (infantry, 
tanks, etc.) and of cooperating units (air, 
engineers, etc.). 
Combat groupments of artillery, instrumen-
tal reconnaissance, and attached aviation 
( including missions, position areas and 
observation sectors, and primary and 
emergency sectors of fire) . 
Time of readiness for opening fire. 
Duration of registration. 
Ammunition allowances. 
Location of command post and axis of signal 
communications. 
Location of supply points. 
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The engineer plan includes missions assigned to 
each unit during progressive combat phases; assign-
ment of engineer personnel and allocation of mate-
riel; time schedules; division of responsibilities; 
and individual missions executed by order of the 
chief engineer (army or army group). 
4. FRAGMENTARY AND ORAL ORDERS 
Fragmentary orders are used when speed in deliv-
ery and execution is imperative. These orders are 
issued successively as the situation develops. They 
consist of separate instructions to one or more sub-
ordinate units prescribing the task each is to accom-
plish in the operation or in the separate phases of 
the operation. 
5. REPORTS AND SUMMARIES 
Reports are classified as periodic reports and field 
reports. The schedule of reports, prepared by the 
Chief Sigpal Officer in cooperation with the Chief 
of Operations, is approved by the Chief of Staff. 
Field reports are promptly submitted on the in-
itiative of the subordinate commanders or of head-
quarters. Signed by the Commander and the Chief 
of Staff, they include: 
All operations taking place on the ground and 
in the air. 
Location and condition of the troops. 
Intensity and outcome of the engagement. 
New information about the enemy. 
Enemy strength, technical equipment, and 
activities. 
Decisions of the Commander with reference to 
the situation. 
Summaries are submitted at fixed times and give 
an account of events which have occurred since the 
last summary was sent out. Summaries are classi-
fied as operations, intelligence, rear area, and signal 
summaries. The operations summary is prepared 
by the Operations Staff and is signed by the Chief of 
the Operations Section and by the Chief of Staff. It 
contains the following information: 
Ground and air operations and changes that 
have occurred in the situation since the 
last summary was forwarded. 
Nature of combat operations carried out by 
subordinate units. 
Condition of units, losses, and their present 
combat efficiency. 
Captured materiel. 
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General nature of the situation and enemy 
action. 
Activities of Soviet air force. 
Soviet front line. 
Adj acent units and supporting troops. 
Communications, weather, visibility, and con-
dition of roads. 
Location of command posts. 
The intelligence summary is prepared by the In-
telligence Section and is signed by the Chief of Staff 
and the Chief of the Intelligence Section. 
Rear service summaries must give a clear account 
of the condition of the rear services. Signed by the 
Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Rear Services Sec-
tion, they contain the following information: 
Location of supply stations. 
Transportation and evacuation roads (if 
changes have taken place). 
Status of transportation. 
Equipment shortages. 
Status of evacuation (men and animals). 
Amount of ammunition and fuel on hand. 
Food and fodder in daily rations, reserve sup-
ply on hand or in transit. 
Local resources and how they can be used. 
Medical and veterinary situation in rear dis-
tricts. 
General conclusions. 
Signal summaries are prepared by the Signal 
Section and are signed by the Chief of Staff and the 
Chief Signal Officers. They provide the following 
information: 
Equipment available. 
Types and requirements for signal com-
munications between the command post, 
subordinate units, and the staff (com-
manders) • 
Requirements for signal communications be-
tween chiefs of arms and the commanders 
of directly subordinated units. 
Requirements for signal communications for 
coordination between subordinated units 
and the various a::-ms and between the sec-
ond echelon of the staff, the command post, 
and rear units. 
Organization of the air warning system, with 
indications of the location of posts and 
the method of communication between 
them. 
Signal equipment reserve and its location. 
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Copies of summaries and reports are forwarded 
for the information of subordinate and adjoining 
units. In urgent cases, special conversations may 
be conducted over the telephone personally, or 
through liaison officers. 
6. CODING SERVICE AND HANDLING OF DOCU· 
MENTS 
Responsibility for organization of the coding serv-
ice in the field is assumed by the Commander and 
the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff organizes the 
coding service in the field through the Chief of the 
Operations Section. The latter selects the Com-
mander's code keys, the conversation chart, map 
coding orientation points, and time of change. He 
controls the functioning of the coding service at his 
and subordinate headquarters. 
Conversations concerning operations cannot be 
sent in the clear. Field orders and reports on de-
cisions, from division and higher, may be trans-
mitted by radio, in code, only if no other means of 
communication is possible. Violations may be 
made the basis of a court martial for disclosing mili-
tary secrets. Clear text by radio is permitted in ar-
tillery to direct fire; in aviation, to transmit field 
orders in flight or, in case of forced landings~ to re-
port damage, when time does not permit use of code; 
and in the tank corps, to transmit field orders dur-
ing combat. In all clear text messages, unit num-
bers are referred to --by previously established code 
names. 
Before opening a radio conversation, an officer 
must have at hand a coded situation map, a code 
conversation chart, radio-signal chart, pad of entry 
forms, pencil, compass, and watch. Conversation 
opens with the calling party stating his code name. 
Field documents are divided into groups, based on 
urgency, as follows: 
Group "G." Documents requiring immediate 
dispatch, urgent or operational priority. Field or-
ders are always included in Group "G." The Com-
mander and the Chief of Staff are the only persons 
who may classify documents as Group "G." 
Group "K." Documents which are to be opened 
and read by the addressee only. Such documents 
are received and dispatched personally by the Com-
mander and the Chief of Staff and are forwarded 
",.-ith the same priority as those in Group "G." 
Group "B." All operational field documents, or-
ders, and reports pertaining to combat organization 
and security. On these documents~ group designa-
tion, time of delivery, and addressee are indicated. 
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Group "B" classification may be designated by an 
chiefs of sections at headquarters and the chiefs of 
arms and services. 
All other documents bear no group designation 
and are forwarded by air and field mail. 
Section V. COORDINATION AND 
CONTROL OF COMBAT 
1. GENERAL 
The Operations Section of the staff is responsible for 
the uninterrupted coordination of arms during com-
bat, and for the organization of signal communica-
tions and liaison to insure this. Upon receipt of the 
mission, coordination of all arms is obtained by 
tables of combat coordination which are developed 
by the Operations Section together with the chiefs 
of arms. The main tactical controls-forward posi-
tions, artillery positions, line of departure, and bar-
rage phase lines-are determined. The exact time 
schedule, missions, and areas of operation for each 
arm (artillery, tanks, aircraft, and chemical warfare) 
are established in accordance with the decision of 
the Commander. 
Execution of coordination and adjustments in the 
tables of combat coordination are made possible by 
the direct control of the Commander, and by con-
tinuous intercommunication with subordinate units 
and between arms. The most important channels 
of intercommunication are through signal communi-
cations and liaison officers. 
2. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS 
The Chief Signal Officer is the immediate director of 
the Signal Service. He is fully responsible not only 
for the efficient and timely organization of signal 
communications and their uninterrupted operation, 
but also for the prompt transmission and delivery of 
all orders. Collaborating with the Chief of the Op-
erations Section, on the basis of instructions received 
from the Chief of Staff and reconnaissance data, the 
Chief Signal Officer prepares a signal plan specifying 
the organization of communications throughout the 
projected operation. This plan is submitted to the 
Chief of Staff and issued with the field order. 
a. Planning principles. Red Army signal 
communications systems are laid out in conformity 
with certain fixed principles. Rigid centralization 
and strict signal discipline are required to integrate 
the circuits of the various arms and subordinate 
units, eliminate unnecessary traffic, and maintain 
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signal security. Concentration of signal equipment 
to facilitate execution of the main effort is achieved 
by ruthless economy in secondary sectors; service 
and administrative nets, except for ammunition sup-
ply, are virtually nonexistent. At the same time, 
duplicate facilities and signal. reserves are always 
built up in critical areas. For instance, the passing 
of barrage phase lines by infantry is verified by 
radio voice, radio telegraph, and rocket as well as 
by observation from a dense network of infantry 
and artillery observation posts (fig. 18). To pro-
vide absolutely reliable communications with the 
artillery in support of the main effort, the normal 
artillery nets are split, with separate forward 
switchboards, double wire communications, and 
radio circuits being provided. The rest of the ar-
tillery uses the basic nets. 
Similarly, 1.5 to 2 reserve battery sets must be 
maintained for each division or corps radio station, 
with 2.5 to 3 sets for each mobile detachment or 
flank unit. Two or three alternate channels must 
be provided for each major radio circuit. Reserve 
equipment for wire communications is similarly 
maintained. 
Communications are established down and to the 
left, and supporting units are responsible for com-
munications with the supported units. Liaison offi-
cers provide their own communications. 
Another important factor is the timely organiza-
tion of communication centers in the progressive 
displacement of the command and other staff posts. 
This is achieved by the echeloned forward move-
ment of radio equipment according to a plan desig-
nating the order of setting up and closing down the 
specific radio stations; by the echeloned forward 
movement of wire circuits in coordination with the 
main phase lines; and by notifying all subordinate 
staffs as to the new main axis of communication and 
the location of forward message centers and second-
ary communication centers. 
The full utilization of captured signal equipment 
(especially wire for duplicating lines) has become 
part of Soviet signal doctrine, and special recon-
naissance groups are sent out on the personal initia-
tive of the chief signal officers of regiments and 
higher units to collect usable equipment left by the 
enemy. 
h. Signal nets. The signal doctrine of the Red 
Army stresses reliable and often duplicated com-
munications, which are deemed necessary for op-
erational control and coordination of combat units 
at the expense of administr_ative circuits. This is 
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well illustrated by the types of signal nets which are 
habitually established in all formations of combined 
arms (fig. 19). 
Two types of command nets are established. One 
command net connects the command observation 
post of the Commander of Combined Arms with the 
command post, the command observation posts of 
all immediately subordinate units, and those of the 
chiefs of arms. The second command net connects 
the command observation post of the chief of a par-
ticular arm with the chiefs of that arm in subordi-
nate units. Both wire and radio are used. When 
radio is used, a set is assigned to each commander 
within the net and follows him wherever he may go. 
The establishment of the combined command net is 
often facilitated by the proximity of the principal 
command observation posts in units larger than the 
regiment. The command posts of regiments and 
higher units are often equipped with public address 
systems connected with the command net. This ar-
rangement insures the dissemination of key decisions 
to all staff divisions, expedites transmissions of or-
ders, saves time, and eliminates several circuits 
within the command post. 
The staff net connects the command post of a for-
mation with the command posts of immediately sub-
ordinate units. Staff nets are used for all routine 
staff operations. Wire, duplicated by radio, is used. 
The cooperation net is established to insure syn-
chronized action of all participating arms. Both 
wire and radio communications, supplemented by 
visual signals and liaison officers, are established 
through the forward message center to the command 
posts of the units participating in a given operation 
or in a phase of this operation. 
The artillery fire control net is distinguished from 
the artillery command net in that, in addition to the 
command posts of each organic and attached ar-
tillery unit, it includes the command post of each 
supported unit, artillery forward and paired obser-
vation posts, and firing positions. Provisional mor-
tar battalions (formed by grouping regimental mor-
tar batteries) are included in the artillery fire control 
net. Wire communications are duplicated by radio, 
liaison officers, and messengers. 
The reconnaissance net provides direct communi-
cation between each reconnaissance element and the 
command posts of the responsible headquarters. 
Dissemination of the results of reconnaissance is ac-
complished through the staff net. While radio is 
normally used, wire is often laid to forward informa-
tion-collecting centers which are set up when recon-
V-33 
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Figure 18. Plan oj coordination of artiller'F support of an infantry attack in depth. 
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naissance elements operate for long periods at a 
considerable distance from their headquarters. 
In large formations a distinct antiaircraft and 
antitank warning net is established. In smaller ones 
the air and tank raid warning net is superimposed 
on one of the other nets, with the highest priority 
being given to "flash" messages. 
In armies and other formations which have or-
ganic air support, an air liaison net is set up. Wire, 
duplicated by radio, connects the headquarters of the 
AAjAT 
WARNING NET 
WjL- 3 
TK CORPS ARMY STAFF 
ARMY STAFF NET 
FOR MAIN EFFORT 
(CORPS COOPERATION 
NET, MAIN EFFORT) 
Wjl- 2 
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formation of combined arms with the headquarters 
of the supporting air unit. 
c. Signal elements. The communications sys-
tem is organized according to the following elements: 
Signal centers. 
Primary and secondary axes of signal com-
munications. 
Intermediate stations. 
Message centers. 
Multiple-station and two-station radio nets. 
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Figure 20. Rifle corps radio net (simplified). 
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The signal center is the point of concentration and 
intersection of primary and secondary axes of signal 
communications. The main centers are established 
at the command posts and provide staff and coopera-
tion channels in all directions (fig. 20). Reserve 
signal centers are set up in the areas of reserve com-
mand posts, and maintain communication in the 
event of displacement of headquarters from the main 
to a reserve command post. Auxiliary centers are 
points where communication can be made with flank-
ing communication lines. Artillery signal centers 
are also habitually established. 
A FROM ADJACENT UNIT 
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to enable the command to communicate with sub-
ordinate command posts, with the rear, with cooper-
ating arms, with neighboring units, and with head-
quarters of reinforcing units. 
Intermediate stations are established along pri-
mary and secondary axes of communication. The 
chief function of these stations is to maintain com-
munications with separate units. Subordinate unit 
headquarters either utilize intermediate stations or 
connect these stations with their communication axes 
(fig. 21). 
Message centers circulate necessary field docu-
PRINCIPAL LINES -------
AUXILlA'RY LINES --l~--II---
Figure 21. Rifle division wire net (simplified). 
The primary axis of communications is the base 
for all other communication lines to subordinate and 
cooperating headquarters. Normally it consists of 
an all-wire circuit from the main switchboard at the 
command post to a forward switchboard near the 
command observation post; for emergencies, one or 
more switch lines provide alternate circuits. Pri-
mary axes provide a foundation for the entire Red 
Army communications system, especially during the 
displacement of command posts in the course of 
combat. 
Secondary axes of communication are developed 
ments among subordinate headquarters, and collect 
and deliver reports emanating from them. 
A multiple radio net comprises a group of radio 
stations operating in accordance with general in-
structions concerning their employment. A two-sta-
tion net constitutes two radio stations maintaining 
communications on a fixed wave length. This two-
station net is used most frequently for command, 
reconnaissance, and lateral liaison circuits. 
d. Equipment. In infantry units, wire is the 
primary means of signal communications in all 
except mobile situations. All-wire circuits are used 
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for major circuits. Telegraph is used extensively for 
routine signal traffic at divisional and higher level, 
and teletype is used by armies and army groups. 
Except in extremely mobile situations, wire commu-
nications only are maintained with the rear services 
and installations. 
While the organic wire facilities of the Soviet rifle 
division are only slightly greater than those of a 
U. S. infantry division, they are heavily reinforced 
for operations. In an offensive situation, 150 com-
mand and observation posts were set up in one rifle 
division sector by the division and supporting artil-
lery. Approximately 30 switchboards were used to 
connect some 700 circuits joining the various com-
mand observation posts. 
During the preparatory phase of an offensive, 
wire communications are established with the tank 
and mobile infantry units at their advance command 
posts (near the line of departure). Mobile obser-
vation posts maintain wire communications with the 
supporting artillery and mortar units. 
The organic allotment of radios in a Soviet rifle 
division is a little over 10 percent of that of the U. S. 
infantry division; radio is used as an auxiliary to 
wire, principally in command and artillery fire con-
trol nets. In Soviet tank and mechanized units, 
however, the allotment of radios is about 30 percent 
of that of similar U. S. units. In special situations 
large quantities of additional radio equipment are 
furnished from higher echelon signal reserves. For 
example, 27,174 radios were used in the Belorussian 
operation in June-July 1944. 
Centralized control of radio frequencies and 
grouping of available radios into radio nets insure 
efficient use of allotted equipment. Strict regulation 
of frequencies and economy of messages simplify 
technical employment of radios and also aid in main-
taining signal security. The use of sky-waves even 
for short distances (up to 180 miles) reduces the 
number and types of radio sets necessary to maintain 
adequate communications. Radio centers at army 
and higher levels and allocation of prior.ities to mes-
sages reduce the number of necessary sending sets. 
Auxiliary methods of signal communications are 
visual signals (rockets, blinkers), public address 
systems, liaison planes, and messengers. 
e. Responsibilities of Commander, Staff, 
and Chiefs of Arms. During combat, the Com-
mander must be at the command observation post, 
from which he can observe and control the main 
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effort. In order to assign missions during the course 
of combat and to direct coordination between arms 
efficiently, he must have at all times complete knowl· 
edge of the capabilities of each arm and of the equip. 
ment and supplies available to both his own and 
enemy forces. 
Normally, some members of the staff, the chiefs 
of the arms, and the Chief Signal Officer are with 
him. The staff at the command post maintains con· 
trol over secondary operational areas and rear serv-
ices. Liaison with neighboring and higher com. 
mands is continuous. 
The tactical plan is prescribed in the field orders 
and annexed tables of combat coordination, issued 
by the Commander. Supplementing these are the 
orders and plans of the various arms (artillery, in· 
fan try, engineers, tanks, etc.) , the primary responsi· 
bility for which rests with the chief of each arm. 
It is the duty of the Commander, either by means 
of personal reconnaissance or through his staff, to 
check on the execution of these combat plans. Dur-
ing the course of operations, maneuvers may deviate 
from the preestablished tactical plans. Wide lati-
tude is permitted subordinate commanders (of arms 
and lower units) to use their full initiative in attain-
ing assigned mISSIOns. Over-all responsibility, 
however, remains with the Commander, who ob-
serves the progress of maneuvers, orders support. 
and commits reserves. 
The appropriate staff sections conduct incessant 
observation and reconnaissance from ground and 
air, constantly collect and correlate incoming recon-
naissance and observation reports from subordinate 
units, submit reports to the commander concerning 
front· line developments, suggest appropriate steps to 
be taken, and organize the coordination demanded 
by the development of new situations according to 
the commander's decisions. 
When the Commander or Chief of Staff cannot 
personally control combat phases, command liaison 
officers (often the commanders of arms or services) 
are sent as his deputies to subordinate units. 
If, on the basis of his personal observation, the 
Commander decides that alteration in the prescribed 
phase-lines with reference to time or space are neces-
sary, he issues fragmentary orders amending the 
original orders. Fragmentary orders may also kle 
issued on the basis of reports submitted by the chiefs 
of the various arms and by the numerous observers 
along the front. 
Throughout the combat phases, the plans of the 
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arms are continuously coordinated and adjusted be-
tween the staffs of each arm, and also with the staff 
of the Commander. This cooperation insures the 
fulfillment of the prescribed time and space sched-
ule, the maximum exploitation of tactical capabili-
ties, and the maintenance of a joint system of combat 
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security and camouflage discipline. Lateral adjust-
ments may be made among the chiefs of the various 
arms (and lower units) as to the methods of attain-
ing the phase-lines. The Commander is advised by 
signal (wire, radio, or rocket) as each phase-line 
is attained. 
PART II. TACTICS OF GROUND ARMS 
Section I. INFANTRY 
1. GENERAL 
Soviet infantry units are characterized by great 
strength in automatic weapons and mortars. Their 
tactical mobility is low if they are equipped only 
with organic transport. Their moving weight is 
low, compared to similar U. S. units, and as a re-
sult their maneuverability is good. The rifle regi-
ments (less their supply trains), rifle battalions, 
and rifle companies have horse transport only and 
can move across country even in difficult terrain. 
The supply capacity of Soviet rifle units is adequate 
even for heavy combat, but their maintenance fa-
cilities are inadequate and must be supplemented 
by army resources. 
2. BASIC DOCTRINE 
Soviet tactical employment of infantry is predi-
cated on rapidity of maneuver of small groups, 
concentration of fire of automatic weapons, and 
shock action. In fluid situations, rapid deploy-
ment and immediate engagement with the enemy 
are the rule. In more stable situations, engage-
ment with the enemy is generally preceded by thor-
ough reconnaissance and planning, and detailed re-
hearsal of the contemplated maneuver, including 
even the tactics of the individual soldier. The ob-
jectives of infantry attack are to break the cohesive 
defense of the enemy, to divide him into small iso-
lated groups, and then to destroy him. The plan 
of maneuver usually calls for an advance to the 
flanks of the enemy, culminating in a single or 
double envelopment. This plan may be varied to 
conform to the situation or to achieve surprise. 
Soviet infantry units are deployed for combat 
similarly to the U. S. practice; that is, in line, 
wedge, inverted wedge, column, and echeloned to 
right or left (fig. 22). The size of the reserve is 
rigidly controlled. For example, if a regiment on 
the defensive occupies an interior position, the re-
serve consists of one rifle company, some antitank 
rifles, and the regimental antitank and howitzer 
batteries. In a similar situation, the battalion re-
serve will consist of one rifle platoon, one antitank 
rifle platoon, the battalion antitank guns, and sev-
eral heavy machine guns. 
A regiment generally attacks on a front 1,500 
yards wide; an interior battalion on a front up to 
700 yards; a company up to 350 yards; and a pla-
toon up to 100 yards. On the defensive, a battalion 
occupies an area up to 2,000 yards wide and 1,500 
to 2,000 yards deep; and a company occupies an 
area up to 700 yards wide and 700 yards deep. 
To insure the success of its missions, the Red 
Army infantry regiment has at its disposal several 
specialized units: the reconnaissance company, the 
submachine gun company, the antitank rifle com-
pany, the heavy mortar battery, the antitank gun 
battery, and the regimental howitzer battery. The 
reconnaissance company executes normal recon-
naissance and screening tasks. The submachine 
gun company is used for rapid flanking moves, in-
filtration, security of accompanying tanks, and as a 
mobile reserve. The antitank rifle company pro-
vides antitank security in all phases of combat. 
The antitank gun battery, together with battalion 
antitank guns, is used to repel tank attacks in es-
pecially vulnerable sectors. Regimental and bat-
talion antitank guns, together with the regimental 
artillery, are used extensively for direct fire in sup-
port of river-crossing operations and assault of 
fortified positions. The heavy mortar battery is 
used under centralized control during artillery prep-
aration on the offensive and for laying down bar-
rages on the defensive. It is under control of sup-
ported units in the assault phase of the offense and 
III decentralized defense. 
3. APPROACH MARCH 
A Red Army infantry regiment, acting as an advance 
guard of a division, has the missions of overcoming 
the resistance of enemy outposts, occupying terrain 
favorable for deployment of the division, and orga-
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nizing preliminary reconnaissance. To accomplish 
these missions, the regiment advances in the follow-
ing order: advance guard preceded by reconnais-
sance elements, the main body, the flank guards, and 
the rear guard. The advance guard consists of an 
infantry battalion reinforced by artillery and engi-
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an exposed flank, the flank guard on the exposed side 
is increased to approximately a battalion (fig. 23). 
Artillery elements which form parts of the main body 
must always be ready to support the advance guard. 
During long halts, artillery habitually deploys for 
action, while antitank units reconnoiter and deploy 
Figure 22. Plan 0/ attack, rifle battalion echeloned to the left. 
neers. The main body follows 1.2 to 1.8 miles be-
hind the adv-ance guard. It consists of several sec-
tions, each comprising a balanced fighting group of 
approximately battalion size. The main body is 
flanked by security groups consisting of rifle platoons 
reinforced with heavy machine guns and antitank 
rifles. The rear guard, likewise, consists of a rein-
forced rifle platoon. If the regiment advances along 
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in sectors considered especially vulnerable to attack 
by tanks. 
If the advance guard encounters only disorganized 
resistance, it overpowers enemy rear guards while 
the main body continues advancing. If the advance 
guard encounters organized resistance at a well for· 
tified position, the regiment deploys for action and 
endeavors to overpower the opposit:Jon by speed of 
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maneuver and shock action. If the enemy is fully 
prepared to defend organized positions, the regiment 
secures advantageous ground for the deployment of 
the division and for organized intensive reconnais-
sance. During the advance the Commander retains 
his command post in the advance guard. 
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slOn is determined by the over-all objective of the 
division. It generally consists of overcoming all 
enemy resistance in the assault sector including en-
emy artillery positions. Both the initial and the 
successive missions are designated in terms of space 
and time. The assault is conducted in three distinct 
Figure 24. Example 0/ in/an try offensive, rifle battalion in double envelopment. Example 0/ wedge and inverted 
wedge. 
4. THE OFFENSIVE 
In the offensive, infantry generally has two succes-
sive missions: First, it must break into the forward 
defense lines of the enemy in a particular sector and 
destroy or neutralize the system of infantry and anti-
tank weapons. This mission is accomplished by the 
initial infantry assault groups. The subsequent mis-
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phases: the preparation, the execution of the initial 
mission of the infantry groups, and the penetration 
of the enemy defenses in depth in the execution of 
the subsequent missions (fig. 24). 
a. Preparation for the attack. The prepara-
tion phase includes command and staff reconnais-
sance; the command decision; formulation of the 
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operations, intelligence, signal, and rear area plans; 
and formulation of the tables of combat coordina-
tion. Upon receipt of their missions, subordinate 
commanders formulate their plans of maneuver and 
designate assault groups for the execution of specific 
tasks. A typical assault group consists of three to 
five engineers, a rifle platoon, and several antitank 
rifles. 
Some battalion mortars and battalion guns are 
assigned to the various assault groups according to 
the general and partial fire plans. Heavy machine 
guns are either allotted to the assault groups, or 
retained under centralized control. 
According to the demands of the situation, regi-
mental and, less frequently, divisional specialized 
arms are distributed among the assault groups. If 
time permits, the assault groups rehearse the plan 
of maneuver both individually and as a whole. These 
rehearsals are generally conducted in daylight and 
at night over terrain similar to that of the contem-
plated operation and far enough removed from the 
enemy to escape his observation and interference. 
Before important operations it is not uncommon for 
Soviet troops to spend considerable time drilling in 
standard and specialized use of their weapons. 
h. Conduct of the assault. During the as-
sault, regimental and battalion commanders remain 
at their command observation posts. Only in excep-
tional circumstances may they leave their command 
posts to lead subordinate units in combat. It is 
considered imperative that the final artillery barrage 
be laid so that there is a minimum of time between 
it and the moment that the infantry reaches the for-
ward defense lines of the enemy. Regimental and 
battalion antitank guns and mortars will continue to 
fire on their targets until the last possible moment. 
The infantry must be placed so as to reach the enemy 
forward lines from 1 to 2 minutes after the artillery 
barrage is lifted. Red Army regulations state that 
infantry can follow within 200 yards and 100 yards, 
respectively, of forward and flanking barrages of 
artillery firing at ranges of 2,000 to 3,000 yards. 
Infantry can follow within 150 to 200 yards behind 
the bursts of 82-mm mortars, and within 200 to 250 
yards behind the bursts of 120-mm mortars. 
During the assault, antitank guns and mortars 
revert to the control of the supported units. Regi-
mental artillery supports the assault in depth and 
prepares to displace forward. Battalion command-
ers do not commit their units in extended fire duels 
with the enemy centers of resistance; instead, they 
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move ahead, leaving small detachments to deal with 
the by-passed enemy. 
When the infantry advance reaches the artillery 
positions of the enemy, widening of the breach, de-
struction of the by-passed centers of resistance, and 
exploitation of the break-through are achieved by 
the regimental reserve, assisted by some of the as-
sault groups. The remainder of the assaulting force 
consolidates captured positions, prepares to repel 
counterattacks, or regroups and continues the 
advance. 
If tanks accompany the infantry attack, regimen-
tal and battalion artillery concentrate fire on enemy 
antitank defenses. Infantry and engineers protect 
the tanks from hostile infantry, neutralize antitank 
minefields and other antitank obstacles, and help 
e\lacuate damaged tanks. Tanks must not outdis-
tance their supporting infantry by more than 400 
yards. Typical missions which may be assigned to 
accompanying tanks by an infantry commander 
include: 
Determination of the location and number of 
breaches to be made in antipersonnel 
obstacles. 
Firing positions of the enemy which are to 
be destroyed. 
Sectors of responsibility for repelling coun-
terattacks. 
Assembly areas. 
Subsequent missions of tanks. 
5. THE ENCIRCLEMENT 
The Soviet encirclement is carried out in two phases: 
the process of encircling an enemy force, and the 
destruction of the encircled force. Although under 
special circumstances a smaller force may encircle 
and destroy a larger one, normally a regiment is 
required for encircling and destroying a battalion. 
In addition to problems which accompany frontal 
assault, combat for encirclement requires the main-
tenance of lines of supply and evacuation over longer 
routes, as well as protection of the exposed flanks 
and rear of an inverted front. Displacement of the 
service centers must be coordinated with the advance 
of the combat teams in order to, utilize service per-
sonnel most efficiently. While the break-through 
sector is narrow, control of the service units must 
be centralized; that is, service elements of two bat-
talions may be combined to render most effective aid 
to the encircling and security units. When the 
break-through sector becomes wider, these service 
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elements revert to the control of the parent units 
(figs. 25 and 26). 
Engineers must be allotted to the service elements 
in order to establish and maintain supply and evac-
uation routes, and to help the security units in the 
construction of defenses along the exposed flanks 
and rear. Infantry reinforced with antitank weapons 
must be made available to the commander of the 
rear echelon; these are assigned the tasks of clearing 
the break-through area of enemy stragglers, mop-
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commander to initiate pursuit. Pursuit, once it is 
started, may be halted only by the senior commander. 
In order to prevent the enemy from withdrawing 
and forming march columns, infantry battalions in-
crease pressure along the entire sector and the artil-
lery and mortar batteries conduct interdictory fire 
on road junctions and assembly areas. The Com-
mander moves his reserves forward, groups them into 
reinforced platoons, and deploys them for rapid ad-
vance in the direction of the main effort of the 
Figure 25. Organization of lines of supply and evacuation at the start of an encirclement. 
ping up the by-passed centers of resistance, and 
defending the exposed rear and flanks of the in-
verted front. Medical elements of the encircling 
battalions must have a.-l;Jitional personnel for evacu-
ation of the wounded along longer than normal 
routes. 
6. THE PURSUIT 
The slightest indication of the enemy's intention to 
withdraw from combat is a signal for every Soviet 
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assaulting battalions. The submachine-gun com-
pany, grouped by platoons, infiltrates into the en-
emy's rear area, disrupting his lines of communica-
tion and control. 
As the pursuit develops, artillery and mortars ad-
vance by bounds so that one echdon is ready to fire 
missions on request from the pursuing elements, 
while the other echelon displaces. The antitank-
rifle company and the regimental antitank battery 
~ Figure 26. Organization of lines of sllPply and evacuation during an encirclement. Note that the supply and evacu-ation centers of the two encircling battalions have been combined. 
,.. 
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organize protection of the flanks against counterat-
tacks. Rear-area security groups keep the lines of 
supply clear of enemy stragglers. The engineer offi-
cer organizes obstacle-clearing detachments which 
march with the pursuing elements and facilitate the 
advance of artillery, mortars, tanks, and supply 
vehicles. 
If motorized transport is available, pursuit detach-
ments are organized and sent in parallel columns 
along secondary roads in order to overtake the enemy 
and strike him from the flanks and rear. A motor-
ized pursuit group generally consists of a rifle com-
pany, a reconnaissance squad, a machine-gun pla-
toon, an engineer squad, and an antitank-gun team. 
If possible, each pursuing vehicle is provided with an 
antiaircraft machine gun. 1£ tanks are available for 
the pursuit, infantry riders are assigned from the 
battalions. Regimental mortars advance with the 
infantry, but if half-tracks or other suitable transport 
is available, mortars may be loaned to tank units for 
exploitation of the break-through. As the pursuing 
elements outdistance the original battalion assault 
teams, these teams are also organized into pursuit 
groups and sent on supplementary missions. 
During the pursuit, the regimental staff organizes 
flank and rear security detachments, controls op-
erations of the reconnaissance elements, organizes 
coordination between the pursuing groups and their 
supporting units, and provides for continuous sup-
ply of ammunition and fuel. 
7. THE DEFENSIVE 
The objectives stated in Red Army defensive doc-
trine are: hold important positions with small 
forces; utilize natural and artificial obstacles; in-
flict heavy losses on the enemy by an organized fire 
of all weapons, thus forcing him to abandon the at-
tack; and finally, destroy him by a determined 
counterattack. Red Army doctrine for the organ-
ization of defensive positions prescribes the fol-
lowing requirements: 
The positions should be established in depth. 
Each defensive area and its parts should be 
capable of all-around defense. 
The defense should be supported by planned 
counterattacks. 
The fire plan should be designed to provide 
fire trap concentration on sectors subject 
to probable enemy attack. 
In setting up defensive positions, all commanders 
are responsible for the construction of field forti-
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fications, shelters, main and reserve command and 
observation posts, and main, alternate, and night 
firing positions for artillery and mortars. All de-
fense installations and fields of fire are checked by 
the Commander and the Chief of Engineers. In the 
Red Army, lack of care and thoroughness in organ-
izing and executing the construction of defense in-
stallations is considered one of the most serious of 
military offenses. 
a. Centralized defense. Tactical doctrines of 
the Red Army define two types of de:£ense: cen-
tralized and decentralized. Centralized defense is 
preferred. It is organized to hold the main ap-
proaches to important positions with a system of 
mutually supporting strongpoints. Secondary ap-
proaches are covered by fire and by a relatively 
large mobile reserve. In this type of defense, ar-
tillery is massed, counterattacks are initiated by the 
over-all commander, and supply installations are 
centrally located. Wire communications are estab-
lished along the main defense axis. 
h. Decentralized defense. Decentralized de-
fense is undertaken when the forces available for 
defense of a sector are insufficient for the central-
ized type of defense. Decentralized defense con-
sists of a series of self-sufficient islands of defense, 
each with a local commander, artillery, and supply 
installations. The reserve of the over-all com-
mander is relatively small, and counterattacks are 
undertaken on the initiative of the local command-
ers. Communication is accomplished primarily by 
radio and visual signals. 
c. Infantry division defense. In general, the 
defensive positions of an infantry division consist of 
an outpost line, a security line, and the main line of 
resistance. 
OUTPOST LINE. The outpost line is designated by 
an army or divisional commander. It is sited 6 to 
10 miles in front of the main line of resistance. The 
outpost line is intended to inflict losses on the enemy, 
to disrupt his attack groupments, and to gain time. 
It consists of forward and intermediate field positions 
manned by forward detachments. 
SECURITY LINE. One-half to one mile in front of 
the main line of resistance, an infantry division 
forms a security line. The purpose of this line is 
to prevent surprise attacks and to form an anti-re-
connaissance screen. It is established according to 
instructions of the divisional commander. The se-
curity line consists of a number of strongpoints 
manned by elements of the forward battalions and 
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supported by their fire. Often, in order to deceive 
the enemy, the security line is made strong in front 
of dummy positions and weak in front of the main 
defensive positions. 
MAIN DEFENSE LINE. The main defense line is 
intended to stop the attack of the hostile infantry and 
tanks, and to force the enemy to abandon the attack. 
The main line is divided into regimental sectors, 
which are in turn divided into battalion sectors and 
regimental reserve sectors. 
Each regimental sector consists of several centers 
of resistance which integrate a system of strong-
points for all-around defense. The strongpoints con-
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ASSIGNMENT OF MISSIONS. After personal recon-
naissance of the terrain, the divisional commander 
assigns a defensive mission to the regiments. The 
regimental commander initiates command recon-
naissance and issues preliminary instructions to his 
staff. These instructions include orientation points, 
boundary lines between battalions, and location of 
the outpost line, the security line, the main defense 
position, and the regimental reserve. The regimental 
commander sketches out the location of the principal 
antitank installations and specifies time limits for 
the completion of the various defense preparations. 
Instructions to the battalion commanders include 
Figure 27. Reinforced battalion in defense. 
sist of field and permanent fortifications connected 
by antitank and antipersonnel obstacles, minefields, 
and traps. The system of obstacles must contain 
gaps for use by counterattacking forces. These gaps 
must be arranged so that they may be quickly closed 
in the event of enemy penetration of the defenses. 
The strongpoints are manned either by specially de-
signed garrisons or by elements of the forward hat-
talions. In the former case, the forward battalions 
occupy positions defending approaches to the strong-
points and support them with fire. In defending a 
strong position, the regimental reserve may consist 
of a rifle battalion reinforced with artillery, antitank 
weapons, and tanks. The main line of defense may 
be abandoned only on orders of the commander of 
the next higher echelon. 
boundaries of their sectors, antitank defenses for 
which they are responsible, plan of fire for long and 
intermediate ranges, and the composition and mis-
sion of the security line. The battalion commanders 
are told what fire support they may expect, and the 
probable direction and relative time of the regi-
mental counterattack. 
The regimental reserve is assigned its defense 
sector, probable direction of counterattacks, and a 
plan of fire within the defense positions (fig. 27). 
ARTILLERY MISSIONS. In the defensive, regi-
mental artillery and antitank weapons, together 
with allotted divisional weapons, are generally por-
tioned out to the battalions according to the im· 
portance of their sectors. However, artillery fire 
is planned so that it can be shifted easily from de-
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centralized to centralized control. The artillery 
fire is designed to support defensive operations of 
forward detachments. In particular, emphasis is 
placed on delaying enemy preparations for attack. 
The Soviet gunners attempt to cause casualties 
among enemy personnel and armor during deploy-
ment for the attack and to separate tanks from ac-
companying infantry, destroying the infantry ,dth 
artillery and mortar fire and destroying the tanks 
which penetrate into the defensive positions with 
antitank weapOll3. 
In organizing defensive positions, the formation 
of antitank centers of resistance is stressed. These 
centers, usually located in terrain inaccessible to 
tanks, consist of a rifle company with three to five 
antitank guns, one or two antitank rifle platoons, 
mortars, and heavy machine guns. Minefields are 
laid only on orders of the divisional commander. 
The mission of the infantry is to keep enemy foot 
soldiers from destroying or neutralizing antitank 
obstacles. Antiaircraft positions are chosen in ter-
rain inaccessible to tanks. Careful camouflage and 
camouflage discipline is emphasized. Defensive 
combat is controlled from a command post which 
must not be located within the artillery positions. 
Control of fire, timely commitment of battalion and 
regimental reserves, and avoidance of premature 
disclosure of positions and plan of defense are pri-
mary considerations in successful defensive combat. 
During the first stages of enemy attack, artillery 
fires from alternate positions. 
8. WITHDRAWALS AND DELAYING ACTION 
On receiving his mission, the regimental com-
mander conducts command reconnaissance of the 
terrain and designates the first and subsequent de-
fense lines. Sectors of responsibility of each 
battalion and of the reserve, and the composition of 
the supporting groups for each battalion, are deter-
mined for each defense line. The battalion com-
manders are given instructions concerning the rela-
tive time of their occupation and retreat from each 
defense line, and their responsibility for antitank 
defense. The reserve, approximately a battalion 
made up of rifle, submachine-gun, mortar, artillery, 
heavy-machine-gun, and antitank-rifle platoons, is 
instructed as to its sectors of responsibility and 
probable direction of counterattack from each po-
sition. The staff initiates reconnaissance in front 
of and on the flanks of the regimental sector, deter-
mines the axis of communications, provides for 
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flank and rear area security, and works out relative 
time schedules for the displacement of the command 
post and rear area installations. 
Defense lines are so chosen that the enemy upon 
taking one line would have to displace his artillery 
and mortars in order to attack the next. Each suc-
cessive position is strengthened with field fortifica-
tions and antitank and antipersonnel obstacles. The 
interval between strongpoints is covered by artil-
lery and mortar fire. 1£ terrain permits, ambushes 
are prepared in corridors between strongpoints. 
The location and composition of ambushes are des-
ignated by the regimental commander. 
The regiment occupies two lines simultaneously: 
the first is occupied by the forward battalions and 
the second by the regimental reserve. When the 
enemy attacks, the forward battalions open fire at 
extreme ranges, forcing the enemy to deploy for 
battle, causing casualties, and delaying neutraliza-
tion of obstacles. They do not engage the enemy, 
but on completing their delaying mission, retreat, 
covered by the fire of the reserve. The reserve 
counterattacks if the enemy succeeds in flanking one 
of the battalions or if the forward battalions are un-
able to disengage. The commander of the last bat-
talion to occupy a defense line or, if the situation 
demands it, the regimental commander, orders 
demolition of bridges and roads. 
Section II. ARTILLERY, MORTARS, 
AND ROCKETS 
1. BASIC TACTICAL ROLE 
Artillery is the basic striking force of the Red Army. 
Its mission is to neutralize and destroy the enemy 
system of fire throughout all operational phases, thus 
enabling Soviet infantry to encircle and destroy en-
emy personnel. To carry out this mission, the Red 
Army has used artillery on a much larger scale than 
any other modern army. In repeated offensive oper-
ations during W orId War II, the artillery density 
was 320 to 480 pieces per mile (200 to 300 pieces 
per kilometer). In certain operations the Soviets 
employed a total of more than 20,000 pieces, a num-
ber approaching the total quantity of artillery pieces 
used by all armies during World War I. This un-
precedented mass employment of artillery required 
the development of large artillery units-such as 
artillery, mortar, and rocket divisions-to supple-
ment organic artillery of the infantry division. To 
facilitate the commitment of such masses of artillery, 
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a highly developed system of artillery reconnaissance 
cnd artillery planning was essential. 
!!. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT 
[he organization and tactical employment of Soviet 
artillery underwent continuous changes during the 
war. These changes were not always the result of 
newly formulated doctrines, but were often imposed 
upon the Red Army by specific strategic situations. 
During the first period of the war, Soviet artillery 
was organized according to conventional concep-
tions. Only about 20 percent of the total artillery 
was in army artillery units (the Soviets had four 
artillery divisions, several independent artillery regi-
ments, and a number of heavy artillery units), while 
the bulk was found organically in the rifle divisions 
or in corps artillery units. The major defeats suf-
fered by the Soviet Union in 1941, which led to 
destruction of a great portion of its original number 
of artillery pieces, forced the Red Army to exploit 
the remaining artillery by increased centralization. 
Up to this time, the rifle division had two artillery 
regiments (one motorized and one horse-drawn regi-
ment). The motorized artillery regiment was taken 
from the rifle division and organized in army artil-
lery units. Within the rifle division, also, artillery 
and infantry heavy weapons were brought under 
centralized control. 
Simultaneously with this reorganization, the pro-
duction of artillery was given high priority. When 
newly produced weapons were made available to 
the Red Army, they were included in army artillery 
units. The great number of independent artillery 
regiments created a command and logistical prob-
lem, which the Red Army solved by forming larger 
artillery organizations such as brigades, divisions, 
and even corps. The great increase in the number 
of army artillery units also facilitated the organ-
ization of specialized units such as mortar regi-
ments, mortar divisions, antitank divisions, anti-
tank brigades, antiaircraft artillery divisions, and 
even superheavy artillery units. These new or-
ganizations were employed for the first time for 
large-scale operations at Stalingrad. 
The steady growth of the army artillery made a 
reverse process possible, so that at the present time, 
army artillery regiments are attached to rifle divi-
sions to increase the fire power of their direct sup-
port artillery. 
a. Mortars and rockets. Mortars and rockets 
playa far greater tactical role in the Red Army 
TM 30-430 
than in any other army. The fundamental principle 
of mortar employment in the Red Army is the use 
of massed mortar fire as an independent striking 
weapon. Requirements are set by the infantry 
commander, while technical control and coordina-
tion are the responsibility of the artillery com-
mander. Fundamentally, Soviet mortar units em-
ploy field artillery methods. The principle of 
rocket employment in the Red Army prescribes mass 
commitment at critical phases of an operation. 
Rocket units are normally coordinated in the gen-
eral plan of artillery and mortars, and are under the 
control of corps artillery. 
h. Self-propelled artillery. Soviet self-pro-
pelled artillery units are found either as organic 
parts of armored, mechanized, or cavalry corps or 
as independent regiments for employment in the 
main effort. Soviet self-propelled artillery is 
equipped with telescopic sights which permit in-
direct fire and employment for other than assault 
artillery missions, such as reinforcement of regular 
artillery units. Soviet doctrine prescribes that 
self-propelled artillery should be employed in bat-
teries or larger units; for indirect fire it is central-
ized in regiments or brigades. When self-propelled 
artillery is committed in support of infantry, it is 
under the control of the infantry divisional (regi-
mental) commander. 
In the attack, self-propelled artillery is employed 
in the main effort to support infantry, tanks, or 
cavalry, with the primary mission of destroying 
unforeseen enemy centers of resistance at short 
range. It may also be used as the Commander's 
fire reserve for action against enemy counter-
attacks. When attacking on the move, self-pro-
pelled artillery goes into position on a broad front 
without echeloning in depth. In an attack on a 
fortified position, it is organized in depth. During 
the attack, self-propelled artillery provides continu-
ous support for infantry and tanks by displacing 
forward and firing from concealed positions. 
In the defense, self-propelled artillery regiments, 
as a rule, constitute the mobile fire reserve. This 
reserve is employed as support for counterattacking 
tanks and infantry, or as an antitank reserve. Dur-
ing retreat, it may be attached to the rear guards. 
c. Division artillery. The artillery weapons 
and mortars of an infantry division are found in the 
field artillery regiment and in the infantry regiments. 
The field artillery regiments have three identically 
organized battalions. Each battalion consists of two 
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batteries with 76.2-mm guns (four guns to a bat-
tery) , and one 122-mm howitzer battery. The infan-
try regiment contains a howitzer battery with four 
76.2-mm howitzers, and a heavy mortar batt~ry with 
six 120-mm mortars. Each battalion also has nine 
82-mm mortars. In stabilized situations, the 33 
mortars of each regiment are organized, according 
to a definite standing operating procedure, into a 
provisional mortar bat:talion. The two 50-mm mor-
tars of each company ~re for direct infantry support 
only. The antitank artillery pieces of an infantry 
division are found iIi the division antitank battalion 
and within each infantry regiment. The antitank 
artillery battalion has three batteries, each with four 
45-mm or 57-mm antitank guns (a total of 12 
pieces) • The infantry regiment has four 45-mm 
antitank guns in its antitank battery and two 45-mm 
antitank guns in each infantry battalion. 
Since the divisional artillery consists of only 36 
artillery pieces, recent Soviet practice has been to 
reinforce the artillery by one to four battalions of 
122-mm and 152-mm howitzers. The divisional ar-
tillery commander, however, is in control of all the 
artillery in the division including artillery reinforce-
ment from higher echelons. He also exercises con-
trol of the over-all employment of the heavy mortar 
battery or provisional mortar battalion of each 
infantry regiment. 
Organic artillery is employed on a regimental 
combat-team basis, but direct battery-infantry-bat-
talion coordination is provided. In the regimental 
combat team, the field artillery battalion controls the 
provisional battalion that may be formed from the 
120-mm mortar and the 82-mm mortar batteries. 
76.2-MM GUNS. The tactical characteristics of the 
76.2-mm guns (M1939 and 1942) are their high rate 
of fire, good muzzle velocity, and great maneuvera-
bility. These guns are employed in close support of 
infantry ( tanks), and especially for direct fire. 
Their primary missions are destruction of personnel 
and neutralization of infantry weapons in the open; 
antipersonnel barrages; destruction of tanks, vehi-
cles, embrasures, and dragon's teeth by direct fire; 
and harassing fire. Secondary missions are accom-
panying barrages and concentrations; neutraliza-
tion of artillery and mortars; establishment of smoke 
screens; and destruction of wire. Exceptional mis-
sions are fire reconnaissance, destruction of light 
materiel with indirect fire, and destruction of mine-
fields. 
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122-MM HOWITZERS. The characteristics of the 
other divisional artillery weapOl1, the 122-mm 
howitzer (M1938) which is the backbone of Soviet 
field artillery, are its great flexibility in muzzle 
velocity and traj~ctory, very effective burst, and 
good maneuyerability. (A lighter model 1910/30 
is employed when terrain prohibits the use of the 
M1938.) This weapon may be used for almost any 
mission except the destruction of strong positions 
or for distant fire. The primary missions are: 
Destruction of personnel and neutralization 
of infantry weapons in the open and under 
cover. 
Antipersonnel barrages, accompanying bar-
rages, and concentrations. 
Destruction of light field fortifications. 
Neutralization or destruction of mortars. 
Fire reconnaissance against camouflage and 
minefields or in conjunction with sound 
ranging. 
Neutralization of artillery at medium ranges. 
Establishment of smoke screens. 
Harassing fire. 
Secondary missions include antitank defensive bar-
rages; destruction of artillery; attack on fortified 
houses; destruction of wire; and destruction of 
tanks, ordnance, embrasures, antitank escarpments, 
and dragon's teeth by direct fire. The destruction 
of minefields is an exceptional missio~. 
152-MM HOWITZERS. The 152-mm howitzers 
(M1938) differ from the 122-mm howitzers in their 
greater radius of burst, slightly longer range, lower 
rate of fire, and reduced maneuverability. Basi-
cally, they reinforce 122-mm howitzers or replace 
them against more resistant targets. Their primary 
missions are to furnish accompanying concentra-
tions; to provide antitank defensive barrages; and 
to neutralize or destroy personnel, infantry weapons 
in the open or under cover, light and medium field 
fortifications (including fortified houses), antitank 
ditches, artillery and mortars, and minefields. Sec-
ondary missions are direct fire against very strong 
earth and timber fortifications; establishment of 
smoke screens; and reinforcement of antipersonnel 
and accompanying barrages. Exceptional missions 
are destruction of tanks and motor vehicles by di-
rect fire, and harassing fire. 
OTHER WEAPONS. The 76.2-mm howitzer is an 
organic weapon of the infantry regiment. Some-
times several 122-mm MlD/30 howitzers are at-
tached. Both weapons are excellent direct infantry 
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support weapons because of their light weight. The 
45-mm guns of the infantry regiment and battalion 
are employed for direct fire missions at ranges of 
about 1,000 yards. 
The 120-mm and the 82-mm mortars compare in 
radius of burst with the 122-mm howitzer and the 
76.2-mm gun, respectively. They are emplaced pri-
marily against personnel, in concentrations or de-
fensive barrages. 
d. Organic artillery of armored formations 
and cavalry corps. The organic artillery of the 
mechanized, tank, and cavalry corps is highly mo-
bile and possesses great fire power. The organiza-
tion of the tank corps includes three self-propelled 
artillery regiments, one antitank artillery regiment, 
one antiaircraft artillery regiment, one mortar regi-
ment, one rocket battalion, and one antitank bat-
talion. The three tank brigades and the motorized 
brigades of the tank corps have additional artillery 
pieces, antitank guns, and, mortars. The mech-
anized and cavalry corps have only one or two self-
propelled artillery regiments instead of three, while 
the other supporting components are about the same 
as in the tank corps. 
Mobile formations are usually employed in the 
exploitation of a break-through to widen the gap 
and to pursue the enemy. Normally, they do not 
assist actively in the initial stage of the operation, 
although they may be employed for flank protec-
tion. In an extensive operation, the average dis-
tance of advance of such formations is about 200 
miles. Their artillery is employed particularly for 
close support of irifantry and tank elements, making 
large use of direct fire in the attack of organized 
positions. During the advance, the artillery is 
greatly decentralized. When, however, the forma-
tion establishes defensive positions far beyond the 
original line of departure, the artillery immediately 
converts to strictly centralized control. The for-
mation possesses a sufficient amount of antitank and 
antiaircraft protection to enable it to hold out 
against enemy counterattacks until the arrival of 
the main forces. 
e. Corps artillery. Artillery at corps level in 
the Red Army is of relatively less importance than 
in the U. S. Army, because the Red Army places 
greatest stress on artillery at army level. Corps 
artillery is normally in control of the artillery in 
sectors of secondary priority, while army artillery 
controls the artillery in the sector of main effort. 
Artillery units at corps level include medium ar-
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tillery brigades, antitank artillery regiments (towed 
tank destroyers with 76.2-mm guns), and rocket 
units. The weapons of the medium artillery bri-
gade are the 122-mm guns and the 152-mm gun-
howitzers. 
122-MM GUNS. The 122-mm guns (M1931/37), 
the basic long-range weapons of Soviet field artil-
lery, have high muzzle velocity, great penetration 
and range, good rate of fire, but only moderate 
maneuverability. (They are replaced by 107-mm 
guns, M1940 or 1910/30, in difficult terrain or 
when rapid movement is required.) The 122-mm 
guns are employed against distant targets and for 
destruction of materiel. Their primary missions 
are neutralization or destruction of artillery and 
armored trains; neutralization, interdiction, or har-
assment of distant targets; destruction of moder-
ately strong permanent fortifications by flat-trajec-
tory fire; and fire reconnaissance against distant 
targets. Secondary missions are destruction of 
tanks and vehicles by direct fire; destruction of ele-
vated targets; and destruction or neutralization of 
field fortifications, mortars, infantry weapons, and 
infantry in the open. Exceptional missions are 
antipersonnel and accompanying barrages, and de-
struction of minefields. 
152-MM GUN-HOWITZERS. The 152-mm gun-
howitzers (M1931/37) have much greater range 
and penetration than the 152-mm howitzers, but a 
lower rate of fire and, except with the self-propelled 
KV mount, considerably less maneuverability. 
They are employed in conjunction with the 122-mm 
gun against targets beyond the range or capabilities 
of the 152-mm howitzer. Their most important 
missions are: 
Neutralization or destruction of artillery 
and armored trains. 
Neutralization or interdiction of distant 
targets. 
Destruction of strong field fO,rtifications. 
Destruction of moderately strong permanent 
fortifications by flat-trajectory fire. 
Fire reconnaissance of exceptionally impor-
tant or resistant targets. 
Destruction of distant minefields. 
Secondary missions include destruction or neu-
tralization of mortars, infantry weapons, and in-
fantry in the open; and destruction of tanks, ve-
hicles, armor, and concrete by direct fire. Re-
inforcement of antipersonnel fire and employment 
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in accompanying barrages and concentrations are 
exceptional missions. 
ROCKET WEAPONS. Normally rocket units are 
not assigned to echelons lower than corps. Corps 
artillery control assures their centralized employ-
ment for intense, surprise shock actions during criti-
cal phases of offensive or defensive operations. 
Rockets are brought forward with great secrecy and 
are moved immediately after firing. They are 
committed against area targets, supplementing ar-
tillery preparations or counterpreparations, and are 
normally directed againsf enemy infantry concen-
trations. 
f. Army artillery. The heaviest fire power of 
Soviet artillery is concentrated at army level. Great 
flexibility is the advantage of large artillery organ-
izations. Soviet commanders are provided with the 
means to concentrate large artillery forces in the 
area of the main effort. 
The artillery division of the Red Army includes 
in its organization a well balanced assortment of 
weapons ·which, as a ruJe, are employed together. 
The component parts of the artillery divisions are: 
One howitzer brigade with three regiments 
of 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers 
(M1938) . 
One light artillery brigade with three regi-
ments of 76.2-mm guns. 
One gun brigade with two regiments of 122-
mm guns and 152·mm gun-howitzers. 
One mortar brigade with three regiments of 
120-mm mortars. 
One observation battalion. 
The fire power of the artillery division is rem-
forced as needed by additional brigades or regi-
ments containing heavy, very heavy, or superheavy 
guns, howitzers, and motar-howitzers-such as 152-
mm guns, 203-mm howitzers, 280-mm mortar-how-
itzers, 406-mm mortar-howitzers-and other super-
heavy caliber weapons. 
The general characteristics of the guns are ex-
tremely great range, very high muzzle velocity and 
penetration, low rate of fire, and poor maneuver-
ability. They are employed against extremely dis-
tant targets or, in conjunction with the heavy how-
itzers, for destruction or neutralization of excep-
tionally important and resistant targets. Heavy 
howitzers and mortar-howitzers are used by Soviet 
field artillery when exceptionally great blast and 
penetration are required. Targets for these weap-
ons are carefully selected because of the low rate 
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of fire and great weight of ammunition. Typical 
targets are permanent fortifications (using either 
flat-trajectory or high-angle fire), bridges, railroads, 
and buildings. The mortar-howitzers are em-
ployed at moderate ranges. Normally, fire recon-
naissance by lighter weapons precedes the employ-
ment of the reinforcing heavy-caliber weapons of 
the artillery division. 
The mortar brigade of the artillery division com-
poses the countermortar group which also may be 
reinforced by a 132-mm rocket regiment of 12 
rocket installations or by a regiment of 122-mm 
howitzers. 
Mortar divisions and brigades have been formed 
to support large-scale operations against strong 
enemy fortifications or powerful defenses at river 
lines. Mortar divisions contain rocket as well as 
mortar regiments. Rocket units of regimental size 
have also been organized. They employ mobile 
and stationary installations. 
g. Artillery groupments. The outstanding 
organizational characteristic of Soviet artillery is 
the artillery groupments, which are the basic op-
erating organizations of artillery. It is the re-
sponsibility of the artillery commander to form 
these groupments from artillery divisions, from 
units and elements of GHQ regiments, from infantry 
divisional artillery, and, to a limited extent, from 
regimental or even battalion mortars and cannon. 
These groupments are organized on the basis of a 
careful estimate of the special requirements for a 
specific operation. 
TYPES. One infantry support groupment is set 
up for each regiment of infantry, divided into sub-
groupments for each battalion of infantry when 
three or more battalions of artillery are alloted to 
the groupment. 
Countermortar groupments usually operate dur-
ing the artillery preparation. They consist of 120-
mm mortar and 122-mm howitzer units supported 
by sound-ranging or other instrumental reconnais-
sance elements. At the conclusion of their mission, 
the component elements are often attached to in-
fantry support groupments. 
Artillery destruction groupments normally con-
sist of fire reconnaissance and destruction subgroup-
ments. These groupments are often operative only 
during the preparation phase. The fire reconnais-
sance subgroupment and light guns from the de· 
struction subgroupment are then attached to infantry 
support groupments, while heavy and very heavy 
artillery either reverts to the army artillery com· 
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mander or is attached to the counterbattery or dis-
tant operations groupments. 
COllnterbattery groupmcllts are maintained 
throughout the operation against deep defenses. 
When large quantities of artillery are available, 
separate distant-operations groupments are also 
formed. 
Antiaircraft grollprvents initially protect the en· 
tire artillery and infantry deployment area. (An 
antiaircraft artillery division usually operates as the 
basis of such a groupment.l Upon displacement 
by light artillery and mortars, elements of the 
groupment are detached and placed under forward 
artillery or infantry control. Medium and heavy 
antiaircraft artillery remains in place to protect 
army artillery groupments and rear installations. 
Roving batteries operate during the advance 
guard and screening phases of the operation only. 
They are then attached to infantry-support group-
ments. 
Accompanying guns (direct fire weapons) are 
generally allotted and sited during the night pre-
ceding the artillery preparation. If they are al-
lotted to artillerY destruction groupments, they be-
gin operations during the destruction phase of the 
artillery preparation. If they are allotted to in-
fantry units (down to companies), they begin op-
erations at the end of the preparation. 
The number of groupments and subgroupments 
depends upon the expected difficulty and duration 
of the operation, the quantity of artillery, the width 
and the depth of the zone of operations, and possi-
bilities for observation. A groupment may vary 
from one to nine battalions in size; a subgroup-
ment from a battery to three battalions. A group-
ment or subgroupment must be provided with ade-
quate fire controL signal communications, observa-
tion, and transport to execute its mission. The 
sector of fire varies with the range; it is usually di-
vided into a primary and an emergency sector. 
CONTROL. Groupments and subgroupments may 
be controlled by the army artillery commander, by 
an artillery division, by an infantry corps artillery 
commander, by an infantry division artillery com-
mander, by a regimental artillery commander, or by 
an infantry commander ~ from corps to company). 
Control is determined by the phase of the opera-
tion, the scheme of maneuver, the width and depth 
of the firing sector of each groupment, and its po-
sition area. 
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In general, the divisional or regimental artillery 
commanders control artillery during the advance 
guard and covering phase. During preparation, 
control is highly centralized. The army (army 
group) artillery commander personally supervises 
fire against the most critical targets, regardless of 
their character. The artillery divisions control 
counter battery, distant operations, antiaircraft, 
antitank, and sometimes countermortar and artil-
lery destruction groupments. The divisional artil-
lery commanders control infantry support and, 
normally, countermortar and artillery destruction 
groupments, as well as roving batteries and accom-
panying guns. Furthermore, the artillery com-
mander at each level sets aside a portion of fire of 
one or more artillery units as command reserve for 
critical emergencies. 
With the assault, control of accompanying guns 
and infantry support groupments passes to the in-
fantry artillery divisions. to insure their most ef-
fective employment. 
During reorganization, when the security of the 
assaulting troops is a paramount problem, the regi-
mental and divisional artillery commanders control 
artillery in advanced positions, while the army ar-
tillery commander continues command of the ar-
tillery division. 
In exploitation, control is increasingly assumed 
by infantry commanders, and artillery is decentral-
ized to small units (even battalions or companies I . 
Long-range artillery, howe\"er. remains under cen-
tralized control to give distant support to mobile 
troops. 
The degree of centralized control varies with the 
tactical importance of each sector. In the zone of 
the main effort, the army artillery and artillery di-
vision commanders have primary responsibilities; 
in secondary sectors, the corps or the divisional ar-
tillery commanders. In operations on a wide front, 
the reinforcing artilleq" of secondary sectors may 
be controlled by infantry corps. 
The width and the depth of the firing sector, and 
the position area of each groupment are determined 
bv its mission. A countermortar groupment, for 
e~ample, may operate on the front of two infantry 
divisions. An artillery destruction groupment may 
fire from firing positions of one division at targets 
in the sector of another. In such instances, con-
trol is assumed by the next higher echelon, corps or 
army, with subgroupments allotted to each division. 
V-53 
TM 30-430 
3. ARTILLERY AND AIR OFFENSIVE 
a. Basic doctrine. The large-scale offensive 
use of artillery crystallized in 1942 into a Soviet 
tactical doctrine, "the artillery and air offensive." 
The fundamental element of this doctrine is the re-
sponsibility of the highest artillery commander, 
through the artillery chain of command, for the 
organization and execution of a unified system of 
fire preparation, support, and security for infantry 
maneuver. The operations of tactical air bombard-
ment and other supporting fire power are coordi-
nated with the basic artillery responsibility. The 
success of the doctrine can be judged from repeated 
operational examples: Orel, the crossing of the 
Dneiper River, Novogorod, the Karelian Isthmus, 
the Perekop Isthmus, and Sevastopol. 
Most important in the execution of the artillery 
and air offensive are the following features: 
INTELLIGENCE. A comprehensive intelligence 
system includes a thorough standing operating 
procedure for troop reconnaissance by batteries and 
battalions, and aggressive action by infantry and 
artillery patrols to push observation as far for-
ward as needed_ Specialized types of instrumental 
and air reconnaissance augment the results of troop 
reconnaissance. Extensive documentation and 
systematic analysis of information are required. 
Operational recommendations from lower echelons 
are combined directly with their intelligence re-
ports. Higher echelons, particularly army, must 
disseminate all necessary intelligence directly and 
promptly to every operating level down to batteries. 
PLANNING. Continuous comprehensive planning 
of fire is based upon a thoroughly developed firing 
technique. The requirements of fire against per-
sonnel, tanks and ordnance, field fortifications, per-
manent fortifications, minefields, wire and dragon's 
teeth, elevated targets, bridges, railroads, and high-
ways have been well determined. Initial standards 
for the neutralization, destruction, interdiction, 
harassing, and fire reconnaissance of targets have 
been established. Beyond this, great attention is 
paid to secrecy and surprise, maneuver of fire, ag-
gressive displacement, and variation of tactics. 
Planning develops from the combined scheme of 
maneuver and the detailed analysis of enemy capa-
bilities by operational phases of time and space, 
starting with the initial concentration of forces 
through the de)5truction of the enemy defensive 
system and culminating with the exploitation in his 
deep rear. Neutralization of enemy capabilities 
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must be effected within the time allotted, and with 
maximum economy of personnel, materiel, and am-
munition. 
After careful calculation of the requirements, the 
fire power, transportation, and signal systems of 
the entire task force (army, front or group of 
fronts) are reorganized accordingly. Flexibility to 
meet surprises or to exploit unexpected successes is 
provided by systematic duplication of material in 
critical areas (for example, radio duplicated by 
wire, mortars duplicated by rockets), and by allot-
ment of reserves. Centralized reserves under the 
immediate control of the senior artillery commander 
are employed in mass for decisive results. Local 
reserves, particularly of ammunition, insure secur-
ity. 
COORDINATION. Coordination of time, space, and 
command is the basic concern of every artillery 
echelon. The following are mandatory: personal 
contact, exchange of liaison officers, multiple com-
munications, unified code, and terrain reference 
systems within and between artillery units and with 
supported or cooperating arms. Survey is always 
initiated at the earliest possible moment; full sur-
vey is prescribed for all units in the main effort. 
Command and organizational groupments are 
changed as required with every new operational 
phase to support the infantry most closely and ef-
fectively. 
h. Fire plan. Accurate, unceasing planning of 
fire is a mandatory function of artillery regimental 
and higher staffs. Advance planning, with suit-
able modifications during combat, alone can insure 
continuous, reliable, and close support of infantry 
(or tanks), as well as economy of ammunition and 
ordnance. 
REQUIREMENTS. Primary responsibility for ar-
tillery fire plans rests with the highest artillery 
commander engaged in the operation (army, army 
group, or GHQ). The plan, based on the infantrv 
(or tank) scheme of maneuver, must embrace th~ 
entire contemplated operation from advance guard 
action to completion of exploitation. 
A correct plan is dependent upon continuously 
developing intelligence. Needed intelligence In-
cludes: 
The forward line of enemy defenses, which 
determines the location of observation 
points and firing positions. 
The grouping of enemy reserves, which de-
termines the measures taken for their di-
1 Nov 45 
rect neutralization and for the interdiction 
of routes of communication. 
The locations, numbers, and types of enemy 
artillery and mortars, which determine 
the composition, firing positions, and mis-
sions of counterbattery and countermortar 
groupments. 
Detailed analysis of the enemy defensive sys-
tem in the zone of main effort comprising 
the location of strongpoints and of firing 
and communications trenches. 
Fields and densities of fire of automatic 
weapons, mortars, and infantry guns_ 
These factors determine the composition, firing posi-
tions, and missions of the infantry-support and artil-
lery destruction groupments, as well as the allotment 
of weapons to infantry units. Basic factors of ter-
rain, vegetation, and weather determine the systems 
of observation and fire control, and the capabilities 
of artillery displacement. 
COORDINATION. The plan is initiated with the 
first warning order. It is continuously coordinated 
with the staff of combined arms, and with the staffs 
of other arms, to insure a common time and space 
schedule, a common system of essential signals and 
signal communication, maximum exploitation of tac-
tical capabilities, joint combat security, and joint 
camouflage discipline. It is checked to the greatest 
practical degree by personal reconnaissance of the 
artillery commander and the commander of com-
bined arms. It must be disseminated to lower eche-
lons, in preliminary form, as early as possible; in 
final form, simultaneously with the field order. 
The estimate of artillery fire allows for the neu-
tralization of all probable enemy capabilities. Du-
plicate equipment must be provided for execution of 
the most important missions. Safety factors and 
reserves of ammunition and ordnance for unforeseen 
contingencies must be generous. Artillery must not 
hesitate to ask for fire by air, by mortars and rock-
ets, by infantry, or by other weapons when more 
rapid, economical, and certain results can be 
achieved thereby. 
The fire plan must provide maximum surprise and 
deception. Sudden concentrations, false transfers 
of fire, irregular periods of neutralization or inter-
diction, and employment of alternate firing posi-
tions or roving batteries-all are important methods 
which must be utilized to surprise and shock the 
enemy. 
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Soviet doctrine emphasizes the necessity for large-
scale artillery support in offensive operations. An 
artillery groupment must be formed or activated for 
the execution of each major artillery mission, usu-
ally bringing the proportion of artillery to infantry 
to 2 to 1. Certain groupments are maintained 
throughout the operation; others, through one or 
more phases only. 
USE OF THE PLAN. The artillery plan computes 
the necessary densities of fire and the capabilities 
of friendly artillery. In addition, it recommends 
army (front) and subordinate artillery groupments 
as well as the position areas and missions of army 
(front) artillery, and the missions of lower echelons 
of artillery. The plan computes the time necessary 
for artillery preparation and ammunition require-
ments; -and it determines the time when the artillery 
will be ready for combat and the most effective meth-
ods for the support of infantry and tanks. 
With the aid of this plan, the Commander of 
Combined Arms prescribes the following: 
Attachment of army (army group) artillery 
to lower formations. 
Composition of army (army group) group-
ments. 
Priorities and system of deployment. 
Time and duration of artillery preparation, 
infantry assault, and reorganization of as-
saulting forces. 
Parallel regrouping of artillery. 
Allotment of ammunition. 
The Commander of Combined Arms checks the 
position areas or firing positions of army (army 
group) artillery groupments and assigns missions 
of the following types: counter battery; neutraliza-
tion of deep reserves; neutralization or destruction 
of supply installations; accompanying barrages and 
concentrations in the zone of the main effort; and 
destruction of strong permanent fortifications. 
Control of the initial fire plan during combat is 
indispensable. The execution and effectiveness of 
firing missions must be continuously reported by 
lower echelons and checked by responsible staff offi-
cers. Estimates must be corrected to conform with 
actual expenditures of ammunition and ordnance. 
Groupments and missions must be modified with 
changes in enemy and friendly capabilities, with 
movement, with increasing intelligence, and with 
changes in weather and observation. The objective 
of artillery at all times must be to anticipate the im-
mediate requirements of the supported troops. 
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DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION. The develop-
ment and execution of fire plans is accomplished in 
six steps: The combined scheme of maneuver; 
analysis of targets and enemy capabilities; deter-
mination of objectives of fire; computation of ar-
tillery fire requirements; formation (or activation) 
of groupments and assignment of batteries, position 
areas, and mission; and control of operations. 
The scheme of maneuver is normally divided into 
five phases of time and space: advance guard (cov-
ering forces) action and assembly of main forces; 
fire preparation; infantry (or tank) assault;. re-
organization and security of assaulting forces; and 
exploitation. 
Known targets and suspected areas are plotted. 
Enemy capabilities of movement and employment 
of fixed installations, both for the known and the 
probable order of battle, are then calculated. The 
objectives of artillery fire against each group of 
targets in time and space are then prescribed. 
During the first phase (advance guard action and 
assembly of main forces) normal objectives are 
neutralization of enemy artillery, interdiction of 
enemy attack, and fire reconnaissance. 
During the fire preparation phase (subperiods: 
neutralization; registration, fire reconnaissance, and 
destruction; and neutralization) the normal obj ec-
tives are: 
Neutralization and destruction of enemy 
field and antiaircraft artillery. 
Neutralization and destruction of enemy 
mortars. 
Neutralization of observation and command 
posts, local reserves, and important centers 
of resistance in enemy rear areas. 
Interdiction of main enemy routes of com-
munication and fire reconnaissance. 
Destruction of the most important fortifica-
tions, especially permanent ones of con-
crete and steel. 
Break-through of gaps in obstacle systems 
( in con j unction with engineers and 
tanks) . 
Destruction of located flanking, firing points 
(machine guns and infantry and au'titank 
guns) and neutralization of the automatic 
weapons defensive system. 
Support of the infantry assault requires the fol-
lowing of artillery: 
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Continued neutralization of enemy artillery. 
Interdiction of main enemy routes of com-
munication. 
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Destruction of antitank guns, machine guns, 
and field fortifications in the zone of ad-
vance (especially by direct fire of accom-
panying weapons). 
Neutralization of observation and command 
posts, local reserves, and important cen-
ters of resistance in enemy rear areas. 
Accompaniment of infantry and tanks by fire 
and displacement. 0-
Interdiction of enemy counterattacks. 
Normal artillery objectives during the fourth 
phase (reorganization and security of assault 
forces) include neutralization of undamaged, newly 
found, and revived enemy batteries and centers of 
resistance; interdiction of enemy counterattacks 
and of the movement of tactical reserves; neutrali-
zation of rear installations. 
The artillery's tasks during exploitation include 
support of mobile forces by displacement of light 
artillery and by long-distance fire from heavy artil-
lery; destruction of remaining enemy centers of 
resistance; interdiction of enemy counterattacks, 
and movement of tactical or strategic reserves. 
Computation of artillery fire requirements in-
volves two problems: the expenditure of ammuni-
tion, and the types and quantities of artillery. Am-
munition expenditures include the total required for 
all targets (with a safety factor in some cases) ; 
duplication of the most important missions; a com-
mand reserve for each echelon (to be utilized only 
by permission of the next higher commander) ; and 
an un allotted reserve. Requirements for each target 
are determined by: the nature and the size of the 
target; the accuracy of target location, registration, 
and survey; the range; and the objective of fire. 
(In neutralization and interdiction, the duration of 
fire is also a factor.) The range and the objective 
of fire are basic factors in the choice of weapons. 
The time allowed for the mission governs the needed 
quantity of artillery. 
EXAMPLES. Figures 28 and 29 present an ex-
ample of an artillery fire plan in the offensive in a 
secondary sector. Thus, corps rather than army, 
is in control. The field fortifications encountered 
require only a brief period of destruction fire. 
Characteristic of the operation are the alternation 
of concentrations, destruction fire, and repeated 
false transfers. The duration of the preparation 
is 1 hour and 55 minutes. The plan for the artil-
lery commitment after the assault phase is not de-
tailed in this instance, but is of the general mission 
type. 
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PHASES OF ARTILLERY I GROUPS AND MISSIONS 
ATTACK T.Ml~ IN I INFAN'I'UY IHI{ECT FinE \"'It'l'ILLERY AND MORTARS\ COHPS COUNTER- ARMY LONC-RAN'f:F. SURe 
I. ARTILLERY PHEI'-
AHATION: 
A. First concentration. 
h. Destruction .. 
c. Se(~ollcl concentra· 
tion. 
d .. First false transfer. 
c_ Direct firc. 
f. Third concentration. 
g. Second false trans-
fer. 
h. Foul"th concentra-
tion. 
II. ASSAULT. 
III. COMBAT SECU-
RITY PHASE: 
8. ""hen infantry pas-
ses phase line co-
ordinates 37-49-
36-51. 
h. When infantry pas .. 
ses phase line 
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MINlITES WEAr-ONS ARTII.LEllY (IHVI~IONAI.) CORPS ARTILLERY MORTAR GUOUP CORPS ROCKET GROUP C-ROUPMENT 
5 
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mente in first 
trenchlinc 
(A-A)_ 
5 I .~8 in .1. 
5 As in a. 
I;; 
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IU 
15 I A.in a. 
"IT" 
On first trench-line 
(A-A) and on COIlI-
munication trcnchCM 
to second trench-
line (ll-lll_ 
On second and third trench-
line (13-13, C-C); on an 
identified E'trongpoint in 
forward position (coneen-
u'alion 120); on communi-
cation treUf:~hes from sec-
ond to third trench-line~ 
and on CPs in forward 
pm,ilion. 
DiviKional mis'"'ions. .1 On sel-ccted trench ~ctHrs in 
the second and third trench-
line. (13-B, C-CJ_ 
On mortar h.uteries 
identified in the 
forward position. 
Methodical fire on 
nelltrali~ed hat-
teri.e8~ destruction 
fire on act i v t' 
lTlnrtars. 
As in a. On first trench-line in rear I On active mortar 
position (D-D) and on an battel"ies. 
identified strongpoint in 
the real" position (concen-
tration 201). 
On an identified strong--
point in forward pORi-
tion (the same tar!!et 
as for corps artillerv-
concentration 120) 
Firl~: one battalion 
concentra tion. 
As directed .. ,IOn fint trench-line of 
real" position (D-D) 
and on communica-
tion trenches to 
second trench-line 
(E-El_ 
Third trench-line of forward 
position (C-:C) and on com-
munication trenches from 
1!'t.C'_ond to third trench-
line. 
As in a ....... , . , .. 1 On an identifie(l stron!!-
Division plnn. Methodical fire on destr()\-etl trench seCtors in second * 
line of trenches and de~ner. 
As in a. . . On target coordimtte 38-49 
Htfongpoint (concentration 
120) on third trench-line 
of forward position (C-C). 
As in c ...... . 
point in forward posi-
tion (coordina te" 38-49) 
Fire: One ref.!imental 
concentration. 
As directed. On second and third trench- I As in a ....... , As in d. --r.Ire: On bat-
line of forward p08ition talion concentration. 
On previou!'!iy T-A8-·in a. , .. 
destroyed 
(B-B. C-C) and on com-
munication trenches from 
Mccond to third trench-line. 
As in a. As in c .... , 
On i4.lentified artillery bat-
teries behind the rear 
position: on rCserveA in 
the enemy~s rcar. (Nos. 
3'10_ 302. 320, 321, 322, 
333. 331. 352_ 353_) 
Methodical fire on neu-
tralized batteries and 
neutralization of active 
hattcries. 
On active bntterie .... and 
signal centers. 
As in a. (E~cluding 300 
and 302. 
Neutralization of ac-tive 
lwtterie~. 
On ~l(~tive hweries and 
sig-nal centers. 
On revived halleries and 
reserves near Heil!ht 
191 (rear pOfli I ion) 
(concentration 200). 
On artive hateries and 
reserves. concentration 
targets. 120. 
Support RHsault with douhle accompan~jnl! barrageA .. ,., As in Ic. I As in Id ...... ,. I On active hatteries. 
Transfer to first phase I Transfer to Accond phase line 
line. under divisional arti Hery 
control. 
Further transfer to phase line (coordinates 37-49--36-
51 under division control. 
Prepared to neutralize-
enemy in area 191.2 
and 35-49 with four 
La ttalions. 
Prepared to neutralize enemy 
wlth concentl"ations 200, 
201. Inlerdict co u n t e r-
attacks with anti-per-
sonnel harrages M and N 
Interdict retreat from 
stron,;poillt Kamen (in rear 
position). 
Prepared to neutralize enemy 
areas! with concentrations 
215 and 216. Interdict 
counterattack with anti-
personnel barrages Nand 
O. Covel" commitment of 
Special attention to 
southern reverse 
!>lopes. II e i g h t 
191.2_ 
Neutl"alize act i v e 
mortar hatterie~ 
special attention 
to Height 193.4_ 
Prepared for full concen· 
tration on Height 191.3 
and Kamen. 
Prepared for regimental 
concentration. 
Neutralization of active 
batterie8. Inter J i ct 
approach of reserves 
from direction Height 
193.4-l1slinovka. 
'--______ -'-_____ ---' _________ --'_-=~cond infantry division:c-=_--:c---:--____ ::-:c--'-_____________________ _ 
·Methodical fire is conducted for continuous neutralization and to pl"e\o"ent reoccupation of previously .destroyed positions. Normally it is observed fire. 
Figure 28. Extract from the plan for artillery ofJen!ive of the 1st Rifle Corps_ 
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The plan covers the commitment of the following 
weapons, units, and formations in the corps sector 
with an approximate width of 1.5 miles: infantry 
weapons, mortars, and an organic field artillery 
regiment plus one howitzer regiment under division 
control; a medium gun brigade, a mortar regiment, 
a rocket regiment and probably one antitank regi-
ment under corps control; and part of a heavy gun 
brigade and part of an antiaircraft artillery division 
under army control. 
~ ~47~ __________ ~43r-___________ 4T9 ____________ ~50r-__________ -T51 ____________ ~5~2 ____________ ~5~3--------__ ~54~ 
39~----------~------------~----~~--~~------------+-----~--~~-------------.~~----------~39 
37 ~-----------4----~-------+ ------~~~~~F===r---------~~~----------~ 37 
~r-----------~------------~ 36 
REAR 
POSITION 
~---------+--------~--t---------~-+~~L-------~----------~----------~35 
34~----+--+--~~ __________ ~ ____________ ~~ __ ~ __ ~+---------~3~53~-------------~------------~34 
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TRENCHES AND COMMUNICATION TRENCHES TO BE NEUTRALIZED BY DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY 
TRENCHES AND COMMUNICATION TRENCHES TO BE NEUTRALIZED BY CORPS ARTILLERY 
:>.<l SECTORS TO BE DESTROYED BY CORPS ARTILLERY 
o ARTILLERY AND MORTAR BATTERIES TO BE NEUTRALIZED 
11111111111111111111111 INTERDICTION OF RETREAT 
INTERDICTION OF COUNTERATTACKS 
Figure 29. Plan of artiLLery fire for artillery offensive of 1st Rifle Corps. 
1 Nov 45 
Figures 30 and 31 are examples of the fire plan 
of a regimental infantry-support groupment in of-
fensive operation in a moderately defended enemy 
sector. The infantry-support groupment in both 
examples comprised three artillery battalions (one 
battalion from the divisional artillery and two at-
tached battalions) and a provisional mortar battal-
ion temporarily organized from the infantry, regi-
mental, and battalion mortar batteries. 
Examples A and B present different methods em-
ployed by the infantry support groupment. In Ex-
ample A, the artillery fires accompanying barrages 
which cover the entire width of the sector during 
the assault phase, while in Example B, the artillery 
supports the assault with accompanying concentra-
tions on definite targets in each phase line. 
c. Characteristics of artillery in the offen-
sive. The location of firing positions is determined 
about 10 days before the attack by the comprehen-
sive reconnaissance of assault unit and artillery 
commanders. About 2 to 3 days before the attack, 
the reinforcing artillery moves into prepared firing 
positions under the cover of night and noise created 
by mortar fire and planes. The newly arrived artil-
lery immediately starts registration fire with single 
pieces from dummy and roving gun positions, mak-
ing extensive use of the firing data available. from 
the artillery already active in the sector. 
As a rule, every battery has a main firing position 
and an alternate position to the front or rear of it. 
The main firing position is usually sufficiently far 
forward to facilitate effective fire into the depth of 
the enemy position. For the destruction or neutrali-
zation of individual strongpoints, firing positions 
are located far forward and prepared for single di-
rect-fire artillery pieces. The most effective ranges 
for direct fire during short and intensive artillery 
preparations are 440 to 880 yards for 45-mm guns, 
1,100 to 1,320 yards for 76.2-mm guns, and 1,650 to 
2,200 yards for 122-mm and 152-mm artillery pieces. 
The army or army group artillery commander 
controls registration when a large amount of artil-
lery is committed. Plans for registration and decep-
tive registration are developed to assure secrecy. 
During the course of the attack, Soviet artillery 
displaces forward as soon as the enemy main line 
of resistance is reached by friendly infantry, always 
keeping two-thirds of the artillery in firing position 
while the other third is on the move. 
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4. ARTILLERY IN DEFENSE 
a. Basic doctrine. The Red Army considers 
its artillery as the main weapon of the defense. As 
previously described, Soviet tactics distinguish two 
basic systems of defense: decentralized and cen-
tralized. The artillery in decentralized defense is 
broken up, and its components are under the con-
trol of the individual strongpoint commanders. In 
the centralized system, the artillery remains under 
the control of the artillery commander. 
The artillery missions, however, are the same for 
both defense systems: 
Fire against enemy march columns and troop 
concentrations. 
Support of the units in the forward positions. 
Interference with the deployment of the at-
tacking enemy. 
Counter battery and countermortar fire. 
Firing of smoke against enemy observation 
posts. 
Annihilation of the enemy infantry and tank 
attacks in front of the main line of resist-
ance. 
Destruction of tanks which have penetrated 
through Soviet lines. 
Preparation fire for counterthrusts and 
coun ter attacks. 
b. Concentration of artillery for defensive 
operations. Soviet artillery in the defensive is 
usually organized to facilitate the massing of fire in 
definite areas. For this purpose, artillery in a corps 
sector is normally divided into infantry-support 
groupments and artillery groupments for long-range 
counter battery and countermortar missions. 
Soviet tactical doctrine also prescribes the estab-
lishment of three firing positions for each battery, 
and emphasizes that the positions must be selected 
so that the bulk of the artillery can participate in the 
fire against enemy tanks which have penetrated the 
defenses. Emphasis is laid on the construction of 
alternate and dummy positions and the employment 
of roving guns and silent batteries to deceive the 
enemy as to the location of the real positions and 
artillery strength. The weapons are brought into 
position only when firing; the rest of the time they 
are kept to the rear in well camouflaged dugouts. 
The artillery commander also develops a fire plan 
for each sector, considering all possible combat 
phases, including: 
Concentration by long-range artillery upon 
enemy artillery positions, approach routes, 
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Figure SO. Fire chart 0/ regimental infantry support groupment during assault phase and the subsequent concen. 
trations in the depth 0/ the enemy position (example A). 
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Figure 31. Fire chart 0/ regimental in/an try support groupment during assault phase and the subsequent concentra-
tions in the depth 0/ the enemy position (example B). 
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road crossings, and other important in-
stallations in the enemy rear. 
Massed fire at enemy assembly areas, com-
mand posts, and observation posts. 
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The Red Army employs stationary antipersonnel 
and moving antitank defensive barrages. Antiper-
sonnel barrages are the rule in the defense. All 
typt:s of artillery weapons, mortars, and rockets are 
_
_______________ ~----------------~------------~~~~--~~~~~Ref ~-~r_----------93-­No .. 
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--~------------------~-----------92-
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Figure 32. Map for the chief oj section oj the roving gun. 
Box barrages against enemy tanks and large 
troop concentrations. 
Direct fire against tanks which have pene-
trated. 
Barrages in front of the main line of resist-
ance and in the depth of the friendly main 
battle position. 
coordinated for these barrages, which normally are 
about 330 yards in front of the friendly main line 
of resistance. The areas covered by the barrages 
are usually identified with names. Each artillery 
battalion is supposed to have not more than four 
barrage areas, about 440 yards wide and overlap-
ping the barrage areas of adjacent artillery battal-
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ions. Antitank barrages follow the enemy along 
his axis of approach to the friendly main line of 
resistance; however, these barrages find only lim-
ited employment due to gunnery difficulties. 
The Red Army places great emphasis on the em-
ployment of roving guns in the defensive. They 
deceive the enemy as to the quantity and grouping 
of the friendly artillery and thereby force the enemy 
to disperse the fire of his supporting weapons. 
Plans for the employment of roving guns are 
carefully worked out by the battalion commander of 
the firing platoon to achieve maximum effects. 
These plans include the march route of the gun, 
positions to be occupied and the reference points, 
firing positions to be used for effect, and deceptive 
firing positions. With the assistance of the topo-
graphical computation platoon of the battalion, the 
battalion commander also prepares a chart which 
contains: a description of the observation points and 
reference points; a description of the march route; 
target designation and firing data; and the number 
of rounds to be expended for each target and firing 
position. The firing platoon also is furnished with 
a small map which contains the march route, the 
firing positions (which are staked previously on the 
ground for easier identification), and the reference 
points (fig. 32). 
c. Artillery counterattack. Soviet doctrine 
speaks of an "artillery counterattack," thus empha-
sizing the offensive character of the artillery in the 
defensive. The mission of the artillery is to crush 
an enemy attack in its initial phase. The artillery 
counterattack, controlled by a carefully prepared fire 
plan, commences when the enemy moves into his as-
sembly position and begins his attack preparations. 
Soviet artillery relies on the observation battalions 
for firing data, to obtain complete surprise and 
abstain from using registration fire. The organiza-
tion of artillery in the centralized defense facilitates 
the conduct of the artillery counterattack. 
d. Artillery in delaying action and retreat. 
In delaying actions and retreats, the artillery is or· 
ganized in depth. Firing positions and ammuni-
tion reserves are prepared in the rear to facilitate 
speedy retrograde displacement and to permit rela-
tively large expenditure of ammunition by the cov-
ering forces. Single motorized batteries or bat-
talions are subordinated to the rear guard covering 
the retreat of the infantry. Soviet artillery opens 
fire at great ranges to delay and disorganize the 
advancing enemy. 
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5. ATTACK OF TARGETS 
The effectiveness of artillery fire, according to Red 
Army doctrines, depends upon correct determina. 
tion of the nature and location of the target, correct 
choice of the objective of fire, and the mode of at· 
tack (including weapons, ammunition, fuze, charge, 
angle of impact, firing pattern, and expenditure of 
ammunition) . 
Accuracy of registration and constant correction 
of fire, as well as continuous, accurate planning are 
additional factors. 
Surprise is of max!mum importance in fire against 
personnel; prior adjustment directly on the target 
is permissible only in exceptional cases. Short 
bursts of sudden, massed fire at maximum rates pro-
duce the greatest physical and psychological effects. 
Methodical fire, with the observation and adjustment 
of each round, is most effective in the destruction 
of materiel. 
Tabulated standards for neutralization or de· 
struction of targets are only guides. In the de· 
struction of point targets, direct fire is most rapid 
and economical; no expenditure of ammunition can 
replace accuracy in destruction fire. Direct fire, 
however, demands extremely careful preparation and 
camouflage to prevent excessive losses of personnel 
and materiel. All types of fire for effect must be 
employed until the required tactical results have 
been achieved. 
The rate of fire should not exceed the technical 
capabilities of each weapon as designated in stand· 
ard tables. With reduced charges in prolonged 
fire, increases up to 50 percent are permissible. The 
rate of fire must not be increased at the expense of 
accuracy. After prolonged or intense fighting, cor-
rections for heating and other ballistic changes are 
essential. 
a. Types of targets. From the standpoint of 
artillery fire, enemy operations and installations 
may be divided into seven general components, ex-
cluding aircraft: personnel (or animals); tanks, 
motor vehicles, and other ordnance; field fortifica-
tions, tank ditches, houses, and other structures of 
moderate strejl1gth; permanent fortifications and 
structures of great strength; minefields; wire, 
dragon's teeth, and similar resistant, small, but im-
mobile, targets; and elevated targets, such as ob-
servation posts in high trees and observation bal-
loons. 
PERSONNEL. Personnel are the primary or sec-
ondary targets of all artillery fire. Fragmentation 
and incendiary projectiles are most effective against 
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personnel in the open; heavy blast can often neu-
tralize or destroy personnel under cover even in the 
absence of direct hits_ Light and medium artillery 
may be usefully employed against personnel, 
although mortars and rockets of similar calibers are 
more effective. Surprise and quick action are 
mandatory. 
Against moving infantry, cavalry, or motorized 
troops, shrapnel and high explosive shells with 
superquick, delayed (to produce ricochet) , and time 
fuzes are employed. Fire is usually by battery, with 
a normal or concentrated sheaf, in rapid bursts of 
four to six volleys, at each sight adjustment. When-
ever possible, fire is delayed until the approach of 
troops to a registered phase line. Concentrated fire 
begins with their arrival on the line of shorts. 
Against large or rapidly moving masses of infantry, 
zone fire by all available artillery produces decisive 
results. At long ranges, such fire should be adjusted 
by aerial observation whenever possible. 
Against infantry in the open or troops in shallow 
trenches, ricochet fire, and fire with superquick fuze 
and minimum charge are most effective. HE with 
time or superquick fuze is employed against reverse 
slopes. In very broken terrain, high-angle fire is 
used with delayed fuze to get maximum vertical dis-
persion. The sheaf must be normal or concentrated 
to correspond to the width of the target. Bursts of 
three to six volleys alternate with methodical fire. 
Several methods of fire may be employed against 
personnel in field fortifications. Small groups of 
observed or unobserved, but accurately located, 
targets may be grouped into target areas not ex-
ceeding 72,000 to 96,000 square yards, which are 
brought under fire by sudden concentrations of me-
dium or heavy artillery (at least one battalion per 
240 square yards I employing suitable zone fire, 
with HE and incendiary ammunition, quick fuze, 
and minimum charge. When targets are inaccu-
rately located, the probable error in range and 
dispersion must be determined. 
If the target is large, such as a battery position or 
a supply installation, fire is distribu~ed uniformly. 
If the target is small, distribution of fire corresponds 
to the law of probabilities, with the heaviest con-
centration in the center of the area. 
TANKS AND OTHER ORDNANCE. Projectiles which 
result in penetration, incendiary action, and strong 
blast are effective against tanks and other ordnance. 
Accompanying exposed personnel must always be 
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attacked simultaneously-by fragmentation fire 
from other weapons, if necessary. 
Distant firing missions against tanks, motor ve-
hicles, artillery, and similar materiel are executed by 
the concentrated fire of medium or heavy guns, or 
heavy howitzers. Aerial observation and control, 
or precise registration, are essential to prevent ex-
cessive waste of ammunition. HE with superquick 
fuze, or concrete-piercing ammunition, are combined 
with incendiary shells for optimum results. Fire 
proceeds at maximum rates in bursts of 2 or 3 min-
utes, interrupted .by periods of methodical fire and 
ad j ustment. 
Firing missions against moving tanks at medium 
ranges (antitank defensive barrages) must be pre-
viously organized, with one or two battalions of 
medium artillery assigned to each probable tank 
approach, and with light artillery and mortars pre-
pared to fire upon accompanying infantry. Phase 
lines are registered along these approaches at inter· 
vals of 330 to 440 yards, depending on the probable 
speed of the tanks. HE superquick-fuze ammuni-
tion is allotted and prepared at firing positions. As 
the head of the enemy tank column reaches each 
phase line, concentrated fire at maximum rates is 
conducted for 2 or 3 minutes. As soon as the main 
tank group has passed the point of concentration, 
fire is then laid down upon the next phase line. 
Antipersonnel fire may be continued on the first 
phase line to isolate the tanks from their infantry. 
The last phase line is within direct fire range. 
The Red Army considers training in direct fire 
against tanks essential for all light and medium ar-
tillery. In massed tank attacks, fire must be opened 
at a maximum direct·fire range of 1,100 to 1,650 
yards. To destroy single tanks or small units, the 
most effective ranges are 330 to 770 yards, depend-
ing on muzzle velocity. Maximum charges, with 
armor-piercing or concrete-piercing ammunition, 
are employed. In the absence of AP ammunition, 
HE with quick or superquick fuze may be used, 
especially against tankettes, armored cars, and other 
lightly armored vehicles. 
FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. Field fortifications, tank 
ditches, houses, and similar structures present a 
variety of firing problems. Some of the more im-
portant variables to be considered are: hardness 
and texture of the ground; drainage and vegetation; 
presence of timber, brick, steel rails, or other reo 
inforcements; surface and subsurface profiles; na-
ture and degree of overhead cover; and the degree 
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of compartmentation. Hasty defenses may some-
times be destroyed by light artillery and mortars, 
while developed systems often require prolonged 
operations by heavy artillery and direct cannon fire 
even for effective neutralization. The peculiarities 
in each case must he established by the most thor-
ough reconnaissance possible. 
Fire upon field fortifications is best initiated by 
surprise concentrations of medium howitzers, mor-
tars, and rockets (high-angle fire, HE and incendi-
ary shells, quick and superquick fuzes). In addi-
tion to the physical and psychological effects against 
personnel, such concentrations serve to remove 
camouflage, exposing armor or concrete, and re-
veal dummy positions or weak spots. Soviet artil-
lery then initiates destruction fire. Compact groups 
of light fortifications may often be destroyed by 
several repeated concentrations, carefully observed 
and adjusted. 
The destruction of strong and extensive field for-
tifications in this manner, however, is rarely feasible. 
In firing upon such systems, comprehensive recon-
naissance must establish, as far as possible, the 
coordinated tactical grouping of the fortifications, 
differentiating occupied and alternate firing posi-
tions, observation posts, personnel shelters, commu-
nication trenches, barrier systems, and dummy in-
stallations. A definite firing plan must be developed 
for each strongpoint. 
An artillery-destruction groupment or subgroup-
ment is formed, and necessary types and numbers of 
weapons are allotted. Guns or howitzers are used 
for direct short-range fire at embrasures or vertical 
walls (using HE delayed fuze). Medium howitzers 
or heavy mortars with HE and quick or delayed fuze 
destroy and interdict communication or other 
trenches: in frontal fire, high-angle fire is used; in 
flanking fire, flat-trajectory. Personnel shelters and 
emplacements with good overhead cover must be 
destroyed by high-angle fire from heavy or very 
heavy howitzers using HE or incendiary shells and 
delayed fuze. Mortars, howitzers, or light guns may 
be used to neutralize other, lighter positions or to 
blind them with smoke. In all cases, fire must secure 
maximum accuracy. Observation is deployed as far 
forward as possible. No more weapons than neces-
sary are employed, and every round must be 
ob~erved. 
Firing upon fortified houses is normally difficult 
and time consuming, because, in modern tactics, the 
main battle position is dug into the basement, with 
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firing apertures broken through the wall. In the 
center of the basement, a personnel shelter is con-
structed, while a communication trench facilitates 
escape from one or more hidden exits. This position 
is not only given natural protection by the house 
foundations, walls, and floors, but it is also rein-
forced and fireproofed by the construction of barri-
cades and blast walls, and the packing of earth on 
floors. The roof and upper stories are used for 
observation and harrassing fire. 
There are two methods of artillery attack upon 
such a strongpoint. Heavy or very heavy howitzers 
may demolish the entire position. If these are not 
available, or if time and ammunition do not allow 
their extensive use, an entirely different technique 
must be employed. Destruction of the upper struc-
ture alone is not only futile, but it hampers subse-
quent artillery and infantry operations by limiting 
visibility in dust and smoke, and increasing protec-
tion and camouflage afforded by rubble. The most 
effective technique is neutralization of the windows 
and roofs with time fire or shrapnel; destruction of 
the forward and other edges of the basement with 
direct fire or flat trajectory (HE, delayed fuze) fire 
from medium howitzers or guns; and interdiction 
of possible exits with suitable zone fire (by howitz-
ers or mortars). After the main battle position is 
thus destroyed or neutralized, the upper structure 
may be destroyed by using HE or incendiary pro-
jectiles, or it may be mopped up by infantry. 
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. Successful fire 
upon massive structures requires comprehensive 
visual and fire reconnaissance, employment of very 
heavy howitzers and medium guns, close range and 
continuous observation and adjustment, and, if pos-
sible, suitable firing positions not over 5 kilometers 
from the target. Under favorable circumstances 
fortified targets up to 10 kilometers distant may be 
destroyed; at greater ranges only neutralization is 
usually possible. Destruction can rarely be ac-
complished in less than several days' reconnaissance 
and a day's fire, or with the expenditure of less than 
several hundred rounds per target. 
Permanent fortifications are destroyed by the flat 
trajectory fire of medium and heavy guns, and of 
very heavy howitzers, or by high-angle fire from 
very heavy howitzers. Such targets are neutralized 
by direct, short-range fire of light and medium guns 
at embrasures and armor. The angle of impact in 
all cases must not be less than 58 degrees. Flat-
trajectory fire, and especially direct fire, must be 
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employed whenever possible, since these bring about 
an economy of 80 to 90 percent in time and ammu-
nition_ Care must be exercised, however, to con-
duct such fire against the actual wall of the position, 
rather than against a mask or exterior blast wall. 
Red A];my artillery missions against massive struc-
tures are divided into four phases: fire reconnais-
sance, selection of firing positions for very heavy 
artillery, registration, and destruction fire. To 
conduct such an attack, an artillery destruction 
groupment or subgroupment is formed. As far as 
is necessary, its operations must be protected against 
counterbattery fire by the neutralization of enemy 
artillery. 
Fire reconnaissance is conducted by medium and 
heavy howitzers, and, to a lesser degree, by mortars 
and rockets. It must be closely coordinated with 
repeated aerial and ground photography, and with 
continuous optical observation. Fire on the sus-
pected area seeks to strip away masks and cam-
ouflage, and to establish the presence and thickness 
of concrete or armor, the outlines of the fortified 
structures, the location and direction of embrasures, 
and the system of tactical coordination with other 
strongpoints. In fire reconnaissance, the presence 
of gray dust in a low, wide burst and a sharp rever-
bration indicate concrete; a very marked reverbera-
tion, and frequent, sudden ricochets indicate the 
presence of armor. Indisputable evidence of the 
presence of permanent fortifications is afforded by 
the gradual disclosure of angular outlines, embra-
sures, and cupolas. On the other hand, a dummy 
position is indicated if repeated hits develop a large, 
sagging depression not over 2 yards above ground 
level without revealing any indications of the pres-
ence of concrete or armor. 
If fire reconnaissance discloses a field fortification 
within the capabilities of the artillery then firing, 
these guns continue fire until the target is destroyed. 
Once fire reconnaissance has definitely established 
the presence and character of permanent fortifica-
tions, firing positions for very heavy artillery are 
chosen. One to two pieces are assigned to each 
target. Whenever feasible, the positions should al-
low flat trajectory or very high-angle fire at ranges 
under 5,500 yards, provide reasonable cover from 
enemy fire, and coincide as closely as possible with 
the longitudinal axis of the targets. Suitable cov-
ered approaches must exist. Observation must be 
provided as far forward as possible, preferably 
within 550 yards of the target. In some instances, 
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local infantry attacks may be necessary to facilitate 
such observation. Observation posts are either sin-
gle or in pairs. The single observation post must 
coincide as closely as possible with the gun-target 
line. In every case, exact survey is indispensable. 
Soviet gun positions for dir.ect fire against em-
brasures are also chosen with great care; they should 
be within 660 yards of the target and in direct line 
with embrasures, vertical walls, or other vulnerable 
parts of the target. Extremely careful camouflage 
must be maintained in occupying positions and prior 
to opening fire. Artillery which has a mission of 
destruction takes precedence over all other weapons 
in the occupation of suitable firing positions and 
observation posts. 
Fire continues until the obvious collapse of the 
target, or until two or three complete penetrations 
ha ve resulted. This requires from two to ten direct 
hits by heavy guns or very heavy howitzers, depend-
ing on the strength of the fortification and the power 
of the weapon. Approximate ammunition require-
ments for each hit may be calculated by the prob-
ability formula. When destruction has been com-
pleted, interdiction fire by light and medium artil-
lery is essential to prevent reoccupation of the ruins. 
MINEFIELDS. Establishing gaps through mine-
fields in volves two phases: fire reconnaissance and 
fire for destruction. In fire reconnaissance, a heavy 
battery combs the entire suspected area, employing 
a parallel sheaf and elevation changes of one prob-
able error. (Combing fire is an observed barrage 
progressively covering an area with suspected, es-
pecially immobile, targets. As soon as results of 
fire confirm the location of the targets-by explo-
. sions, sudden ricochet, etc.-massed fire for effect 
is initiated.) HE, with quick fuze, is employed. 
Two battery salvos are fired at each s-ight setting, 
with careful observation for signs of sympathetic 
detonations. 
Once the boundaries of the minefield and of the 
desired gaps have been determined, fire for effect 
is begun. If possible, heavy or very heavy how-
itzers are used. The sheaf is closed or concen-
trated to ll-yard intervals. Ricochet fire is em-
ployed, with the burst no higher than II yards above 
the ground. Fire is conducted at one sight setting, 
with observation of each salvo, until no evidence of 
sympathetic detonations can be seen or heard. If 
the probable error in range is small and the mine-
field deep, then the bombardment is repeated at the 
next sight elevation, until the gap has been com-
1 Nov 45 
pletely cleared. In the absence of heavy or very 
heavy howitzers, the Red Army may use medium 
howitzers or light guns against minefields. HE with 
quick fuze is used. Large expenditures of ammuni-
tion are necessary, however, and results are not 
always certain. 
WIRE. Against wire, dragon's teeth, and similar 
resistant, small, but immobile, targets, the Soviets 
employ frontal, flat-trajectory fire by light guns or, 
in some cases, medium howitzers. Protection of 
these weapons by other artillery fire is generally 
necessary. If more than one weapon is employed, 
calibration and ballistic corrections must be applied. 
Whenever possible, direct fire is used; in no case 
should the range exceed 3,300 yards. 
Medium howitzers or light guns are employed, 
singly or in small units, to destroy wire. If the 
desired gap is 9 yards or less, a concentrated sheaf 
is used; otherwise, the sheaf corresponds to the de-
sired width. HE ammunition is employed, with 
superquick fuze and the minimum possible charge 
(to produce the maximum angle of impact with 
least range dispersion). The forward edge of the 
wire serves as the aiming point; to secure the best 
results, one·third of the rounds should be shorts. 
Fire is continued until the gap is completely cleared. 
Requirements in time and ammunition vary greatly 
with the range and the depth of the wire barrier. 
Dragon's teeth are attacked with short-range di-
rect fire. Light guns with AP ammunition are 
employed against concrete and granite dragon's 
teeth; timber obstacles are destroyed by medium 
howitzers with HE fire and superquick fuze. Ar-
tillery fire is ineffective against heavy steel obstacles. 
In all cases, dragon's teeth and similar obstacles 
require the expenditure of much time and ammuni-
tion. Fire must be continued until the remnant 
stumps can be cleared by tanks. 
b. Fire objectives. The obj ectives of Soviet 
of fire for effect are: neutralization, destruction, 
interdiction, or harassment. Fire reconnaissance is 
either an independent objective or a phase of ob· 
served fire for effect. Above all, choice depends on 
the targets' threat to the infantry (or tank) scheme 
of maneuver. Successive phases of an operation will 
often require different objectives in firing upon the 
same target: for example, neutralization during the 
artillery preparation, destruction during the assault, 
and interdiction of the ru'ins during exploitation. 
Other important factors are: firing capabilities of 
the artillery within the time and with the ammuni-
tion available; accuracy of target location and reg-
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istration; size of the target and its resistance to fire; 
range; and meteorological and visibility conditions. 
Neutralization is the normal objective of artillery 
fire; by employing surprise and intense fire, almost 
any target can be successfully neutralized. This 
condition is primarily psychological, and results 
normally from attacks on personnel that achieve 25 
percent casualties, with accompanying shock and 
destruction. Neutralization is achieved by two or 
three repeated periods of concentrated fire, inter-
rupted by periods of adjustment and methodical 
fire. Whenever possible, continuous observation 
must be maintained on neutralized targets. If signs 
of activity are observed, harassing fire should be 
employed; a major resurgence of activity should be 
neutralized by a new concentration of fire. 
The annihilation of personnel or the certain de· 
struction of materiel by artillery fire are possible 
only under favorable conditions. Direct fire at 
short ranges, as the most certain, rapid, and econom-
ical method, must be employed whenever possible. 
Flat-trajectory observed fire and high-angle ob-
served fire by medium, heavy, and very heavy artil-
lery demand successively greater accuracy in initial 
data and a greater expenditure of time and ammuni-
tion. Unobserved fire for destruction is practicable 
only with large masses of heavy and very heavy 
artillery and cannot be guaranteed against small, 
mobile, or very resistant targets. It should be uti-
lized only in exceptional cases, against targets of 
the greatest importance. Fire for destruction by 
large masses of artillery is usually feasible only 
against personnel or light field fortifications. When 
more than one piece is employed for the destruction 
of a small resistant target, full ballastic preparation, 
precise registration, and continuous control of fire 
are indispensable. 
Soviet artillery fire is widely employed to deny 
terrain to the enemy and to immobilize him under-
cover. The principal types of interdictory fire are 
antipersonnel and antitank defensive barrages, ac-
companying barrages, accompanying concentra-
tions, and distant interdictory concentrations. All 
interdiction fire requires accurate registration on 
the target, and continual knowledge of the exact lo-
cation of friendly troops. The battalion, or its 
equivalent, is usually the smallest unit to conduct 
interdiction fire. Often such types of fire are 
mixed: for example, an antipersonnel mortar bar-
rage fired in conjunction with an antitank artillery 
barrage. 
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ANTIPERSONNEL DEFENSIVE BARRAGES. These 
are planned so as to lay down fire on registered and 
observed phase lines, screening friendly forces 
against infantry attacks or counterattacks. If the 
friendly troops are under cover, such barrages may 
be laid down not closer to them than 220 yards with 
frontal fire, and 110 yards with flanking fire. If 
the friendly troops are in the open, minimum dis· 
tances for light or medium artillery are 440 yards 
with ricochet or superquick fuze, and 220 yards with 
quick fuze. The normal sheaf is employed in fron· 
tal fire; in flanking fire, platoon (two.gun) con-
centrations are separated by one sight setting for 
guns or two for howitzers. Fire is conducted at 
one sight setting only. At each piece, 10 or 12 
rounds of fuzed ammunition are set aside; in firing, 
two or three rapid volleys are followed by methodi· 
cal fire every 5 to 10 seconds. Registered ranges 
and deflections are noted prominently on each piece; 
care is taken to correct for decreases in range after 
prolonged fire and for other errors. Calls for anti· 
personnel defensive barrages take precedence over 
all other firing missions, which are immediately sus· 
pended. 
ANTITANK DEFENSIVE BARRAGES. These have 
been described under attacks against tanks. 
ACCOMPANYING BARRAGES. These are employed 
to support infantry and tanks through the main line 
of enemy resistance (1,650 to 2,200 yards) in the 
assault of organized positions. They consist of a 
rolling barrage by heavy mortars, medium howit· 
zers, or light guns; direct fire through gaps in the 
infantry lines by light guns and howitzers; and ac· 
companying concentrations against rear areas by 
heavier weapons. In organizing the rolling bar-
rage, the zone of fire is divided into sectors by pri-
mary and intermediate phase lines. The first pri. 
mary phase line is 220 to 275 yards from the line 
of departure. In the support of infantry, other 
primary phase lines are from 165 to 330 yards apart 
(usually on enemy trenches or on other lines of re-
sistance or movement) ; in the support of light tanks, 
275 to 440 yards; in the support of medium or heavy 
tanks, 440 to 880 yards. Intermediate phase lines 
for infantry are separated by 110 yards; for tanks 
by 220 yards. 
The width of the sheaf varies from 40 to 80 per· 
cent of normal. Density of fire on each phase line 
varies from 6 to 18 rounds per no yards per minute, 
depending on the caliber (76.2- to 152-mm) of the 
weapon used. When exceptionally heavy resistance 
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is expected, the barrage may be deepened-not 
thickened-by additional layers of medium or heavy 
artillery fire. HE with superquick or delayed (rico· 
chet) fuzes and flat-trajectory fire are employed; 
also shrapnel and smoke shells under favorable 
circumstances. 
The duration of fire on each primary and sec-
ondary phase line is determined by the speed of 
advance of the supported troops. Fire is lifted by 
signal from primary phase lines, and by schedule 
(not over 2 minutes) from intermediate phase lines. 
Accompanying barrages require exceptional safe-
guards: full ballistic preparation and precise regis. 
tration, reliable multiple-signal systems, and con· 
tinual observation of friendly troop;; from all 
possible points. 
ACCOMPANYING CONCENTRATIONS. This type of 
fire, employing uniform zones, neutralizes suspected 
or active areas of enemy resistance. It is employed 
either as a part of an accompanying barrage or-if 
the resistance is moderate or when ammunition is 
insufficient for an accompanying barrage--inde-
pendently. The concentrations may be fired on call 
or on a schedule. Generally, fire is lifted by signal. 
INTERDICTION FIRE AT LONG RANGES. This is 
used to block communications. Employment of 
precise data is necessary to avoid excessive waste of 
ammunition. If the target is under observation, fire 
is begun at the approach of enemy vehicles or per· 
sonnel; otherwise, an irregular schedule of harassing 
fire is maintained. The weapons and firing unit 
employed depend on the range and the size of the 
target. 
Harassing fire, designed to reduce enemy effi-
ciency and excite return fire, is conducted by roving 
batteries or from alternate positions. It may con-
sist of sudden concentrations, or the more constant 
fire of a few guns. Intervals, expenditure of am-
munition, and pattern of fire must be constantly 
varied to secure maximum effect. High explosive 
with delayed (ricochet) or superquick fuze and min-
imum charges are utilized. 
Fire reconnaissance, conducted by roving batter-
ies or by elements of an artillery destruction group-
ment, seeks to clarify the enemy situation and to 
permit the economical and effective use of heavy 
and very heavy artillery by provoking enemy fire or 
other noticeable activity; by stripping off camou-
flage, earth, and other cover from suspected perma-
nent fortifications; by detonating mines, etc. Me· 
dium guns and howitzers are employed, with de. 
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layed (ricochet) or quick fuze, depending on the 
target. Observation, aerial photography, or sound 
ranging are indispensable. Against areas suspected 
of containing personnel, harassing or combing fire 
is most effective; against minefields, combing fire 
is required; against camouflage, combing or con· 
centrated fire may be utilized. 
c. Registration. The Soviets regard accurate 
registration as the indispensable foundation of their 
techniques of massed fire and fire on unobserved 
targets. The four elements of registration are: bal-
listic preparation; development of a network of reg-
istration check points; adjustment of fire; and 
transfer of fire to the target, or massing it on the 
target. 
In massing large quantities of artillery, registra-
tion is limited to gain surprise and to avoid obscur-
ing observation. Registration fire is usually con-
ducted by one piece of each caliber and a model 
from each battalion or groupment, although the 
proportion may be as low as one piece every 4,400 
to 5,500 yards. Ballistic preparation and survey 
must have been completed. The registration piece 
must be the best available, that is, have the lowest 
differential reduction of muzzle velocity, and be 
carefully calibrated, preferably by fire. 
ADJUSTMENT TECHNIQUE. The primary tech-
nique of adjustment of fire is bracketing, controlled 
by a single axial or lateral observer. Whenever 
possible, shells from the same lot and of the same 
weight and fuze setting are employed both in ad-
justment and in fire for effect. For adjustment on 
an impact check point, at least four rounds are re-
quired; for adjustment on an air burst or sound 
ranging check point, from six to nine rounds. 
Normally, adjustment is fired by a single piece, 
with corrections for range, deflection, and-in air 
burst or ricochet-elevation. When speed is de-
sired, as in adjustment on personnel, or when ad-
justment is by sound ranging or aerial observation, 
battery or battalion salvos are employed. 
OBSERV ATION. Aerial observation is undertaken 
with the light, two-seater U-2 airplane, the slow 
but heavily armored Stormovik, or with an obser-
vation balloon. It is normally limited to ranges in 
excess of 5,500 yards or to areas inaccessible to 
ground observation. In every case, thorough brief-
ing of the pilot and air observer in land marks, 
orientation points, and recognition signals is re-
quired to reduce time in the air and to obviate er-
rors. Salvos are always concentrated. The fire of 
battery or battalion ladders is a common type of 
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control. In another method of correction, the ob-
server drops a flare or a smoke bomb at a point 
visible to ground observers and adjusts fire in rela-
tion to this reference point. 
When large numbers of guns are firing, identifi-
cation of the correct bursts for adjustment is insured 
by checking the estimated time of flight with a stop 
watch. 
Adjustment of fire by paired observers is under-
taken to insure both greater accuracy and greater 
economy of ammunition than are possible with a 
single observer. This is the basic method for heavy 
artillery, and is utilized whenever time and terrain 
permit establishment of suitable observation points 
and signal communications. The angle of inter-
section between the observers' lines of sight and the 
target must always exceed 250 mils. 
FIRE TRANSFER. Two techniques are employed 
for transfers of fire: K-transfer (computation of the 
coefficient between survey and registration distances, 
angle of site, drift, and necessary additional cor-
rections for changes of ammunition) when survey 
has been completed; and direct transfer from a real 
or an arbitrary check point with or without survey. 
The first method is applicable to transfers up to 
1,650 yards from the check point; the second, up to 
330 yards, with a deflection not in excess of 300 mils. 
Whenever possible, fire should be transferred im-
mediately after adjustment on a check point. When 
this is impossible, the correction of two factors must 
be considered. Adjustments for meteorological con-
ditions must be made within a maximum of 3 to 
12 hours, depending inversely on the height of 
trajectory. Adjustments for change in range of the 
trajectory due to the heating of tubes and ammuni· 
tion must be made after 20 to 30 minutes of steady 
fire. To compensate for this decrease in range, ele-
vations should be raised by one or two sight gradu-
ations for ranges of 3 to 6 kilometers; by two to 
three graduations for longer ranges. 
More accurate correction of the transfer results 
from re-registration executed by the original regis-
tration piece. If graphs of the lines of registration 
distances and deflections have been previously pre· 
pared, it is necessary only to fire one check point. 
The old data are then recomputed proportionally 
to the new correction. Such re-registration is espe-
cially important in unobserved fire. 
6. ARTILLERY ANTITANK TACTICS 
The destruction of tanks and self-propelled guns is 
the primary or secondary mission of all artillery, 
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and Red Army crews on all types of artillery are 
trained in direct fire. The antitank defensive bar-
rages of medium and heavy artillery have been 
described above under the discussion of types of 
targets. The primary tank·destroying weapons are, 
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rifle corps and division commanders for the protec· 
tion of primary sectors. Part of the antitank artil-
lery must always be kept by the Commander of 
Combined Arms as a reserve. For example, one-
fourth of the antitank guns of a rifle division, in-
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Figure 33. Antitank artillery supplemented by obstacles in a Soviet main battle position. 
however, towed antitank guns: 45-mm, 57-mm, 76.2-
mm, 85-mm, and IOO-mm guns are found in organic 
and GHQ antitank artillery units. Self-propelled 
artillery often supports towed antitank guns, particu-
larly in mobile corps; self-propelled artillery tactics 
are described under section III, Armored and 
Mechanized Forces. 
Antitank artillery regiments are often attached to 
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eluding regimental and battalion weapons, are held 
in the mobile divisional antitank gun reserve. 
Coordination between antitank artillery and other 
arms, especially field artillery, mortars, engineers, 
and infantry, is of prime importance. Antitank ar-
tillery regiments are also used as tank support in 
the area of the main effort. 
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Antitank artillery is usually employed in echelons, 
with weapons of varied caliber in each to insure 
equal distribution of fire power. Light and medium 
antitank artillery is supported as a rule by heavy 
antitank artillery, such as the newly developed 100-
mm gun, for fire against heavy enemy tanks. 
Lighter guns are emplaced as far forward as prac-
ticable, although normally not before the second line 
of infantry trenches. Well dug-in and camouflaged 
positions, protected by infantry and antitank rifles, 
are mandatory. Each battery must have at least one 
alternate position. When this is occupied, the orig-
inal position is maintained as a dummy position. 
Change of position usually takes place at night. 
Antitank guns in each position are placed in rhom-
bus pattern to obtain all-around fields of fire. 
The fire plan of Soviet antitank artillery is care-
fully worked out, with particular attention given to 
the natural tank approach routes_ The fire of the 
antitank guns is usually coordinated with a system 
of ground obstacles erected under engineer control; 
constant liaison and coordination between antitank 
artillery and combat engineers is therefore manda-
tory_ Also, minefields normally are laid to pro-
tect the gun position itself (fig. 33). 
The Soviets compute the minimum required den-
sity of antitank weapons in defensive sectors on the 
basis of the suspected number of enemy tanks, the 
number and characteristics of tank approaches, and 
the average number of rounds necessary for a tank 
kill. On the basis of experience against enemy ar-
mor, the Red Army figures on six rounds of fire from 
76.2-mm antitank guns, or 12 rounds from 45-mm 
antitank guns, for the destruction of one medium 
tank_ 
Antitank fire is directed not only against tanks, 
but also against accompanying infantry. Such 
antipersonnel fire is usually supported by mortar 
units and automatic weapons in coordination with 
the antitank artillery. 
Antitank guns continue firing until overrun, since 
the Red Army considers that the destruction of a 
large number of enemy tanks represents the success-
ful execution of the mission even when all of its 
own pieces are lost. The Soviets consider that each 
antitank gun is capable of destroying an average of 
2 to 3 enemy tanks before it is put out of action. 
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As a rule, antitank guns fire at ranges of 550 to 
660 yards in order to avoid revealing prematurely 
the location of positions_ However, when a so-
called "firesack" is prepared, a limited number of 
guns (usually flank pieces) open fire at the first 
enemy tank wave at 1,650- to 2,200 yard ranges, 
attempting to channelize the enemy tanks into the 
area of the prepared concentration. Reinforcing 
self-propelled artillery fires at the tanks from con-
cealed positions; supporting artillery, such as 152-
Figure 34. Organization of a firesark by an antitank 
artillery regiment. 
mm howitzers, fires from positions to the rear and 
flanks of the antitank guns (fig. 34). 
The mobile antitank artillery reserve usually con-
sists of one battery from each regiment. It is lo-
cated to the rear, in the center, and on the flanks of 
the defense sector under the centralized control of 
the Commander. Artillery reserves are committed 
by platoons against enemy tank attacks at the flanks_ 
One platoon will open fire immediately while an-
other moves to a more favorable position", pulled 
over short distances by the gun crew_ 
A secondary mission of antitank artillery is its 
employment in support of infantry and tank attacks, 
with the bulk of the antitank artillery committed in 
the first assault echelon (fig. 351. 
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Figure 35. Antitank artillery regiment in support of a tank attack. 
Section III. ARMORED AND 
MECHANIZED FORCES 
1. COMBAT MISSIONS 
The combat tasks of Soviet armored forces are to 
deliver decisive blows on a narrow sector, to wedge 
deeply in the enemy defensive system, and, in co-
ordination with other arms, to envelop and destroy 
large hostile units. The paramount principles of 
Soviet tank tactics are the continuity of coopera-
tion with other arms and full exploitation of tank 
mobility. 
From late 1942 to the end of World War II was 
a period of definite change in Soviet employment 
of armor. Soviet strategists believed, in the early 
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part of this period, that the main effort should be 
made primarily by infantry and that armor should 
be used in the exploitation of a break.through to 
develop a pursuit. This tactic, however, seldom was 
successful, since German defenses were progres-
sively deepened to the point where resistance was 
never completely broken by a penetration of the 
main line of resistance. 
As German defenses stiffened, Soviet armor was 
more extensively used to effect penetrations; and 
additional units of armor were used successively to 
effect exploitation, pursuit, and envelopment. 
Current Soviet doctrine requires that all armor be 
given local protection by infantry, normally riding 
on the vehicle prior to deployment in order to com-
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bat concealed infantry traps. Advance engineer de· 
tachments and engineer tank riders clear lancs in 
minefields. In addition, mine.clearing vehicles 
called "trawlers" (operating on the same principle 
as the British "Scorpion") have been developed to 
clear paths for tanks in the assault of strong defen· 
sive posItIons. The enormous depth of German 
defensive systems with continuous lines and centers 
of resistance made it necessary for Soviet tank {or· 
mations to be reinforced by fully mobile infantry, 
artillery, and mortars in order to regain their mo· 
mentum against continuous resistance. Self-pro. 
pelled artillery could not be limited to the role of 
assault guns but had to be capable of centralized, 
massed indirect fire_ Full-track carriers (Bren gun 
carriers and Weasels) proved most effective for the 
transportation of infantry and mortars. 
2. ARMORED FORCES AND THEIR CAPABILITIES 
Armored forces as large as "tank armies" are found 
within the Red Army, but the normal operating units 
are the tank corps and the mechanized corps. These 
units are usually part of the GHQ reserve to be used 
by the army or front commander as the situation 
may demand. They are well balanced units resem-
bling our armored divisions in strength and organi- . 
zation. There are fewer tanks in the Soviet armored 
units but the medium and heavy tank components, 
compared to U. S. light and medium tanks, give 
more weight to the Red Army armored units. Sim-
ilarly, the Soviet units have less self-propelled artil-
lery but it is of greater caliber length, hence more 
powerful. The Soviet armored unit has a larger 
infantry component than the U. S. armored division 
and also contains heavy mortar units and a rocket 
battalion which are absent in the U. S. armored 
division. 
The Soviets consider that armored forces are most 
effectively employed in the enemy operational depth. 
After intensive artillery preparation, the infantry 
assault penetrates into enemy defenses. Then, ar-
mored forces strike in the direction of the deepest 
infantry penetration on a narrow front from a con· 
cealed centralized position, develop the break-
through, and strike at the enemy's rear to destroy 
him (figs. 36 and 37). The scale of operations may 
reach mammoth proportions as in the break-through 
of German defenses on the River Oder by some 4,000 
tanks supported by 5,000 planes on a 50-mile front. 
Large Red Army armored forces advanced as far 
as 125 miles in 3 days under conditions of continu-
ous and intensive combat against the German Army. 
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The maneuver of armored forces is limited by 
extreme terrain conditions such as swamps, thick 
woods, mountains, and deep snow, but they are not 
road bound and operate freely over difficult coun-
try. In a break-through sector a tank corps moves 
on a front not wider than 3 miles, but may spread 
out in the enemy operational depth depending upon 
the available road nets, terrain, enemy resistance, 
and assigned objectives. 
Rapid transfers of Soviet armored units from one 
sector to another laterally have been executed on 
many occasions. These movements have been exe-
cuted with secrecy and without disrupting the sup-
ply lines of units holding the area traversed. The 
Soviets emphasize that the duration of sustained 
combat depends upon resupply efficiency. Continu-
ous fuel and ammunition supply can maintain ar-
mored units in action for several weeks, but Red 
Army doctrine prescribes that infantry units must 
consolidate and hold the territory penetrated by 
tanks. The cavalry-tank team can increase the 
tempo of the offensive from 1.5 miles per hour with 
infantry to 3.5 miles per hour with cavalry. 
a. Tank corps. The mission of the tank corps 
is to destroy enemy infantry and firing positions 
throughout the depth of the defenses in the break-
through sector. The tank corps has great fire and 
shock power for a frontal attack in a narrow sector, 
but coordinates its assault with infantry units in 
that sector. This infantry-tank assault team, aided 
by intensive artillery preparation, repeatedly spear-
headed Soviet offensives. 
The major corps units are the three tank brigades, 
and the motorized infantry brigade, supported by 
two self-propelled artillery regiments-one regiment 
each of 76.2-mm antitank artillery, antiaircraft ar-
tillery, and 120-mm mortars, a rocket battalion, and 
a 45-mm antitank battalion. 
The tank brigades are the striking elements of 
the tank corps, and are reinforced by an attached 
heavy tank regiment when circumstances require 
maximum shock power. The tank brigade has a 
strength of about 1,200 men and consists of 65 tanks 
and a batta~ion of infantry with antitank rifles, anti-
tank guns, and mortars. 
h. Mechanized corps. The mechanized corps 
is very similar to the tank corps in composition ex-
cept for its larger infantry component. Three mo-
torized infantry brigades, one tank brigade, and 
one additional tank regiment give the mechanized 
corps a strength of 16,000 as compared with 10,300 
in the tank corps. The tank corps has two self-pro-
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Figure 36. A typical armored assault in coordination with a frontal attack. 
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Figure 37. Tank brigade in a coordinated attack. 
pelled artillery regiments; the mechanized corps has 
one. 
A mechanized brigade consists of a motorized 
.brigade and one tank regiment of 40 medium tanks. 
The mechanized corps centralizes control of the four 
tank regiments but may detach them to support the 
infantry elements. An additional heavy tank regi-
ment is sometimes attached to the corps. 
The mission of the mechanized corps is to exploit 
break.throughs in organized defenses rather than to 
accomplish the break-through. It is capable of 
greater independent action than the tank corps, be-
671306"-45--6 
cause of its balanced strength of infantry and armor 
which resembles the U. S. combat command in tac-
tical employment • 
The average for mechanized corps operations in 
four major offensives during 1943-44 follows: 
Continuous action __________________________ 46 days 
Period of concentration _____________________ 4 days 
In offensive operation_______________________ 20 days 
On defensive ______________________________ 22 days 
Percentage of time on defensive_____________ 52 percent 
Maximum penetration ______________________ 228 miles 
Depth of territory consolidated after counterat-
tacks by enemy reserves. __________________ 202 miles 
V-7S 
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c. Infantry-support armored units. Small 
GHQ units, such as the independent heavy tank 
regiments, are frequently attached to infantry units 
to support the infantry assault of strong defensive 
positions. The missions of these tank units are des-
ignated by the commander of the infantry unit to 
which the tanks are attached. 
3. ROLES OF COMPONENT ARMS OF ARMORED 
FORCES 
a. Medium tanks. In the Red Army, the me-
dium tank is the basic shock and maneuvering ele-
ment of all armor. Its primary mission is to assist 
the infantry in occupying enemy positions and 
destroying enemy personnel. This mission is usu-
ally accomplished by frontal penetration or deep 
outflanking of enemy positions. In frontal assaults, 
medium tanks advance on a broad front or in a wide 
wedge under cover of supporting weapons. They 
are preceded or closely followed by infantry or engi-
neers who guard the flanks and rear, reconnoitering 
areas of suspicion. The tanks engage machine guns, 
infantry heavy weapons, and antitank guns with 
utmost vigor in order to force the enemy to disclose 
his entire system of defensive fire. Frontal tank 
attacks must always be deeply echeloned. 
In operations against enemy armOl, particularly 
against heavy tanks and assault guns, medium tanks 
made full use of their speed and maneuverability, 
attempting constantly to strike at flanks or rear. The 
use of medium tanks as tank destroyers from con-
cealed positions is exceptional. Even in defense, 
tanks are used in a mobile role and particularly to 
support counterattacks. 
h. Heavy tanks. Heavy tanks are used in mass 
in the direction of the main effort, and always in 
coordination with medium tanks which protect their 
flanks and rear. Medium tanks force commitment 
of enemy antitank weapons which are then destroyed 
by heavy tank fire. In operations against armor, 
particularly medium tanks, the heavy tanks attack 
frontally, while accompanying medium tanks envelop 
the enemy flanks and rear. Only in the support of 
assault groups destroying emplacements are heavy 
tanks used in small separate detachments of 2 or 3 
tanks. Infantry must always support heavy tanks. 
When enemy opposition is severe, heavy tanks rein-
force medium tanks by attacking heavy enemy tanks, 
self-propelled artillery, antitank and field artillery, 
and permanent fortifications. They depend primar-
ily upon long-range, flat-trajectory, direct fire from 
short halts. 
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c. Self-propelled artillery. Self-propelled ar-
tillery provides security for tanks by protecting their 
flanks and rear against armored counterattacks. 
They operate from hull defilade or concealed posi-
tions, covering probable avenues of tank approach. 
Unlike towed antitank guns, which fire in place 
until either they or enemy tanks have been neutral-
ized, Soviet self-propelled guns utilize their mobil-
ity and speed repeatedly to outflank attacking tanks. 
They must, however, be provided with automatic 
weapons and antitank rifle protection against enemy 
infantry. In frontal assaults, self-propelled guns 
follow tanks (at approximately 400 yards) by mov-
ing from cover to cover. 
They also support infantry in the reduction of 
by-passed field or light permanent fortifications. 
Heavy self-propelled guns reinforce the fire of me-
dium self-propelled howitzers and tank destroyers. 
Their heavier armor permits more aggressive tank-
like tactics. Their great fire power makes them 
extremely effective against all armored vehicles, ar-
tillery, and permanent fortifications. Low rates of 
fire and limited ammunition capacity are their prin-
cipal weaknesses. 
d. Mine-clearing tanks. Flail-type mine clear-
ing tanks are employed to clear lanes through enemy 
minefields as rapidly as possible in order to facilitate 
the uninterrupted forward progress of tanks and self-
propelled guns. Mine-clearing tanks approach the 
line of departure from concealed positions during 
the artillery preparation phase and take lead posi-
tions in the infantry tank-support groups. Two or 
three mine-clearing tanks are used for clearing each 
lane. Close support by tanks, self-propelled guns, 
mortars, and pioneers (combat engineers) is always 
provided to protect the mine-clearing tanks from 
enemy fire covering the minefield. Assault tanks 
follow mine-clearing tanks within 60 yards. The 
pioneers from the first echelon of the tank support 
group move forward with the mine-clearing tanks, 
using visual signals for working with the tanks. 
The pioneers remove mines from sectors of the field 
inaccessible to mine-clearing tanks, remove tank 
obstacles, and assault prepared enemy engineer for-
tifications under fire cover of the mine-clearing tanks 
and assault tanks. After passing through a mine-
field, the mine-clearing tanks assemble in a con-
cealed area to reorganize for succeeding missions, 
while the assault groups move forward. 
e. Artillery and mortars. Close artillery sup-
port is delivered to tank formations at all times. 
Great flexibility in the control of artillery is normal 
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when it moves forward into the penetration area. 
After the artillery preparation, which is the normal 
initial artillery mission for all artillery and mortars, 
long. range army artillery units continue to support 
the armored assault for depths up to 5 or 6 miles. 
Direct army artillery support of the armored unit 
ceases at this point, and other missions are exe-
cuted- such as counterbattery fire against enemy 
positions on the flanks of the break-through area. 
The mobile artillery units continue to deliver fire 
against enemy strongpoints encountered in the pene-
tration area and on the flanks, as directed by the 
supported armored unit commanders. One of the 
most important Soviet artillery missions is to combat 
counterattacking enemy tanks. Fire against strong-
points is delivered in short area concentrations. Not 
less than one unit of fire is allotted to artillery for 
the assault phase of the armored offensive. Ap-
proximately one brigade of artillery supports each 
tank brigade of the first corps echelon. The 152-
mm gun-howitzers and the 122-mm guns are deemed 
especially effective in supporting tanks against strong 
resistance. 
Heavy mortars are always employed in support of 
motorized infantry. The battery commanders' ob-
servation posts are well forward within . 1;2 to 1 mile 
of the advance units. Control is decentralized to 
battery commanders; larger concentrations are de-
veloped when enemy resistance slows down the 
atlvance. The heavy mortars are always used in 
supporting the independent operations of motorized 
infantry, as well as during the break-through phase. 
f. Rocket units. The rocket battalion is under 
the control of the corps commander throughout the 
entire operation. Rocket units are used only at 
critical times. The launchers are brought to their 
firing positions secretly and are fired in sudden con-
centrations. Rocket units are usetl for independent 
operations of the armored corps, against enemy 
counterattacks, and during the general artillery prep-
aration for the corps offensive. 
g. Infantry component. The infantry com-
ponent of the armored corps is not entirely concen-
trated in the motorized infantry brigades, but has 
infantry groups for local security of tanks and self-
propelled guns. The motorized submachine-gun 
battalion of the tank brigade has a tank-riding com-
pany as well as a mortar, antitank gun, antitank rifle, 
and an automatic-weapons company. These infan-
trymen facilitate the advance of armor by neutraliz-
ing enemy infantry antitank weapons and traps; they 
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also organize small defensive positions against enemy 
counterattacks. 
h. EngiIreer troops. Engineer troops of the 
armored corps are used especially in small units as 
tank riders and with the leading motorized elements. 
Their primary duties are to clear enemy mines and 
obstacles, to facilitate the advance of armored ve· 
hicles, and to assist in the reduction of strongpoints 
with demolitions, flame throwers, and other engineer 
assault equipment. In defending armor against 
counterattacks, special hasty mine.laying techniques 
are employed using both controlled and contact type 
mines. The corps engineer battalion is capable of 
other types of engineer support as well. 
4. ARMORED AND MECHANIZED FORCES IN THE 
OFFENSIVE 
The armored offensive differs from the infantry of· 
fensive in the following respects: The main effort 
of the armored offensive is made on a relatively 
narrow front by a deeply echeloned formation with 
the objective of completely breaking through enemy 
defensive positions and exploiting the break· through 
by attacking enemy rear installations, encircling and 
destroying enemy forces, and generally effecting 
deep penetrations. The break-through operation of 
large armored units passes through five distinct 
phases: Concentration of forces, fire preparation, 
the assault, securing the offensive, and exploitation 
(fig. 38). 
a. Concentration phase. This phase involves 
movement of units, the dispersal of units, and very 
extensive planning of coordinated action of all arms 
for all phases of the offensive. Carefully planned 
lateral movements of armored units from adjacent 
sectors to the concentration area are executed at 
night for distances up to 60 miles. Special traffic 
controls insure regulated movement across the supply 
lines of adjacent front-line units with minimum in· 
terruption. Usually the armored formation moves 
in at least two columns, with tanks and self·propelled 
artillery to the front, and the remaining columns of 
wheeled vehicles and tank corps reserves moving on 
interior roads. 
The concentration is usually 25 to 50 miles from 
the front lines (fig. 39). The concentration phase 
varies in duration from 3 to 8 days, during which 
time coordination of all arms is based on informa-
tion obtained from reconnaissance units and ob· 
servers. The reconnaissance group of the tank or 
mechanized corps, the various artillery observation 
and survey detachments, engineer reconnaissance 
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Figure 38. Tank brigade in break·through operations. 
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units, and infantry patrols conduct intensive un-
interrupted operations in the break-through sector. 
Specific information vital to the armored force of-
fensive is obtained by ground observation of engi-
neer and tank reconnaissance units. This informa-
tion includes: 
Terrain throughout the enemy defensive 
depth with respect to the maneuver of ar-
mored units. 
Location and extent of the enemy fortifica-
tions strongpoints ( especially antitank-
gun emplacements I and troop dispositions. 
Routes of withdrawal available to the enemy. 
Air reconnaissance supplements this information 
by determining the possible directions of enemy tank 
counterattacks, the location of tank reserves, and 
other pertinent data. The various artillery recon-
naissance groups and observation posts determine 
the location of artillery targets and firing plan of the 
artillery offensive. 
h. Fire preparation phase. This phase varies 
in duration from several hours to several days, de· 
pending entirely on the extent of the enemy defensive 
pOSItIOn. The tank corps attacks independently 
only in a sector where enemy defenses are relatively 
weak. Then a short intensive artillery preparation, 
immediately followed by the tank assault, combine 
the shock power and surprise necessary to achieve 
a break-through. Otherwise, an extended infantry. 
artillery attack is necessary to breach the enemy 
defensive pOSItIon. Large armored formations 
move forward from the concentration area to the 
assembly area, which is 9 to 12 miles from the 
enemy front lines, prior to the period of artillery 
preparation. This movement is made by echelons 
during the night between D·minus 2 and D·minus 
3 days. 
c. Assault phase. During the period of artil· 
lery preparation on the night before D.day, the 
armored formation advances to its jump.off position, 
located from % to 2 miles from the enemy front line. 
Assault groups are organized from infantry, engi· 
neers, and tanks for infantry support. These groups 
vary in size from infantry companies to regiments 
and are supported by tanks from independent bat· 
talions, regiments, and brigades. Coordination be· 
tween elements of the assault groups, the following 
echelons, and supporting artillery is worked out in 
detail. The mission of the assault group is to destroy 
enemy firing positions and fortifications which the 
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artillery preparation failed to neutralize, and to 
clear lanes in minefields. 
The first echelon of medium tanks follows immedi-
ately behind the assault groups, together with mine· 
clearing tanks which clear lanes through minefields, 
and attacks enemy positions by direct fire and flank 
maneuvers. The first infantry echelon follows the 
tanks at a distance of 200 to 400 yards. The second 
echelon of tanks consists of heavy tanks and self· 
propelled artillery moving behind the infantry at 
a distance of 100 to 200 yards. These tanks and 
self-propelled artillery support both the infantry and 
the medium tanks of the first echelon. The artillery-
support group and the second infantry echelon follow 
behind the heavy tanks (fig. 40). 
Enemy defensive positions, 3 to 5 miles deep, 
often consist of multiple belts containing lines of 
trenches and numerous strongpoints. The immedi· 
ate objective of the infantry-support tank group, to-
gether with the first infantry echelon and assault 
groups, is to seize the first two trench lines of the 
forward defense belt. The immediate objective of 
the infantry group (infantry strength of about one 
division) of the first corps echelon is to penetrate 
the entire forward defensive belt, including enemy 
battalion reserve positions and all strongpoints be· 
tween the forward and the second defense belts. 
Successive missions of the group, reinforced by 
armor and infantry of the second corps echelon, are 
to penetrate the second and remaining enemy defen· 
sive belts. The assault of an armored corps takes 
place on a sector not less than 3 miles wide. Tanks 
in the first echelon move in bounds from phase line 
to phase line, from 1,000 to 2,000 yards apart. 
d. Securing the offensive. The closest con· 
tact is maintained between combat arms of each 
echelon and with supporting echelons, in order that 
enemy counterattacks may be effectively repulsed by 
tanks and self-propelled artillery. The speed of the 
offensive is maintained by centralizing the control 
of self-propelled artillery in support of tank battal-
ions when enemy counterattacks are imminent. In. 
fantry with engineers, supported by mortars and 
artillery support groups, seize and fortify all vital 
positions on the flanks of the break.through area. 
Enemy firing positions on the flanks are neutralized, 
and hasty mine belts are placed across flank ap· 
proaches. Flank security groups organize road 
blocks, covering the approaches by artillery and 
mortar fire. 
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Figure 40. Combat formation 0/ tank·supported infantry in the first phase of break·through operations. 
The second echelon of the tank or mechanized 
corps similarly organizes strong flank protection and 
may use rockets as well as mortars and artillery to 
repel enemy infantry attacks. As the offensive pen· 
etrates deeper into enemy defenses, screening groups 
supplement flank security groups to facilitate rapid 
forward movement of motorized infantry and supply 
trains (fig. 41). 
e. Exploitation. The tank corps in exploita-
tion advances rapidly toward a series of terrain ob-
jectives such as crossroads, bridges, and dominant 
terrain features. Enemy lines of communication 
are cut, supply dumps are seized, and the enemy is 
attacked on the flanks and rear with the intent of 
cutting enemy units into many segments which are 
encircled and destroyed. If several break-throughs 
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Figure 41. The corps organization in an approach,· march. 
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are made, the tank forces exploiting each converge 
in a double envelopment. 
ADVANCE UNITS. In exploitation the tank corps 
sends forward the bulk of its tactical reconnaissance 
units, including the armored car reconnaissance bat-
talion and the motorcycle battalion, often reinforced 
by a tank company. The group operates 10 to 15 
miles in advance of the medium tanks in the first 
echelon. The security reconnaissance detachment 
of each tank brigade operates 6 to 9 miles in ad-
vance of the brigade and consists of motorcyclists, 
motorized infantry, armored cars, and a tank pla-
toon sometimes reinforced by antitank guns. The 
reconnaissance detachment of the motorized infan-
try battalion operates 3 to 4 miles forward and 
consists of a squad of motorcyclists or motorized in-
fantry. Flank security detachments, drawn from 
the reconnaissance reserves, are used for flank de-
fense and to destroy by-passed strongpoints. They 
consist of a platoon of tanks, armored cars, and a 
squad of motorized infantry and engineers. 
The mechanized corps has far greater capabilities 
for extensive exploitation than the tank corps, due 
to the powerful motorized infantry component 
which is added to its armored strength. The mech-
anized corps invariably has been employed in every 
major offensive operation, not only to exploit break-
throughs but to develop the break-through into 
pursuit. Air support of armored units has pro-
gressively increased with Soviet air supremacy and 
the close coordination of these arms has resulted in 
more rapid penetration and encirclement of enemy 
positions. 
EXPLOITATION OBJECTIVES. During the exploi-
tation period, mechanized units encounter the 
enemy's tactical reserves and also rear reserves 
rushed up by motor, rail, or even air. Therefore, 
in the process of exploitation mechanized units have 
to carry out bitter actions, sometimes to defend 
themselves, sometimes to disengage themselves. All 
actions are carried out with the following goals in 
mind: to retain the initiative, to defeat the pursued 
enemy in detail, and to surround and destroy his 
reserves after cutting them off_ The job of com-
plete liquidation is left to regular front-line troops, 
while the mechanized units go on to exploit the 
new success_ 
PURSUIT. This strategy is organized in accord-
ance with the possible routes of enemy withdrawal, 
the terrain features, and indications of enemy with-
drawal prior to the disengagement of his main 
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forces. Soviet units selected for pursuit are very 
mobile and capable of independent action. The 
basic composition of each detachment includes me-
dium tanks, reinforced by assault troops with auto-
matic weapons, motorcyclists, motorized infantry, 
artillery, and engineers. Parallel pursuit is em-
phasized in Soviet doctrine_ Enemy rear guards 
and organized defensive positions try to turn parallel 
pursuit into a pursuit from the rear; thus parallel 
pursuit consists of a series of actions, partly frontal 
and partly flanking. Advanced detachments delay 
and hold up the enemy's withdrawal in order to 
give the main forces an opportunity to overtake and 
destroy him (fig. 42). At the same time, advanced 
troops, who have penetrated to the rear of the with-
drawing enemy, attack command posts, destroy sup-
plies, rupture communications, and create panic by 
surprise thrusts. 
The main body operates on the flank of the with-
drawing enemy or in the space between withdrawing 
columns. The combat formation of the main body 
covers the area of the main effort. Strong reserves, 
consisting of tanks, self-propelled artillery, and mo-
torized infantry, are held in readiness to engage 
enemy reserves which may be committed. If sepa-
rate strongpoints succeed in resisting direct assaults, 
the main body by-passes them, leaving motorized-
infantry groups to cover such strongpoints until 
the arrival of troops following the mechanized corps. 
Air support is considered vital to successful pur-
suit operations. Air action destroys enemy reserves 
advancing to engage the pursuing forces. Stormovik 
units are especially effective in giving close support 
to advance detachments. Pursuit must be main-
tained night and day, stopping only on orders of the 
Commander or when fuel supplies are exhausted. 
Every expedient is used to maintain supplies, in-
cluding mobile corps supply units, air drops, and 
captured enemy supplies. Fresh troops from the 
armored corps reserve are held in readiness to be 
sent forward on combat reconnaissance missions. 
5. MEETING ENGAGEMENT 
The deployment of Red Army armored units in a 
meeting engagement varies greatly, depending upon 
enemy strength_ During pursuit, counterattacking 
enemy rear guards are repulsed by combat recon-
naissance groups reinforced by medium tanks, self-
propelled artillery, mortars, rockets, and motorized 
infantry of the first echelon. The main body con-
tinues the pursuit without deploying its forces, 
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although other combat reconnaissance units will be 
organized to replace the units detached. 
When superior enemy forces are encountered, a 
powerful combat group of tanks and self· propelled 
artillery assaults the forward enemy elements in a 
short thrust designed to permit the mechanized corps 
to deploy in a favorable defensive position. 
The corps deploys along a wide front with combat 
groups occupying separate, favorable terrain fea· 
tures. The groups are organized for hasty defense, 
with infantry supported by artillery, mortars, and 
self· propelled guns in the forward echelon, while the 
tanks are assigned to the second echelon as reserves 
and for defense of the rear. Motorized infantry 
occupies the gaps between strongpoints, which are 
also covered by artillery and mortar fire. The corps 
reserve deploys to the rear of the position, ready to 
move against any likely direction of enemy attack. 
Air reconnaissance and the advance reconnaissance 
group, 9 to 15 miles ahead of the advance guard, 
give armored formations timely information con· 
cerning enemy strength, movements, and disposi. 
tions. This information enables the formation to 
deploy to greatest advantage m the meeting 
engagement. 
6. THE DEFENSIVE 
In independent operations, the tank corps and the 
mechanized corps are frequently counterattacked by 
superior enemy forces, especially after deep penetra. 
tions following a break.through. The defensive mis-
sion generally is to hold seized territory against 
enemy counterattack until the combined forces fol· 
lowing the armored units arrive to secure the area. 
a. Tank corps. The tanks corps is limited in 
its capacity for protracted defense. The infantrv 
component of the corps is relatively small, and tanks 
used in fixed positions are not as efficient as when 
their high mobility and shock power are fully em-
ployed. The self· propelled artillery, antitank guns, 
mortars, and rockets are the core of defensive 
strength; but superior enemy infantry units, sup-
ported by armor and artillery, can force the tank 
corps to withdraw by outflanking the defensive posi-
tion. Soviet doctrine emphasizes the tank corps has 
not sufficient infantry to risk encirclement for any 
length of time. The mechanized corps, on the other 
hand, is well organized for independent action far 
forward of the advancing main forces and passes 
from the offensive to the defensive in every major 
operation involving deep offensive thrusts into 
enemy territory. 
TM 30-430 
h. Mechanized Corps. The organization of 
defenses by the Soviet mechanized corps is as thor-
ough as its combat potential, favorable terrain, the 
strength of enemy counterattacks, and time permit. 
Extensive mine belts and fields are laid by engineers; 
antitank gun positions and mortar positions are em-
placed in a fire system integrated with self· propelled 
artillery and rocket launchers. All firing positions, 
infantry positions, and transport vehicles are cam-
ouflaged to the fullest degree. A second defensive 
position to the rear is developed as thoroughly as 
time permits, at the next tactically advantageous 
area. 
The mechanized corps can resist enemy attacks 
from an encircled position for several days. If the 
position to be held is of great tactical value, the 
mechanized corps remains in position, permitting the 
enemy to effect an encirclement, rather than with-
drawing. This is achieved with the expectation that 
advancing strong, friendly forces will relieve the 
mechanized corps within a reasonable time. 
The defensive position consists of groups of mo-
torized infantry in separate strongpoints located in 
advantageous terrain. Each group contains about 
a battalion of infantry supported by two or three 
batteries of antitank artillery, mortars, and self-pro-
pelled artillery and tanks. The self-propelled guns 
and tanks are distributed within the groups in ac-
cordance with the most likely avenues of enemy 
approach and the terrain cover available. Three 
tank reserve groups consisting of medium and heavy 
tanks are held in centralized, concealed areas. Their 
mission is to counterattack enemy forces which pen-
etrate into the defenses through the gaps between 
the strongpoints. The gaps are held lightly by mo-
torized infantry but are covered by artillery fire from 
adjacent strongpoints, as well as by the corps artil· 
lery group deployed to the rear of the tank reserve 
group. The corps reserve, together \\ith all supply 
echelons, is in the rear area of the defensive position 
and is protected by the remaining tank units from 
flank and rear attacks. Forward defenses in two 
echelons are most effective, provided sufficient per-
sonnel strength is available. Successful defense is 
largely dependent upon the efficient operation of the 
tank reserve groups which cover a wider front than 
the first defense echelon and must be ready to attack 
enemy forces at all points of penetration (fig. 43). 
The defensive strength of the mechanized corps 
is greatly increased by the attachment of a howitzer 
regiment. The strength of air support and expec-
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tat ions of supply by air greatly influence the corps 
commander's decision to hold a position or to with· 
draw. The antiaircraft regiment deploys its guns 
to protect the main body of the corps from hostile 
'f?'";"" 
: :".;":c··· , 
1 Nov 45 
armored formation is held in a concealed centra}· 
ized position 10 to 30 miles to the rear of the first 
infantry echelon. When the direction of the enemy 
main effort is determined, the armored formation 
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Figure 43. Defensive position of a mechanized corps. 
air attack. Antiaircraft artillery is also given the 
role of oovering the gaps between strongpoints 
where enemy ground forces are likely to penetrate. 
c. Other defensive tactics. Armored units, 
supporting infantry in decentralized systems of de-
fense, are used as mobile counterattack groups. The 
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moves forward in a wide flanking maneuver and 
attacks the enemy's flank and rear. 
Another type of ambush defense is used when a 
fluid situation exists and defensive positions have 
not been firmly organized. Tank units concentrate 
in concealed areas adjacent to main approaches 
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along which enemy forces are advancing. Terrain 
conditions determine whether two groups of tanks 
in flanking positions or one concentrated group is 
better suited to deliver sudden flank attacks against 
enemy assault spearheads. Tank.riding automatic 
riflemen and self-propelled guns support the tanks 
in destroying the enemy assault elements. The mis-
sion of armor in this type of Soviet defense is to pro-
tect infantry units withdrawing under enemy pres-
sure, as well as to inflict the maximum losses on the 
enemy and thus disrupt his offensive operations. 
7. WITHDRAWALS 
If possible, withdrawals are executed at night, and 
to prepared positions. Daytime withdrawals are 
made under the cover of a smoke screen. Soviet 
davtime withdrawals often coincide with a sudden 
limited counterattack of a strong tank group, sup-
ported by self-propelled artillery, in the direction 
of the enemy main effort. Soviet doctrine pre-
scribes that withdrawals be executed rapidly by 
echelons, without lessening normal artillery fire. 
Mobile armored groups cover the withdrawal by 
counterattacks if the enemy attempts to interfere. 
Section IV. CA V ALRY 
1. CAVALRY MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES 
a. Basic doctrine. The Red Army has retained 
the cavalry arm for use as an independent striking 
force. The fundamental doctrine in the employ-
ment of cavalry stresses that cavalry is not a sub-
stitute for mechanized forces but is a powerful force 
for operations where motorized units are handi-
capped by impassable terrain. By Red Army defi-
nition, the cavalry is capable of independent opera-
tion, of taking part in every kind of engagement, 
and of carrying out actions in every kind of coopera-
tion with other arms. A basic difference between 
Red Army cavalry tactics and U. S. cavalry doctrine 
is the stress placed by the Soviets on the employ-
ment of artillery with cavalry. Divisional artillery 
operating with cavalry is employed under central-
ized or decentralized control, depending on combat 
requirements. The primary mission of divisional 
artillery is the neutralization of enemy antitank guns, 
personnel, machine-gun positions, and similar 
ground targets. 
The tactical employment of cavalry in night oper-
ations and in terrain impassable to motorized ele-
ments such as swamps, steppes, and deep snow was 
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repeatedly and successfully carried out by the Red 
Army in World War II. 
h. Capahilities. Cavalry averages 5 miles per 
hour over severe terrain. Small independent cavalry 
units cannot maintain continuous movement for 
more than 3 days under combat conditions. Large 
units with sizable supply trains and established re-
supply systems can operate for more than a month 
over distances of 100 miles. Whenever possible, 
cavalry forces attempt to strike the enemy flank or 
rear, and to encircle and destroy the main group in 
cooperation with the air forces, armored units, air-
borne units, and frontal assault groups. Other cav-
alry missions include: large-scale raids by cavalry 
divisions and corps, especially during the winter; 
the screening of troop movements of other arms; and 
the execution of counterattacks against the enemy 
flanks and rear from concealed areas in the rear of 
a defensive position. 
Soviet cavalry raids extend to far greater depths 
and are made by larger forces than are envisioned 
by the definition of a raid in U. S. cavalry doctrine. 
For example, Lieutenant General Sokolov's VI 
Guard Cossack Cavalry Corps made a 135-day raid 
and fought behind the enemy lines most of the time. 
c. Cavalry in auxiliary role. The tactical 
employment of small cavalry units for reconnais-
sance, counterreconnaissance, screening, and patrol 
missions is essentially the same in the Red Army as 
in other armies. Emphasizing the cavalry's surprise 
potential, however, the Soviet's place added signifi-
cance on more extensive employment of night recon-
naissance and night raiding parties, especially when 
terrain and weather are favorable to cavalry tactics. 
Assaults are generally made dismounted from all 
sides after rapid and secret flanking movements have 
been executed (fig. 44). Heavy machine guns-
mounted on carts-light machine guns, and subma-
chine guns constitute the greatest fire power of small 
cavalry units. 
Normally, a cavalry regiment operates from 1 to 3 
days in a local area up to 15 miles in depth. The 
objectives are local enemy command posts, artillery 
or antitank batteries, small relatively undefended 
garrisons in the· enemy rear, and the capture of 
prisoners. 
2. CAVALRY UNITS AND BASIC WEAPONS 
Red Army cavalry was modified greatly before and 
during World War II. The cavalry divisions have 
shrunk to a strength of 4,645 officers and enlisted 
men, losing their mechanized regiment and one of 
V-87 
TM 30-430 I Nov 45 
Figure 44. Cavalry regiment attack in winter. 
their horse regiments. Medium and heavy mortars, 
and submachine guns have been introduced in large 
numbers. The number of antitank guns has been 
increased. The introduction of antitank rifles has 
further facilitated close antitank and antiaircraft 
defense. The normal operating unit is the cavalry 
corps, which consists of three cavalry divisions, two 
to four tank regiments of 41 tanks each, an antitank 
regiment, either a composite artillery regiment or a 
mortar regiment, and a rocket battalion. Additional 
tank reinforcements are normally added for large-
scale operations. 
Cavalry units are well equipped to protect them-
selves against enemy armored attacks, although their 
staying power under such circumstances is limited. 
The 14.5·mm long-barrelled antitank rifle carried 
by pack horse provides antitank protection within 
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the squadron. The horse-drawn 45-mm gun is the 
regimental antitank weapon, while the 76-mm field 
artillery pieces, as well as the 120-mm mortar bat-
teries, are brought into play where necessary. The 
Corps has considerable protection against enemy 
armor in the 76-mm gun antitank regiment, the self-
propelled artillery regiment, and the composite ar-
tillery and mortar regiment. The rocket battalion 
and the mortar units provide effective antipersonnel 
fire. 
The vulnerability of cavalry to air attack is the 
greatest single weakness of cavalry units. To 
counteract this vulnerability, the cavalry division 
has been strengthened in antiaircraft fire power to 
nine multiple antiaircraft machine guns and six 37-
mm antiaircraft guns, while the corps is reinforced 
by an antiaircraft artillery regiment in operation 
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where enemy air attacks are likely. As the relative 
strength of the Soviet Air Force increased, cavalry 
operations were given effective fighter support by 
the air forces of the army group. In some in· 
stances, supporting fighter units have been attached 
to the cavalry corps. In the first case, an aviation 
liaison officer maintains continuous liaison between 
the corps and the army group headquarters, whereas 
in the second case no such liaison exists. Night 
marches are stressed for cavalry, especially in win-
ter, with movements planned to conceal the cavalry 
during the day in such covered or camouflaged 
areas as collective farms. 
General Belov's cavalry corps inflicted great losses 
on superior enemy forces in the autumn of 1941 by 
moving at night and striking the enemy rear at 
dawn. Two German divisions were surrounded and 
partly destroyed by this corps in October 1941. 
During that winter, the cavalry corps engaged in 
extensive offensive operations under severe winter 
conditions of cold and deep snow, traveling 30 to 
40 miles a day across enemy lines of communica-
tions. When necessary, dismounted combat against 
fortified positions was undertaken. Although at 
first the offensive succeeded in destroying many 
enemy positions, later large losses were suffered by 
the corps when it was itself encircled, primarily due 
to powerful enemy air attacks which destroyed the 
corps supplies and artillery positions. 
This again stressed the vulnerability of cavalry to 
air attack, especially in winter. 
3. COORDINATION WITH OTHER ARMS 
Coordinated operations of cavalry forces with large 
tank units have been developed by the Red Army 
where the terrain and season are suitable. This co· 
operation may take different forms. In some in-
stances these large units, while executing the com-
plete mission by joint efforts, operate independently 
but coordinate their blows. In other cases the tank 
groups are attached to the large cavalry unit whose 
commander assigns missions to each tank group. 
Finally, a situation may occur when both types of 
cooperation, operational and tactical, takes place at 
the same time. A part of the tank forces execute 
their missions independently, while the balance is 
attached to and operates with the cavalry. 
An outstanding operation in which cavalry and 
tank forces were employed successfully was the en-
circlement and capture of the German garrison at 
T aganrog in August 1943 (fig. 45). In this opera-
tion the cavalry units followed the tanks which had 
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broken through the enemy lines. After entering the 
gap, the cavalry moved rapidly towards the Sea of 
Azov to encircle the enemy garrison at Taganrog. 
The tank units moved in two groups, covering the 
flanks of the cavalry against enemy counterattacks 
by mechanized German relief units as well as from 
the encircled enemy group. All other Soviet tanks 
were attached to the leading cavalry division; these 
tanks moved ahead of the cavalry and paved the 
way by overcoming scattered enemy detachments. 
Wherever enemy resistance was strong, cavalry units 
dismounted and attacked with close support of tanks. 
The massed artillery fire of all cavalry artillery 
was effectively used against strong enemy positions. 
Enemy counterattacks were broken by artillery fire 
and by maneuvering cavalry-tank groups against the 
enemy flanks. Complete success was assured by un-
interrupted contact between the cavalry division 
commanders and the tank group commanders, as 
well as by powerful air support which destroyed en-
emy artillery positions and armor and also provided 
cover against hostile air attacks (up to 1,200 sorties 
were flown daily). 
Self-propelled artillery regiments work especially 
effectively with cavalry in deep penetrations and 
flank operations. Self-propelled artillery has sup-
ported cavalry in extensive Red Army maneuvers 
across swampy terrain, covering as many as 125 
miles in 2 days. One of the most important tactical 
cavalry maneuvers is to establish and to hold road 
blocks on highways over which the supporting self-
propelled artillery must pass. Cavalry executes 
wide outflanking maneuvers across swamps to attack 
enemy artillery from the rear; then the self-propelled 
guns advance over the secured highway. Cavalry 
moves on both sides of the artillery units for protec-
tion against possible flank attacks. Whenever enemy 
guns or small fortified areas are encountered, the 
self-propelled artillery quickly deploys and smashes 
the enemy with concentrated fire. Rapid transition 
from mounted to dismounted attack by cavalry units 
and uninterrupted liaison with self-propelled artil-
lery are basic principles in effective pursuit opera-
tions. Attached engineer and ponton detachments 
greatly facilitate rapid movement of armor in such 
operations. 
4. COORDINATED OFFENSIVE 
a. Organization of attack. Cavalry is used 
to best advantage in coordination with infantry. In 
an offensive, the infantry holds the enemy with a 
frontal attack while the entire mass of cavalry and 
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tanks is thrown upon the flanks and rear of the 
enemy. The objective of cavalry is to strike at the 
enemy's flank and rear; disrupt his headquarters 
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main force and the direction of his main effort. The 
cavalry corps must be reinforced by infantry, tanks, 
artillery, and mortars, and held in a centralized po· 
Figure 45. Cavalry-tank coordinated break-through to encircle enemy garrison at Taganrog. 
and lines of communications; and encircle and de-
stroy his main force. To accomplish this, the cav-
alry must utilize its mobility to the utmost. This 
is achieved by holding the enemy with a frontal 
attack by other arms; by restricting his maneuvera-
bility; and by determining the disposition of his 
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sltJOn from where it can attack the enemy's flanks. 
It is considered advisable to locate the cavalry on 
the enveloping flank of the main attacking force 
with the missions of reducing the enemy's flanks 
and destroying his communications. The success 
of a cavalry operation, especially when it has pene-
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trated into the enemy's operational depth, is condi-
tioned by continuous coordination with the com-
bined arms and tanks attacking frontally. 
Red Army doctrine maintains that the expedient 
moment to commit cavalry is when the enemy's 
defenses in depth have been penetrated by a frontal 
or enveloping assault. The enemy is then forced 
to bring up his reserves. He is in a state of fluid 
defense, has not had time to organize any defensive 
positions, and is most vulnerable to a cavalry attack. 
A successful operation depends not only on a 
well executed initial phase but also on the successive 
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Cavalry formations advancing on the flank of 
an assault group may use two types of attack: the 
"open flank attack" and the "interior flank attack" 
(figs. 46 and 47). In an open flank attack, co· 
ordination and liaison with troops attacking front· 
ally is maintained only on one side, while in an in· 
terior flank attack, liaison must be maintained with 
both flanks, permitting cavalry to pass through the 
secured corridor. Coordination with units of ad· 
jacent sectors is limited to the initial phase. 
The Soviet disposition of troops will depend on 
whether the corps attacks in an open flank or in an 
Figure 46. Cavalry corps attacking with an open flank. 
phases. Cavalry units should not be restricted by 
boundary lines that reduce their mobility and force 
them into protracted combat for strongpoints. 
Therefore, in designating missions to the cavalry, 
the objective, the direction of the main effort, and 
time are indicated. The time factor is coordinated 
with the capabilities of units making the frontal as· 
sault, while the direction of the assault is aimed at 
operationally important objectives in the flanks, 
rear areas, and communication lines. 
Essential considerations are air cover, liaison be-
tween army group and corps headquarters, secrecy 
of concentrations, thoroughness of reconnaissance, 
surprise, and continuous flow of supplies. 
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interior flank. In an open flank attack, the cavalry 
has more maneuverability during the initial phase 
and attacks on a wider front. The corps reserve is 
deployed on the open flank. In an interior flank 
attack, the corps attacks on a narrower front, is 
echeloned to a depth of 5 miles, and has a higher 
density of troop concentration. In this case the 
reserves will be used to augment the blow, and 
will be located to the rear of the main thrust. 
b. Attack phases. COORDINATION AND PLAN· 
NING. A cavalry attack consists of several phases. 
During the initial or coordination and planning 
phase, the Soviet forces will secretly approach the 
assembly area. In this phase air cover must be 
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strong and is provided by the front and army fighter 
air units; one or two battalions of small-caliber 
antiaircraft artillery are attached for protection 
against hostile aircraft. 
Concentration of cavalry takes place in areas 25 
to 35 miles from the front lines, and should end 2 
to 3 days before the start of the general offensive. 
Coordination with units attacking frontally, recon-
naissance, line of departure, and engineer prepara-
tions are determined at this stage. 
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the corps is in the initial assembly area. Detailed 
and careful planning of coordination in this phase 
is the foundation of success in the initial assembly. 
Matters of supply are also determined during this 
initial phase. They assume particular importance 
since cavalry cannot depend on local supplies. In 
addition to ammunition, food, and fuel, cavalry reo 
quires large quantities of fodder. Any interruption 
in the supply of fodder will materially impair the 
mobility and combat value of cavalry. Both army 
Figure 47. Cavalry corps attacking with covered flanks. 
The corps commander must be acquainted with 
the follow ing: 
Initial and successive objectives of infantry 
and tank units attacking frontally. 
Time of attack and boundaries, and direc-
tion of the main effort. 
Location of command posts and their axis 
of displacement. 
Methods of communication with command 
posts, and the signals to be used by units 
reaching designated phase lines. 
Assembly area of tank units, particularly 
GHQ tanks. 
The corps commander's field order includes the 
above information and is issued after coordination 
with the chiefs of supporting arms during the time 
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group and army transportation facilities are widely 
used to insure a regular flow of supplies. 
MOVING TO THE ASSAULT. Movement to the main 
line of departure for the attack is the second phase 
of an operation. The main line of departure is 
usually selected beyond the range of enemy artillery 
and mortar fire, although this distance should not 
exceed 7 to 10 miles. The formation adopted de-
pends on the decision of the corps commander and 
should permit deployment against hostile air and 
tank attacks. The open flank attack is on a front 
4 to 5 miles wide with three cavalry divisions abreast 
and the corps reserve deployed toward the outside 
of the turning movement. In the attack ,,,here both 
flanks are covered, the front is reduced to from 2.5 
to 3.5 miles with two cavalry divisions in assault and 
the third division with corps reserve echeloned to 
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the rear. From the beginning, special attention is 
paid to continuous mobility, freedom of movement, 
and combat preparedness. To protect the forma· 
tion against enemy artillery and mortar flanking at· 
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tinuous coordination are essential for cooperation 
between the cavalry and units attacking frontally. 
LAUNCHING THE ATTACK. The third phase of the 
operation is the actual execution of the basic mis· 
Figure 48. Reinforced cavalry regiment attack on a fortified town. 
tacks, and also from infantry and tank counter· 
attacks, air cover is provided and artillery is de-
tached to protect the flanks. These units move as 
far as 5 miles from the flanks. Consolidation of 
forces is the primary consideration of the second 
phase. Timely exchange of information and con-
sion. Cavalry detaches itself from the troops attack-
ing frontally and loses direct tactical contact; how-
ever, coordination must not cease. The cavalry 
seizes positions to prevent the main enemy force 
from extricating itself from encirclement. Part of 
the cavalry cuts the enemy's route of retreat, while 
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the main force, in coordination with units attacking 
frontally, encircles and destroys the enemy's princi-
pal units. 
Liaison during the third phase of the attack is the 
responsibility of the army group command; without 
continuous liaison, coordinated action with cavalry 
is not possible. 
5. CAVALRY IN PURSUIT 
In exploiting a break-through, cavalry is well suited 
to execute parallel pursuit. Whenever enemy rear 
guards attempt to restrict cavalry activity to pursuit 
from the rear, wide outflanking maneuvers across 
swamps or rough country permit cavalry to strike 
at the flanks of the retreating enemy column or cut 
off his withdrawal by creating road blocks. 
The supporting self-propelled artillery moves up 
to destroy enemy rear guard positions, while the 
cavalry seizes important tactical features in the en-
emy rear to secure highways over which the sup-
porting Soviet artillery and other arms may advance 
more rapidly. Cavalry cannot hold terrain for long; 
therefore, motorized infantry and supporting arms 
must move forward rapidly to relieve cavalry units 
counterattacked by the enemy. The mobility and 
maneuverability of cavalry in sudden continuous 
flank attacks against withdrawing enemy are the 
basic elements of cavalry striking power. Mortars 
and machine guns mOlllted on horse-drawn carts 
supplement the automatic weapons carried by cav-
alry men. The striking power is considerable when 
tanks operate with cavalry. Artillery is the basic 
arm against enemy counterattacks, as well as in the 
assault of fortified positions and road blocks. 
During pursuit operations, small cavalry units are 
detached to reduce important by-passed strong 
points-especially enemy supply centers-situated 
on vital lines of communication. Dismounted as-
saults are made simultaneously from all directions 
by squadrons reinforced by antitank guns, mortars, 
and automatic weapons (fig. 48). The assault group 
may be as large as a reinforced regiment to which 
self-propelled guns are attached to facilitate the 
destruction of enemy defensive positions. Sufficient 
striking power is given such assault units to clear 
the enemy from the position quickly, enabling the 
cavalry unit to rejoin the main body. 
6. DEFENSIVE TACTICS 
On the defense, cavalry covers withdrawals and pro-
tects the flanks and the gaps between units, inflicting 
losses on the enemy by sudden counterattacks upon 
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the flanks of enemy salients. Under extreme condi-
tions, cavalry engages in dismounted defensive 
combat as infantry. In a decentralized defensive po-
sition, care is always taken to conceal horses in a 
defiladed area for safety and to facilitate withdrawal. 
In the defense of road blocks or tactically important 
terrain, artillery and mortars are basic defensive 
weapons relied upon by Soviet cavalry. 
Section V. ENGINEERS 
1. BASIC DOCTRINE 
Engineer work in the Red Army regularly proceeds 
under rapidly changing combat conditions and in 
the face of limitations in the quantity and types 
of engineer equipment available; this is especially 
true of heavy construction and bridge building ma-
terials. These conditions serve to emphasize the 
importance of combat engineers (pioneers) and to 
demand from them efficient and speedy performance 
of a great variety of engineer tasks. In addition, 
the Soviets place a premium on detailed calculation 
of engineer capabilities, full exploitation of available 
equipment, development and perfection of engineer 
techniques, and constant coordination between the 
engineer arm and other arms, especially artillery. 
The primary mission of the Soviet pioneer bat-
talion is identical with that of the U. S. engineer 
combat battalion: to increase the effectiveness of the 
division in all phases of combat by general engineer 
work and to hinder the movement of the enemy. 
Due to the nature of combat on the Eastern Front-
frequent German counterattacks, lesser reliance on 
friendly air cover, pressure of time in executing 
engineer missions-greater emphasis fell on mine 
laying, both in the offense and in the defense, on 
construction of hasty field fortifications, and on 
camouflage. 
The Soviet divisional pioneer battalion is less 
than one-fourth the size of our combat engineer 
battalion, comprising 164 to 170 men as compared 
with 637. Since it is not motorized, when rapid 
movement of engineers is required, units are at-
tached to other troops such as tank units or motor-
ized infantry which provide transportation. Stand-
ard equipment is similar to ours-wire-cutters 
grapnels, mine-detectors, shovels, saws, demolitio~ 
sets, flame throwers, etc.-but there is less power-
driven and more hand equipment. 
The pioneer battalion of the mechanized corps 
is approximately the same size as our armored divi-
sion engineer battalion, and is motorized for move-
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ment into great depths in short periods of time. 
Each of the three motorized brigades in the mecha· 
nized corps has an engineer company of 121 men. 
Specialized GHQ engineer units-independent bat· 
talions, regiments, and brigades-are used exten· 
sively in the Red Army for reinforcement, and par· 
ticularly with infantry,· for the assault of fortified 
pOSitIOns. Light and heavy ponton regiments are 
respectively comparable to the U. S. engineer light 
ponton company, which may be attached down to 
divisional level when necessary, and to the heavy 
ponton battalion, which may be attached to corps 
or army. There also are other special GHQ units-
such as camouflage-similar to ours in function. 
The employment of army and corps construction 
engineers, operating to the rear of the infantry di· 
visions and executing heavier and more complicated 
engineer work, is identical to ours. The use of 
local labor in construction work is common in rear 
areas. 
2. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
a. Reconnaissance. Soviet doctrine stresses 
the importance of thoroughly planned and efficiently 
executed engineer reconnaissance. The organization 
of engineer reconnaissance varies, however, with 
combat conditions and with each specific situation. 
Thus, no Soviet organization can be considered typi-
cal. The following examples serve to indicate the 
saturation of elements for engineer reconnaissance 
and the importance attached to it, especially in the 
offensive (fig. 49) : 
During the period of preparation for a break-
through of enemy defenses, partially located on the 
bank of a river, the engineer staff of a Soviet army 
group composed a plan of engineer reconnaissance 
and assigned to supervising staff officers missions 
and areas of responsibility. Reconnaissance objec-
tives included -enemy installations and obstacles on 
the front line, the presence of escarpment, and of 
breaks in the ice; the nature, extent, and areas of 
defensive constructions; sectors accessible to tanks, 
etc. It was conducted chiefly by observation. On a 
front of 8% miles, 20 forward observation posts 
were operated, 10 of which were manned by engineer 
commanders. 
A systematic reconnaissance of the ice in the 
areas of possible crossings was also undertaken; 
reconnaissance groups of six to seven men were sent 
out to discover mined sectors. Some minefields were 
located by interrogation of prisoners and by mine 
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tracers or indicator movements or sounds; the enemy 
defense system was photographed from the air. 
This was done three times during the period of prep· 
aration for attack so that changes in the arrange-
ment of enemy defenses could be observed and pro-
vided for. During the period of movement through 
the defensive zone of the enemy, two mobile engineer 
posts with four men each were organized for the 
first echelon of each division. In several sectors 
special pioneer groups-each composed of six to 
eight men-were sent out for mine and obstacle re-
connaissance. Two to three pioneers were also 
allotted to each reconnaissance group of combined 
arms. Reconnaissance in the second echelon of 
troops was conducted chiefly for the discovery of 
mine obstacles on the roads and road shoulders, and 
for providing passage for heavy tanks. 
During the period of preparation for attack by 
another army group, engineer observation was con-
ducted by regimental, divisional, and, partially, army 
reconnaissance units. In each divisional zone two 
to three engineer observation posts were set up in 
addition to command observation posts in the main 
operational sectors. The observation posts of other 
arms were used: about 40 percent were artillery 
observation posts, and 60 percent were combined-
arms observation posts. 
Mobile groups of combined arms, which conducted 
active day and night reconnaissance, were also 
allotted pioneers for mine and obstacle clearance. 
In the advance, mobile engineer observation posts 
were formed from regimental and divisional pioneers 
(one to two posts per division) , while army groups 
and army engineer reconnaissance platoons acted as 
mobile reconnaissance g;:oups (one to two per divi-
sional zone). Special groups were also organized 
for reconnaissance of specific centers of defense and 
for assisting tank and infantry units. Small engi-
neer reconnaIssance groups, which infiltrated 
through the front line of defense or were parachuted 
from airplanes, operated in the deep rear of the 
enemy. 
In still another instance, the following elements 
were created for engineer reconnaissance during 
the period of preparation for the attack: 
Two army group reconnaissance platoons, 
operating in the deep rear of the enemy. 
Four army group reconnaissance groups, 
comprising part of the tank reconnais-
sance elements. 
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Figure 49. Plan of engineer reconnaissance and dissemination 0/ in/ormation between staDs. 
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Six army group reconnaissance platoons, 
operating in army zones of advance. 
One engineer group operating within the 
army group reconnaissance organization 
of combined arms. 
Three reserve platoons of the engineer staff. 
Six army reconnaissance platoons, operating 
in army and divisional zones. 
In addition, one or two squads in each divisional 
pioneer battalion were designated for engineer 
reconnaIssance. 
On the basis of collated and verified data from all 
sources, the Soviet engineer staff finally prepares 
an engineer situation map (showing the enemy de-
fensive zone, the lines and centers of defense, and 
antitank and antipersonnel obstacles) and a detailed 
description of enemy installations, which aid in de-
termining the areas most favorable for a break· 
through. In addition, situation maps are de-
veloped, showing water barriers, condition of line 
of communication, availability of water supply, and 
presence of local materials for construction of 
crossings and roads and for camouflage. 
Simultaneously, the engineer staff must assemble 
complete data about its own engineer units to de-
termine the quantity and condition of personnel and 
equipment, and to what extent reinforcements from 
the troops and higher engineer echelons will be 
needed. 
h. Preparation for the attack. In prepara-
tion for the launching of an offensive operation, 
specific responsibilities are assumed by combat engi-
neers. Troop concentrations at the line of departure 
and other installations are camouflaged. Dummy 
troop concentrations, artillery, tanks, fortifications, 
and roads are constructed. Provisions are made for 
water supply. The engineers repair roads and 
bridges, or construct new ones; they fortify obser-
vation and command posts. 
Engineer work for clearing lanes through ob-
stacles and minefields is organized. Trenches are 
dug-at least two to a company-to approach enemy 
positions as closely as possible. Small bridges are 
laid across communication trenches to permit pas-
sage of infantry-one bridge for each platoon. 
Two bridges per battalion are laid for passage of 
motor transport and artillery. 
All preparatory work is executed as silently and 
as secretly as possible so that the direction of at-
tack will not be disclosed to enemy ground or air 
observation. 
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During this period, the engineer staff organizes 
and supervises instruction of the troops in various 
engineer measures. In one army, for example, tank-
borne companies in each infantry regiment were 
organized to force a water barrier independently 
and to secure the opposite shore. In addition, other 
detachments were organized in each infantry and 
artillery regiment and in each division to repair 
roads along the route of march and to clear mines. 
All army troops were instructed in the use of local 
materials for crossing a river. 
c. Assault tactics. ASSAULT ENGINEER-PIONEER 
BRIGADE. The organic pioneers and engineers of 
infantry and tank formations must be reinforced by 
GHQ assault units in operations against strongly 
fortified positions. Assault engineer-pioneer bri-
gades are the basic Soviet assault units. Normally, 
they are employed under centralized control in the 
zone of the main effort. In a typical successful oper-
ation, an assault brigade operated in the zone of an 
infantry corps and was subordinated to the corps 
commander. Units of the brigade, as part of assault 
groups, secured divisional operations and took part 
in the assault. 
Assault engineer-pioneer brigades should never, 
the Soviets teach, be dispersed over a two- or three-
army area with equal distribution of equipment 
along the entire front. 
Brigades are employed in close coordination with 
the other arms; pioneers must at all times be sup-
ported by infantry, artillery, and tanks. Assault 
brigades and assault units should not be used as 
"armored infantry" operating to the front of the 
infantry or for pioneer-tank raids in breaking 
through strongly fortified positions. 
In the break-through of strongly fortified posi-
tions, the brigade performs the following: 
Conducts engineer reconnaissance. 
Detaches mobile obstacle-clearing detach-
ments. 
Includes assault engineer-pioneer elements in 
corps and army antitank reserves for coop-
eration with antitank destroyer artillery 
regiments. 
Repairs and constructs roads, bridges, and 
crossings and lays corduroy roads at the 
line of departure. 
Clears lanes in minefields and other obstacles 
and organizes the passage of advancing 
units through them. 
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Participates in assault groups (detachments) 
for the destruction of timber-and-earth 
and concrete firing positions, and steel 
pillboxes. 
Accompanies tanks and artillery and, to-
gether with infantry elements, assists in 
the displacement of guns and mortars at-
tached to assault groups to new firing posi-
tions, and in equipping these firing posi-
tions. 
Covers flanks and salients of advancing for-
mations and secures seized areas by mines 
and other obstacles_ 
Clears routes of march and inhabited points 
used by troops of mines and obstacles. 
MINE AND OBSTACLE CLEARANCE. In the offen-
sive, pioneers move forward in front of the infantry, 
or with it, to clear lanes through minefields for in-
fantry, tanks, and artillery. Primary march routes 
are cleared of mines first; the most experienced 
pioneers are assigned this task. 
In the Stalingrad offensive, 85 groups of care-
fully selected pioneers, composed of from 10 to 25 
men each, were designated to clear mines on the 
basic roads. They began work early in the morn-
ing and in 3% hours had made 64 lanes and had 
rendered harmless more than 5,000 mines. 
Security detachments are sent out to complete 
mine removal in abandoned houses, trenches, shel-
ters, and mud huts, command posts and troop con-
centration areas, road gullies, enemy fortifications, 
etc., as the offensive develops. 
Thirty-six obstacle-clearing groups may be or-
ganized from an assault engineer-pioneer battalion 
to clear 36 lanes for 12 to 18 infantry companies or 
4 to 6 infantry battalions. An assault battalion can 
clear 18 to 36 lanes for tank platoons-fully servic-
ing a tank brigade or two tank regiments. 
DESTRUCTION OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 
When earth and timber or concrete pillboxes, 
"crabs" (German mobile steel pillboxes), and con-
crete emplacements are expected, special assault 
groups must be formed by the infantry and pioneers. 
Each group contains from a section to a company 
of pioneers; consequently, 9 to 18 assault groups can 
be formed from one assault engineer-pioneer bat-
talion. The infantry battalion or company, sup-
ported by the assault group, is usually commanded 
by an infantry officer, but sometimes by an experi-
enced commander of an assault engineer-pioneer 
company or battalion. 
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The assault group is usually organized into the 
following subgroups (for an alternate, slightly 
stronger organization, see the assault regiment, para-
graph Ib, section II, part III) : 
Demolition subgroups, composed of one to 
two infantry sections, one to two assault 
pioneer sections, and two to four flame-
thrower operators. 
Blocking subgroups, each composed of 1 to 
to 1% infantry platoons with one to two 
heavy machine guns, a section of antitank 
rifles, a platoon of 50-mm mortars, two to 
four men with flame throwers, and up to a 
section of pioneers. 
Reinforcing subgroups (fire subgroups), 
consisting of one to two antitank guns 
(45- or 57-mm), two to six flame throwers, 
and one to two heavy tanks. In addition, 
one to two 82-mm mortars and one to two 
76-mm guns are often included. In the 
case of especially heavily fortified instal-
lations, a 122-mm howitzer is added. 
The assault group must be covered by at least as 
many direct-support infantry guns and machine guns 
as there are enemy direct-support infantry guns and 
machine-gun embrasures. 
The organization and preparation of assault 
groups proceed under the centralized direction of 
the staff of infantry units, with cooperation by com-
manders of engineer elements for both tactical and 
technical supervision of engineer maneuvers. Co-
ordination of infantry, tanks, artillery, and assault 
engineers must be organized between elements with-
in the assault group; between groups within an as-
sault detachment; and also between the assault 
group, infantry elements, security group, and group 
of artillery support. At least two practice assaults 
are conducted to perfect coordination. Three to 4 
hours, after receipt of the mission orders, must be 
allowed for daylight reconnaissance. 
The assault of pillboxes, "crabs," and casemates, 
proceeds in the following order: The assault group 
moves out under cover of artillery fire (which con-
tinues throughout the assault), and of smoke screens. 
Fire cover for the attacked position is neutralized 
first. "Crabs" are assaulted next by groups of re-
duced strength. Antitank rifles conduct fire on the 
side and rear walls, while pioneers use hollow 
charges to blow up the roof. 
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The method of storming a timber·and·earth or 
a concrete pillbox is as follows: The reconnaissance 
and obstacle.dearing subgroup verifies the informa-
tion obtained by engineer reconnaissance and espe· 
cially notes any new firing installations that may 
have appeared on the flanks. The blocking and fire 
subgroups cover approaches to the firing position 
from the enemy side. Simultaneously, part of the 
reconnaissance and obstacle.clearing subgroup 
clears the way for passage of the demolition sub· 
group. Camouflaged pioneers with antitank rifles, 
using all available cover, move up to positions for 
firing on the pillbox embrasures and approaches; 
the assault group must first concentrate its full 
force on neutralization of the embrasures. Flame 
throwers blind and tanks destroy the embrasures. 
If tanks and flame throwers are not available, em· 
brasures are blocked with bags of earth and saw· 
dust. Then the demolition pioneers throw Molotov 
cocktails, incendiary bombs, or smoke hand grenades 
in any openings; or sear the interior of the pillbox 
with a flame thrower. Finally, they blow up the 
pillbox with explosive charges. After its seizure, the 
pillbox must be secured with the help of infantry 
regimental security groups (or battalion security 
groups) . 
d. Hasty defense in offensive operations. 
Red Army combat experience has demonstrated that 
captured enemy positions must be organized and 
prepared immediately against violent and repeated 
counterattacks, especially on flanks and salients. 
Hastily laid minefields are the primary methods 
of engineer support against such counterattacks, al· 
though mobile pillboxes and prepared obstacles are 
important supplements. 
PLANNING THE DEFENSES. Sectors scheduled for 
fortification are chosen with a view to utilizing 
natural barriers which inherently, or with minimum 
adaptation, serve as effectivo obstacles to enemy ad· 
vance. Inhabited points, forests, copses, and 
heights are especially favored. All enemy fortica· 
tions, after being cleared of mines, are used. 
Camouflage concealing the system of fortifications 
is erected if time permits. 
Mine laying is planned in detail by commanders 
of pioneer battalions or of regiments who are desig. 
nated as chiefs of mine operations on a division or 
corps front. The plans are based on thorough 
reconnaissance and designate methods to be used, 
quantities of materials needed, and timing of demo 
olition with troop movements. They are presented 
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for the Commander's approval through the Chief 
Engineer. Chiefs of mining operations maintain 
communication with the Chief Engineer, by means 
of daily reports, and also with the over-all com-
manders of combat sectors with whom mine laying 
is constantly coordinated. This uninterrupted con-
tact enables engineer units, with a minimum loss 
of time, to meet combat developments such as the 
necessity for securing a newly seized enemy posi-
tion, combating a sudden enemy counterattack, or 
eliminating an unforeseen obstacle. 
Coordination of pioneer maneuvers with antitank 
artillery in the laying of minefields is of special 
importance. Mines serve not only to destroy 
enemy tanks by their own action, but also to 
canalize tanks in minefields adequately covered by 
direct Soviet artillery fire. To acquaint artillery-
men with possible areas of tank approaches within 
range of direct artillery fire, and with areas in which 
cover for pioneers laying minefields must be pro· 
vided, engineer and artillery officers make a pre-
liminary reconnaissance for strategic locations for 
minefields and firing positions. Artillerymen must 
be kept constantly informed of the limits of mine-
fields and belts, and of any changes in them. 
LAYING THE DEFENSES. The Red Army often 
attaches a pioneer platoon to an infantry com-
pany, or a pioneer company to an infantry bat-
talion, for laying protective mine belts. An engi-
neer unit assigned to an infantry company is held 
responsible for a sector not more than % to 3 miles 
wide_ A unit assigned to a battalion may cover a 
sector up to 5 to 6 miles in width. The depth in 
both cases is 3 to 4 miles. In one instance, the 
first belt was completed within 3 hours after assign-
ment of the task, the second within 4 hours, and 
the third within 6 hours. 
Mine and demolition equipment are brought for-
ward on large sleds hauled by tanks and on hand 
sleds. The engineer troops are organized into 
small, mobile mine.laying units armed with auto· 
matic weapons and rifles. Such units are equipped 
with ten sleds, each loaded with six fragmentation 
mines improvised from captured I55-mm artillery 
shells; two prepared electrical circuits from the 
engineer demolition chest; 90 antitank mines; fifty 
200'gram blasting caps, with fuzes; two mine de-
tectors; six probes; five grapnels; and two machine 
guns. Controlled, electrically detonated mines in 
circuits are placed across main avenues of approach 
so that the offensive can be continued without wait-
V-99 
Tl\f 30-430 
ing for the removal of minefields. Contact mines 
are used in large numbers, however, in order to 
install adequate defenses within the limited time 
available (fig. 50). 
The time element is so important that mine lay-
ing is continued even under enemy artillery fire. 
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3. DELIBERATE DEFENSE AND WITHDRAWAL 
Chief engineers of regiments and divisions are re-
sponsible for technical assistance to their com-
Iaanders in organizing deliberate defenses. They 
participate in working out the plan of defense and 
all orders concerning the fortifying of defensive po-
Figure 50. Hasty mine belts in an offensive operation. 
Even though the enemy may observe some of the 
mine-laying activity, the prime Soviet consideration 
is to complete the system of defensive belts to the 
greatest possible degree. The necessity for rapid 
action may become so pressing that full comple-
tion of mine laying according to the planned pattern 
is left to the second echelon of pioneer units. 
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sltlOns. By authorization of the regimental (divi-
sional! commander, they give orders to (company) 
battalion commanders concerning the priority of en-
gineer work. Priority is determined by a careful 
evaluation of the nature of combat. character of the 
terrain, quantity of water supply. pressure of time, 
and availability of equipment and personnel. 
I Nov 45 
The troops themselves, within the limitations of 
their organic equipment, fortify positions in their 
own particular sectors, under the direction of their 
commanders. Pioneers act as technical supervisors 
and instructors, themselves carrying out only the 
most complicated and difficult work. Under en-
gineer leadership, communication trenches are dug; 
minefields are laid; machine-gun nests are dug in; 
mortar emplacements, command and observation 
posts, and troop shelters are constructed; obstacles 
are erected; and strongpoints are fortified. 
For technical supervision of the fortifying of po-
sitions, the battalion commander has three to four 
pioneers at his disposal and up to a squad of regi-
mental pioneer instructors. For more complicated 
work (mining, preparation of timber-and-earth fir-
ing positions, etc.), he will have in addition divi-
sional pioneers-one to two platoons per regiment. 
In the withdrawal, engineers are responsible for 
the destruction of all equipment. supplies, and muni-
tions which cannot be transported with the troops. 
4. CAMOUFLAGE 
Engineer camouflage troops (army, army group, and 
GHQ) supervise the execution of strategic camou-
flage plans issued by the commander of combined 
arms. The practices of individual concealment, 
simple camouflage construction, and camouflage 
discipline are the responsibilities of the individual 
soldier. The engineer camouflage units advise, 
supervise, and instruct the troops in camouflage work 
and discipline, inspect camouflage work, assist in 
supply and preparation of camouflage materials, and 
themselves construct complicated, large. scale camou-
flage expedients. 
American and Soviet camouflage doctrines are 
basically similar in purpose, fundamental principles, 
and methods employed. Camouflage by complete 
concealment, imitation, or disguise is used, depend-
ing on tactical desirability and physical practica-
bility. Specific methods are influenced by the dis-
tance of enemy forces, the nature of enemy 
reconnaissance, available time and manpower, acces· 
sible materials for camouflage, season of the year, 
character of the terrain, and meteorological condi· 
tions. Emphasis in both American and Soviet doc-
trine is laid on utilization of natural and artificial 
materials, pattern painting, and dummy construc-
tion. 
Soviet camouflage doctrine, because of a lesser re-
liance on friendly air power for protection, places 
heavy stress on camouflage discipline in eliminating 
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tell-tale indications associated with location of 
bivouac areas, firing positions, command and ob-
servation posts, tanks, supply points, etc. 
Bivouac areas are revealed by the regular, sharply 
defined borders of unit sectors and outlines of tents, 
by smoke from camp fires and kitchens, and by 
worn paths to and from water supply areas, kitchens, 
etc. Rigid Soviet camouflage discipline provides for 
the disposition of troops in small groups so as to dis-
guise the strength of infantry forces, and for the 
pitching of tents in uneven rows using trees and 
bushes as natural camouflage. Campfires can be lit 
only with special permission. Smoke from kitchen 
fires must be controlled and dispersed and, if pos-
sible, kitchens are located in nearby inhabited 
areas and used only at night. Buildings are con-
structed along already existing roads; movement 
within bivouac areas takes place along paths dis-
covered and marked by engineer patrols. 
Similar camouflage discipline hinders enemy dis-
covery of observation and command posts. artillery 
positions, and tanks. Activity in command and ob-
servation posts commences only after camouflage 
measures have been taken. They are approached 
and left only on designated roads. Exposed routes 
do not end at an artillery position but are extended 
to another logical termination. Tank tracks are 
camouflaged by brushing them out or by covering 
them with local materials. In all cases, camouflage 
materials must be prepared, under engineer super-
vision, at a distance from the position or installa-
tion to be camouflaged so that tell-tale indications 
of activity, such as trampled paths and uprooted 
vegetation, will not disclosed their true location. 
Section VI. TACTICAL ANTI. 
AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY 
1. MISSIONS 
The primary mission of Red Army tactical antiair-
craft artillery is to protect troop concentrations, 
hrward and rear area installations, and forward 
lines of communications from hostile aircraft at-
tacks. Antiaircraft artillery also conducts direct fire 
against land fortifications, attacks hostile infantry in 
assembly and deployment areas, assists in repelling 
attacks of enemy ground forces, and executes other 
firing missions which are normally assigned to light 
field artillery. Strategic antiaircraft artillery-with 
heavy, fixed, semimobile, and mobile guns, radar, 
searchlights, and barrage balloons-operates in 
close cooperation with interceptor aviation as an 
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entirely separate arm beyond the scope of this 
discussion. 
2. TYPES OF UNITS 
Tactical antiaircraft artillery units consist of inde-
pendent antiaircraft artillery divisions, and organic 
antiaircraft units of mobile formations. The anti-
aircraft division is the basic GHQ reserve antiair-
craft artillery organization which is allotted to the 
various armies and army groups as required. An 
antiaircraft artillery division consists of an antiair-
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craft gun regiment and three antiaircraft automatic 
weapons regiments totaling sixteen 85·mm guns, 
forty-eight 37-mm guns, and sixty-four 12.7-mm 
antiaircraft machine guns. It can effectively pro-
tect an area 10,000 yards wide and 7,000 yards 
deep-that is, a deployment area for the main effort 
of a major infantry-artillery offensive (fig. 51). 
This tactical employment of antiaircraft artillery 
gives a powerful concentration of medium antiair-
craft artillery in addition to a barrage of automatic 
weapons which is equivalent to that of U. S. practice. 
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Figure 51. Antiaircraft artillery division in defense of an infantry offensive. 
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The organic antiaircraft artillery of the armored, 
mechanized, and cavalry corps consists of an anti-
aircraft artillery regiment plus the antiaircraft 
machine-gun companies of the component forma-
tions, comprising in all sixteen 37-mm guns, and 
fifty-two 12.7-mm antiaircraft machine guns. By 
U. S. standards, this allotment of organic antiair-
craft artillery to the mobile corps is incapable of 
providing adequate antiaircraft protection over the 
entire corps deployment area in most situations. 
However, centralized control of the antiaircraft 
weapons makes up for some of their deficiency in 
numbers, and permits defense of vital installations. 
Combat troops employ their own 7.62-mm machine 
guns and 14.5-mm semiautomatic antitank rifles for 
local protection. 
3. CONTROL 
The commander of the antiaircraft artillery units of 
a Soviet combined-arms formation is subordinate 
to the artillery commander of the formation. The 
artillery commander is the only person who may 
change the missions of the antiaircraft artillery; 
only he may shift its effort from a primary to a 
secondary mission, and the reverse. The com-
mander of the antiaircraft artillery must keep him-
self informed of the general situation and of the 
mission of the supported units. He maintains com-
munications with the staff of the supported organi-
zation and with the artillery commander of that 
organization. Jointly with the signal officer he 
establishes antiaircraft warning service. 
In support of ground operations, the commander 
of the antiaircraft artillery groups his batteries to 
give maximum support to units which are in a most 
advantageous position to develop the offensive. In a 
static situation he groups his batteries to achieve 
concentration of fire over important installations 
and assembly areas. The antiaircraft artillery com-
mander must not allow his tactics to become stereo-
typed and passive; guided by reconnaissance reports 
and study of the tactics and habits of the enemy, he 
must maneuver his batteries, use ruses, and, in co-
operation with interceptor aviation lead the enemy 
into firetraps. 
4. DISPOSITION 
Tactical antiaircraft artillery is used for the protec-
tion of deployment and assembly areas, forward and 
rear area installations such as supply dumps and 
artillery and mortar positions, and for the support of 
ground operations. In protecting troops deployed 
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in forward areas, antiaircraft artillery is deployed 
linearly. The heavy machine guns are emplaced by 
platoons between 300 and 500 yards from the for-
ward elements. Light antiaircraft guns are em-
placed by batteries on a line 1,000 to 1,500 yards 
from the forward lines. The distance between bat-
teries is between 1,000 and 2,000 yards, the distance 
between platoons is between 100 and 150 yards, and 
the distance between individual pieces is at least 30 
yards. The medium antiaircraft guns are emplaced 
by batteries on a line approximately 2,000 to 3,000 
yards from the forward lines. The distance between 
batteries is also between 2,000 and 3,000 yards, and 
thc distance between individual pieces is at least 30 
yards. 
In protecting assembly areas and rear echelon in-
stallations, antiaircraft artillery is deployed in two 
concentric circles. The inner circle is located with-
in the defended area; the outer circle is approxi-
mately 1,000 yards from the perimeter of the de-
fended area. Distances between the batteries, pla-
toons, and individual pieces are the same as those 
employed in linear defense. 
Normally, medium antiaircraft batteries are em-
placed approximately 2,000 yards apart in dug-in 
positions, and are camouflaged. Alternate and 
dummy positions are always prepared for the whole 
battery; if fire against land targets is anticipated, 
special dual-purpose emplacements are also pre-
pared. The depth of emplacements is such that 
gun sights are protected from mortar fragments. 
The preparation of all types of emplacements and 
maneuver of batteries from one position to another 
are habitually accomplished at night. 
Five types of fire control are used by Red Army 
medium antiaircraft artillery: tracking individual 
targets, moving barrage, stationary barrage, direct 
fire against land targets, and observed indirect fire 
against land targets. In tracking individual targets, 
a battery fires as a unit from data computed by a 
range finder and director, or by radar. In erecting 
moving and stationary barrages, a battalion or a 
larger groupment is a firing unit. These, barrages 
are considered inefficient and wasteful of ammuni-
tion, and are used only when tracking is impossible 
due to meteorological conditions or other causes. 
In direct fire against land targets, fire is controlled 
by individual gun commanders against designated 
targets. When massed fire is desired, a battery may 
be used as a unit. Direct and indirect observed fire 
are used against land targets as parts of artillery 
preparations. Antiaircraft artillery guns are as-
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signed targets whose destruction requires high 
velocity projectiles. Observed indirect fire is con-
trolled in the same manner as that of light field 
artillery. 
Light antiaircraft artillery is normally emplaced 
by platoons in dug-in and camouflaged positions. 
Emplacements are deep enough to protect gun sights 
from mortar fragments. Alternate positions for 
duty pieces and positions for fire against land targets 
are prepared with embrasures covering the sectors 
of responsibility for antitank defense. Light anti-
aircraft artillery employs direct fire only. The 
platoon is the firing unit. Effective range against 
approaching targets is 2,000 yards; against depart. 
ing targets, 1,000 yards. In attacking ground tar· 
gets, light antiaircraft guns are effective against em· 
brasures of fortifications, personnel, observation 
posts, machine gun and antitank positions, and 
tanks. 
5. SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS 
In supporting ground operations, antiaircraft artil-
lery has three functions: protection of march 
columns against air and land attacks; protection of 
personnel and materiel in assembly and deployment 
areas; and active support of the assault. 
During the approach march, antiaircraft bat-
teries are disposed throughout the column. Some 
light antiaircraft guns are emplaced in advance at 
points along the route where traffic may become 
channelized (narrow defiles, bridges, fords, or 
woods) . Antiaircraft machine guns are dispersed 
along the column to protect the heavier antiaircraft 
weapons again'st attacks by low.flying planes and 
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enemy ground forces. At night 50 percent of the 
machine guns must be ready to fire against ground 
targets. 
Active support of ground operations is carried out 
in three phases. During the artillery preparation for 
the assault, antiaircraft artillery-in addition to its 
primary mission-is used in planned fire against 
enemy fortifications, firing positions, and observa· 
tion posts. During the assault, light antiaircraft artil-
lery guns and machine guns accompany the assault 
teams to protect them against air attacks and to assist 
supporting arms. As a rule antiaircraft weapons are 
concentrated in sectors where the assault is most suc-
cessful, in order to assist in repulsing prohahle coun-
terattacks and to maintain the momentum of the 
assault. 
6. IMPROVISED ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES 
In addition to the antiaircraft weapons proper, the 
Red Army effectively uses light field artillery and 
semiautomatic antitank rifles against air targets. 
Field artillery batteries (76.2-mm guns and 122·mm 
howitzers) fire in volleys at predetermined ranges 
with pre-cut fuses. Gun emplacements are con-
structed so that trails can be lowered to increase 
the maximum elevation by 30 degrees. To facili-
tate control and to speed fire, orientation points are 
selected in directions of probable approach of enemy 
planes. 
Three to five semiautomatic antitank rifles, firing 
on the same target, are used against low-level and 
dive· bombing attacks. They are considered effec-
tive at ranges up to 500 yards. 
PART III. SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
Section I. OPERATIONS IN LIMITED 
VISIBILITY 
1. NIGHT OPERATIONS 
The Red Army has been successful in both large-
and small-scale operations at night. The Soviets 
consider that night operations are preferable when 
terrain, dense minefields, and other obstacles-
combined with enemy preparedness-eliminate the 
possibility of surprise and make heavy casualties 
in da, time operations a probability. 
Night raids, smaIl·scale attacks, and reconnaiS. 
sance in force are initiated to complete reconnaIS-
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sance data, to force the enemy to disclose his plan 
of defense and plan of fire, to capture prisoners, 
to harass the enemy, and to divert his attention from 
other sectors of the front. During preparation for 
a major offensive, small·scale night operations are 
conducted in order to capture terrain favorable 
for observation of the enemy or suitable for de-
ployment of the main force. All night operations 
are carefully planned and coordinated. For ex-
ample, a typical small raid (figs. 52 and 53) was 
planned 6 days in advance and was preceded by 
careful observation of the enemy by members of 
the raiding party. 
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Order of advance Cross the Vistula in a boat disem· 
of the recon· barking near a separate clump of 
naissance party. bushes. Cross the trench and de-
ploy in the rear of the heavy rna· 
Objective. 
chine gun. 
Heavy machine gun in open firing 
position about 400 yards to the east 
of height 124.8. 
Organization 
the attack. 
o f Reconnaissance party to consist of 
four men; Number 1 to guard the 
boat. Nos. 2 and 3, to attack the 
machine gun crew. No.4 to throw 
a grenade into the shelter. 
Fire support: 
Artillery. 
Mortars. 
Machine guns 
and anti· 
tank rifles. 
Coordination sig· 
nals. 
Two batteries to lay interdictory bar· 
rage at A and B. One battery to 
fire interdictory mission in depth 
along the communication trench. 
405·mm guns to fire in pairs on the 
enemy firing positions to the north 
and south of the objective. 
To lay interdiction barrage at C. 
To engage the same targets as 405·mm 
guns. 
To call for artillery and mortar fire-
one green rocket fired upstream. 
To call for a reserve boat~red 
light from a flashlight. 
Order of with· No.4 to convoy the prisoner to the 
drawal. boat. Nos. 2 and 3 to cover No. 
4, then Nos. 1 and 4 to cover Nos. 
2 and 3. 
Figure 52. Plan of a night raid across the Vistula, 16 
November 1944 
The success of night operations depends on care-
ful reconnaissance, simplicity of maneuver, speed of 
execution, and surprise. The deployment area is 
occupied secretly during twilight hours so that the 
commanders of the assault teams may familiarize 
themselves with orientation points, phase lines, and 
avenues of approach. To achieve surprise, artillery 
preparation is often omitted during the initial 
assault. Two phase lines are selected. The first 
is located within the forward defense zone of the 
enemy. This position is used to regroup the 
assault teams and to establish coordination with 
the supporting artillery for the attack of the next 
objective. The second phase line is so selected that 
its capture would force the enemy to displace his 
artillery. To facilitate control of combat and desig-
nation of targets for the supporting artillery, the 
assault zone is divided into sectors. Orientation 
points for infantry and tanks are carefully desig-
nated. The assault is launched by a signal from 
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the line of departure_ Advance of the assault teams 
is marked by visual and auditory signals. In order 
to reduce the effectiveness of enemy mortar fire, 
infantry advances at a jog_ Battalion commanders 
must continue the assault until the second phase line 
is reached. If the attack fails, it is often repeated 
in the same sector on the assumption that the enemy 
does not expect such a tactic. This IS in contrast 
to U. S. doctrine. 
The battalion attacks III a single wave preceded 
by a small advance guard. The rifle companies 
are deployed in line, each company in turn being 
deployed in a line of platoons. Individual riflemen 
wear white arm bands. Squads advance in wedge 
formation: riflemen to the right of the point fire 
ahead and to the right; those to the left of the point 
fire ahead and to the left. If the assault sector is 
narrow (400 to 500 yards), a rifle battalion may 
attack in two echelons. The second echelon then 
consists of a reinforced rifle company whose mis-
sion is to protect the flanks of the battalion. For 
raiding missions, a special detachment is formed 
to evacuate captured documents, equipment, and 
prisoners. The assault-team principle is followed 
in grouping elements of the rifle battalion; that is, 
riflemen are supplemented by company and bat-
talion weapons and by engineers according to the 
mission of each assault team. 
Tanks are frequently employed in support of 
infantry at night. Preliminary terrain reconnais-
sance, clear statement of tasks, clear definition of 
orientation points, and close cooperation with in-
fantry are considered the salient points in successful 
use of tanks at night. Each tank is assigned its 
route, mission, and the infantry assault team which 
it supports. Several riflemen are assigned to each 
tank to aid its crew in locating antitank weapons 
and obstacles. When the situation permits, tank 
headlights are used to illuminate enemy firing points, 
to light the way for obstacle-clearing parties, and 
to blind the enemy. In street fighting at night, 
tanks often set fire to buildings in order to illumi-
nate the enemy. 
In a night tank-infantry attack on Kuestrin, Ger-
many, the following action was reported: Retreat-
ing Germans prepared an ambush for the pursuing 
Red Army infantry and tanks in a town park. The 
lead Soviet tank stopped and fired a few rounds 
into the town hall, setting it on fire (fig. 54), while 
the remaining tanks and infantry deployed in a 
rough semicircle. German soldiers in ambush were 
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~ - - .. - - ROUTE OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PARTY 
Figure 53. Sketch showing plan of a night raid across the Vistula, 16 November 1944. 
silhouetted against the burning building and Soviet 
tommy-gunners who remained in the shadows made 
short work of the ambush. 
Forcing of the Oder River line is an example 
of a large-scale night operation: 5,000 planes, 
4,000 tanks, and over 22,000 pieces of artillery 
" supported the infantry attack. A special feature of 
this operation was the use of massed searchlights. 
Over 200 searchlights were spaced about 200 yards 
apart to illuminate the path for Soviet tanks and 
blind the enemy. Surprise was achieved by launch-
ing the main attack along the entire front at night 
instead of at daybreak when it was expected. 
2. USE OF SMOKE 
Soviet tactical doctrine stresses the employment of 
smoke to cover friendly troops as much as to blind 
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enemy observation (fig. 55). Smoke IS used to 
cover regroupment of forces, concentrations of 
troops, direction of the main effort, and all phases 
of large- and small-scale operations where the ter-
rain affords little cover from enemy observation. 
It is also used to deceive the enemy by false smoke 
concentrations which cause him to waste ammuni-
tion and disclose his firing positions. 
The Red Army uses smoke concentrations over 
large areas for extended periods to cover major 
attacks; to protect vital installations such as rail-
road bridges, assembly areas, and supply dumps 
from enemy aviation; to screen a counterattack; or 
to cover a withdrawal. The width of such a smoke 
screen varies from 2,500 to 3,500 yards. Roads 
leading to important locations and all orientation 
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points in the proximity of targets are also covered 
with smoke to make their detection more difficult. 
Smoke, when used to cover a major attack, is 
coordinated with the principal phases of the assault. 
In the preparatory phase, smoke is used to cover 
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the activities of the reconnaissance parties and ob· 
stacle-clearing detachments (fig. 56). During the 
assault phase, smoke is laid over the forward lines 
of the enemy (fig. 57). Care is taken not to blind 
friendly observation posts. In this phase, false con-
Figure 54. Armored attack on a town at night. 
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Figure 55. Smoke used to hide a counterattack. Note that smoke covers friendly rather than enemy troops. 
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Figure 56. Use of smoke to cover removal of obstacles. 
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SMOKE 
(FROM SMOKE SHELLSl 
Figure 57. Smoke used to cover the initial objective of the assault. 
V-110 
I Nov 45 TM 30-430 
Figure 58. Smoke used within the defensive positions of the enemy. 
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centrations of smoke are used to confuse the enemy 
as to the direction of the main effort. A smoke 
screen may be laid between the first and subsequent 
assault waves. During combat within the defense 
lines of the enemy, smoke is used to cover portions 
of the enemy positions~ to blind by-passed centers of 
resistance, or to blind stubbornly defended areas 
(fig. 58). 
Small-scale employment of smoke is an es-
tablished practice in the Red Army. Smoke pots 
or smoke hand grenades are used to cover the actions 
of an individual soldier or a small unit~ or to blind in-
dividual enemy observation posts or firing positions. 
Smoke is a valuable cover for individual riflemen or 
a small infantry unit during the advance toward 
enemy lines. Tank units use smoke not only to cover 
their advance from the assembly area to the deploy-
ment area and maneuvers within the enemy defense 
zone, but also for withdrawal from enemy fire. 
Smoke is also used to simulate tank losses, to screen 
the work of tank crews in repairing minor damage 
on the battlefield, and to facilitate the evacuation of 
damaged tanks under fire. Three to five smoke pots 
are used to screen the maneuvers of one tank. 
Judicious use of smoke can nullify efforts of the 
enemy when he uses smoke shells for registration 
fire. 
Section II. ASSAULT AND DEFENSE 
OF FORTIFIED ZONES 
1. PLANNING AND ORGANIZING THE ASSAULT 
The destruction of enemy forces in a fortified zone 
is accomplished by the complete break-through of 
all enemy defensive positions in the sector of the 
main effort, and subsequent flank attacks against 
adjacent sectors to clear the entire fortified zone. 
(See also sections II and V ~ part II.) 
Fortified zones vary in defensive strength ac-
cording to the extent of development, type of 
fortifications, terrain, strength of the defending 
personnel, and defensive fire power. The German 
fortified zones encountered by the Red Army were 
usually about 40 miles deep and extended up to 100 
miles along the front. The outpost defense zone, 
9 to 12 miles from the main defensive position, 
consisted of strong points at all dominating terrain 
features. The main defensive positions consisted 
of permanent steel and concrete emplacements 
organized as strong points, with numerous trenches 
and separate firing positions interlaced between 
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them. Switch positions, to prevent lateral move-
ment if main defensive positions were breached, 
covered the 7- to 10-mile distance between the main 
defensive positions and the second defensive posi-
tions. The second defensive position was generally 
weaker than the main defensive position except that 
counterattacks were a constant threat to the assault 
groups, especially if strong units from the main 
defensive positions succeeded in falling back to the 
second line. This line was 2 to 3 miles deep; 
behind it was the rear defensive belt, generally of 
earth and timber construction, 1 to 2 miles in depth. 
Soviet doctrine prescribes two possible types of 
assault, the accelerated attack and the progressive 
attack. The accelerated attack is used when enemy 
forces are disorganized and the fortified zone is not 
fully developed. Combat formations of combined 
arms and mobile troops reinforced by infantry, 
artillery, engineer units, and aviation are used to 
break through the fortified zone. The progressive 
attack is employed when considerable resistance 
from thoroughly developed fortifications is antici-
pated. Soviet doctrine stresses the intensive train-
ing of assault groups together with the supporting 
arms as the most important single factor in the 
successful assault of fortified zones. In many 
W orId War II operations, at least two rehearsals 
by assault groups and cooperating arms were held 
in rear areas prior to the actual assault. 
The assault may be made with the main effort 
along a single front from 6 to 9 miles wide or in 
multiple thrusts each 2 miles in width. Holding 
attacks are made simultaneously for diversion and 
to seize isolated fortified positions. The basic mis-
sion is to destroy enemy forces within the defensive 
zone and in the rear. Great emphasis is made on 
attacks against the flanks of the penetration area. 
In mountains and swamps, assaults are generally 
made on a narrower front in successive stages. 
2. COMBAT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ASSAULT 
Infantry assault groups must be of balanced com-
position to facilitate control under exacting condi-
tions. The echeloning of troops must be organized 
to provide for the immediate replacement of losses 
in the leading assault groups, to increase the in-
tensity of the attack into the enemy's defensive depth, 
and to develop the breach by attacking the enemy 
flanks. The organization of assault groups begins 
with the assault division; the basic combat element 
is the assault battalion. While some details of the 
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assault organization vary with the situation, the basic 
structure has been standardized since 1944. 
8. Assault division. This consists of a Guards 
Rifle Division of 10,500 men, and strong tank, artil-
lery, and engineer reinforcements which bring the 
total strength up to 16,000 men (fig. 59). The sup-
porting armor normally consists of one regiment 
each of heavy and medium tanks, a regiment of 
76.2-mm or 85-mm self-propelled artillery, and about 
a company of mine-clearing, flame-throwing, and 
bridging tanks. GHQ artillery includes a light artil-
lery brigade, a mortar regiment, two to four bat-
talions of 122-mm to 152-mm howitzers, a battalion 
of 203-mm howitzers, and a battery of superheavy 
artillery. The assault engineer-pioneer regiment in-
cludes flame-thrower operators and other special en-
gineer troops. 
The assault division forms three assault regiments. 
In addition, artillery groups and subgroups, the 
tank support group, the smoke-laying group, and 
the antitank reserve are constituted. 
Four types of artillery operate under the control 
of the divisional artillery commander: 
The divisional artillery support groupment 
(120-mm mortars, 122-mm howitzers, and 152-mm 
howitzers) is responsible for neutralizati.on of at 
least the first two lines of trenches in the assault and 
for reinforcement of the regimental artillery group-
ment. Part of the artillery employs direct fire 
against enemy firing positions and obstacles. 
The division is also allotted subgroupments from 
the corps countermortar (120-mm mortars and 
122-mm howitzers) and destruction groupments 
(152-mm and 203-mm howitzers, super heavy artil-
lery) . The former subgroupment is assigned the 
mission of countermortar and counterrocket opera-
tion; the latter, the destruction of permanent forti-
fications. 
Finally, the division maintains an artillery reserve, 
which is committed by the divisional commander as 
required. 
The assault division is deployed in one or two 
echelons in accordance with the strength of enemy 
fortifications and the assigned missions. A general 
reserve and an antitank reserve must be provided. 
The divisional assault front in the main effort has 
a width of from 0.6 to 1.2 miles. In secondary ef-
forts, and in mountain and swamp combat, the front 
is 2 to 2.5 miles wide. 
h. Assault regiment. Each regiment of the 
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basic rifle division employed in the assault IS rein-
forced by the following: 
Artillery (one battalion of the organic divi-
sional artillery, one battery of the organic 
divisional antitank battalion, a GHQ mor-
tar battalion, and a GHQ light gun bat-
talion) . 
Armored vehicles (two companies of medium 
tanks, one company of heavy tanks, one 
battery of light or medium self-propelled 
guns, and about a platoon of mine-clearing 
tanks) . 
About a battalion of combat engineers 
(fig. 60). 
The assault regiment resulting from these rein-
forcements forms two assault battalions. The third 
rifle battalion is utilized for the infantry component 
of the regimental assault group, the regimental 
obstacle-clearing group, and the regimental reserve. 
The regimental assault group is used in operations 
against forts and concrete casemates of great 
strength. In addition to a rifle company, it com-
prises a pioneer platoon, a heavy tank company, 
mine-clearing tanks, a self-propelled gun battery, 
and platoons of mortars and flame throwers. It is 
often supported by a smoke-laying group. The 
regimental obstacle-clearing groups clear passages 
through minefields and obstacles, prior to and dur-
ing the infantry and tank assault, support the bat-
talion obstacle-clearing groups in difficult opera-
tions, and enlarge gaps for the passage of succeed-
ing echelons. The regimental reserves provide 
antitank and antipersonnel security, especially for 
the flanks and rear of the regiment; they also serve 
as a personnel and materiel replacement pool for the 
assault battalion and the regimental assault group. 
The tank support group consists of two medium 
tank companies~ each of which normally supports 
one assault battalion. 
The regimental artillery groupment consists of 
one organic battalion of divisional artillery (regi-
mental combat team), plus a battalion of heavy 
mortars. This groupment is under the control of 
the divisional artillery commander during the 
artillery preparation phase, but passes under the 
control of the regimental commander during the 
assault phase. This artillery fires from open as well 
as covered positions, supports the assault as directed 
by the regimental commander, and may be utilized 
to replace losses in the battalion direct-fire artillery 
groupment. 
V-113 
TM 30-430 I Nov 45 
RI:~S~I~~:6N + REINJ~~~ING = 
(STRENGTH 10.500) (,STRENGTH 5.500) 
ASSAULT DIVISION 
(STRENGTH 16,000) 
xx 
~ 
GDS 
~~@ 
RCN 
lfu~r:t1 
1 r--- ---..." 
~liJctJ[t] 
(I) (2) (3) 12 I SAME 57-MM ~ AS(J) AT 
cbctJctJ 
4 4 4 
7o..MM 7o..MM J 22-MM 
GUN GUN HOW 
V-114 
~~ 
21 41 
HV M 
I(~I~I 
MINE 70.. OR 
CLEAR- 85-M M 
ING SP 
0~ 
72 36 
LIGHT 120-
ARTY MM 
BRIG 
cbdJ 
1.2. 6 
122-MM 152-MM 
HOW HOW 
d:Jcb 
6 2 
203-MM SUPER 
HOW HEAVY 
dJ 
ASSAULT 
NOTE: N UMBER 
GROUPS FORMED 
(3) ASSAULT REGIMENT 
TANK SUPPORT GROUP 
DIVISION 
SUPPORT GROUP 
COUNTER MORT AR 
SUBGROUP 
DESTRUCTION 
SUBGROUP 
SMOKE LAYING GROU? 
ANTITANK RESERVE 
OF 122 .... 152-MM DIVISIONAL RESERVE 
HOW BNS MAY 
VARY FROM 2 TO 4 
Figure 59. Organization of the assault division. 
COMPOSITION 
OF GROUPS 
(SEE ASSAULT 
REGIMENT) 
~ § 
M HV 
[I] 
cbdJ 
6 6 
122-MM 152-MM 
HOW HOW 
(2-4 BNS) 
80 
18 4 
120-MM 122-MM 
HOW 
ctJcb 
6 2 
203-MM SUPER 
HOW HEAVY 
o 
1l. 
76-MM 
AT 
l±1 
12. 
76-MM GUNS 
1 Nov 45 TM 30-430 
BASE UNIT + REINFORCING - THE ASSAULT REGIMENT UNITS -RIFLE REGIMENT 
GROUPS FORMED COMPOSITION 
OF GROUP 
(2) ASSAULT (SEE ASSAULT 
BATTALION BATTALION) 
~ ~ ... ~ ... Wc::>~ 
§ § REGIMENTAL HV MINE ASSAULT GROUP ••• • •• CLEAR-10 10 ~[±]W fNG M M 
2 LAME 
76-MM 120-THROW. 
SP MM ERS 
~ ~ ~ § ••• §] ~~ S 3 TANK SUPPORT HV MINE GROUP CLEARING 
M M 
~ ~ ~ § •• • ••• •• REGIMENT OBSTACLE [IJrg][E CLEARING GROUP 
SMG 2.7 RCN 5. f AT 76- OR 85-MM [!J RIFLE SP 
11 
REGIMENTAL 76-MM GUNS 
r!J [!] l!J r!J 0 ARTILLERY - i~ 122-MM HOW GROUPMENT [!J 4 6 12 4 
45-MM 76-MM 120-MM 76-MM 45-MM 
AT HOW GUN AT 
\,. IS 
122-MM 120-MM MORTAR 
HOW 
••• [±J r!J SMOKE LAYING @J~[±J m rn + OTHER GROUP SERvICES 2 18 12 120-MM 
GHQ GHQ 
120-MM 76-MM. ~~$ REGIMENTAL 
UJ I1J RESERVE SMG 120-00 MM 
FLAME 4 4 THROWER 45-MM45-MM 
AT AT 
Figure 60. Organization 0/ the assault regiment. 
V-I 15 
TM 30-430 
BASE UNIT 
RIFLE BATTALION + 
REINFORCING 
UNITS 
c!J 
76-MM 
GUN 
L 
45-MM 
AT 
ctJ 
76-MM 
HOW 
L 
45-MM 
AT 
lZ1~~ lZJ 
c8J 
MACHINE 
GUN 
rn 
9 
82-MM 
MORTAR 
o 
9 
AT 
RIFLE 
L l 
45-MM 45-MM 
AT AT 
9 
AT 
RIFLE 
(2) 
-
-
1 Nov 45 
THE ASSAULT BATTALION 
GROUPS 
FORMED 
BATTALION 
ASSAULT GROUP 
(2) 
ASSAULT COMPANY 
COMPOSITION 
OF GROUPS 
~[§]~rtJ 
SMG AT paL 
RIFLEFLAME 
THRO.w 
••• ••• •• ER ~~~ 
SMG AT 
RIFLE 
tcOMPANY RESERVE 
INFIL-
TRATION 
TRENCH 
CLEARING 
FLANK 
SECURITY 
DETACH- ~ ~ 
MENTS I.C::::J ~ 
OBSTACLE CLEARING I Eel ~ 
GROUP ~ 
DIRECT FIRE ~~. l L 
ARTILLERY GROUP ~ l!-J 
4-
76-M M 45~ 45-
GUN ~r ~r 
HEAVY WEAPONS 111 ~ 
MG 
BATTALION RESERVE 181 r8l ~ 
SMG AT 
RIFLE 
Figure 61. Organization 0/ the assault battalion. 
V-I 16 
1 Nov 45 
The assault regiment in the main effort deploys 
with assault battalions abreast or in column; its 
zone of action therefore varies from 550 to 1,100 
yards. 
c. Assault battalion. The assault battalion is 
the primary tactical unit employed in the assault 
of fortified positions. It consists of the rifle bat-
talion reinforced by two batteries of 76.2-mm guns 
or infantry howitzers, two light antitank guns, a 
platoon of antitank riflemen, and a company of 
pioneers (fig. 61). 
The assault battalion, like the assault regiment, 
forms but two assault companies, the third rifle com-
pany being allotted to the battalion assault group, 
the direct-fire artillery groups, and the battalion re-
serve. Each assault company deploys two 
platoons-one rifle and one submachine-gun pla-
toon-abreast. Infiltration and trench-clearing 
teams, as well as personnel for flank security, are 
organized from the third platoon. Each company 
is reinforced by an obstacle-clearing group of one 
pioneer and one rifle section; and a direct-fire artil-
lery group of 76.2-mm guns or a howitzer battery, 
two light antitank guns, and a rifle section for se-
curity (fig. 62). Direct-fire artillery does not par-
ticipate in the artillery preparation. 
For operations against pillboxes and concrete em-
placements, an assault group is organized in the 
battalion. Its organizalion varies slightly in strength 
and capabilities in accordance with the resistance of 
the enemy position to be assaulted. Typically, it 
consists of a section of submachine gunners, a sec-
tion of pioneers, a section of antitank riflemen, and 
two or three men with portable flame throwers. 
The battalion mortars and heavy machine guns 
remain under centralized control. The battalion 
reserve consists of the balance of the third company 
(one rifle and one submachine-gun platoon) and an 
antitank rifle section. 
The battalion deploys on a front of 550 yards and 
to a depth of 440 yards in one assault echelon. In 
mountain warfare and in swamps, the battalion de-
ploys in two echelons. 
3. PREPARATION OF THE ASSAULT 
a· Organization of reconnaissance. The 
staff of the senior troop commander organizes the 
reconnaissance plan for the entire operation. Soviet 
practice prescribes mission-type and continuous 
reconnaissance by all reconnaissance units to make 
possible the proper command decision. A minimum 
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of three separate sets of aerial photographs is uften 
prescribed to supplement ground reconnaissance. 
Extensive and uninterrupted ground observation 
during the preparation phase, as well as during com-
bat, is one of the most important forms of recon-
naissance. Day and night reconnaissance patrols de-
termine specific enemy data. Complete information 
must be gained by means of combat reconnaissance. 
A combat reconnaissance group consists of a rifle 
battalion supported by two or three divisional artil-
lery battalions and reinforced by GHQ artillery and 
tanks, mortar units, and aviation. During this op-
eration, special artillery, tank, and engineer recon-
naissance is conducted simultaneously with general 
troop reconnaissance. During combat reconnais-
sance, forward enemy firing positions and outposts 
may be assaulted and seized if the neutralization or 
capture of such positions will facilitate general as-
sault. 
All information of enemy installations and dis-
positions is recorded on large-scale maps and dis-
tributed down to battalion and company command-
ers several days prior to the assault. 
b. Planning the assault. Assault group train-
ing is a fundamental requisite during the preparation 
phase. Thorough training in the proper employ-
ment of the individual weapon is followed by the 
training of assault groups in close coordination with 
all supporting arms. In many operations this type 
of training has taken place on a large scale in an 
area far to the rear, and has included practice 
assaults by the assault teams against reproduced 
enemy fortifications. Holding forces and recon-
naissance units remained in contact with the enemy 
forward positions during this time. 
The line of departure is far more elaborate in 
this type of operations than in the offensive where 
no heavily fortified zone is encountered. A for-
ward trench position is constructed at a distance of 
150 to 200 yards from the enemy outpost line, and 
is occupied by observers and security elements. 
Infantry units are deployed in several lines of 
trenches to the rear where elaborate shelters, dumps, 
and concealed gun positions are prepared. These 
trenches are 100 to 150 yards apart; they contain 
battalion and regimental reserves, dug-in direct-
fire gun positions, mortar positions, command posts 
and medical stations, and ammunition and other 
supply dumps. 
The topographic service produces maps (R. F. 
1/2,000) in sufficient quantities for complete dis-
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Figure 62. Combat formation oj the assault battalion. 
semination. The entire enemy fortified zone is 
indicated in the greatest possible detail. The com· 
bat coordination tables are worked out in complete 
detail with definite missions assigned to every 
assault group. 
Troop concentration and redeployment prior to 
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the assault are carried out by night with great 
secrecy, using specially constructed communication 
trenches. Assault groups must occupy the line of 
departure trenches within one day of the assault. 
On the eve of the assault, ramps are dug and passages 
are cleared to facilitate movement forward of per· 
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sonnel, tanks, and guns from their entrenched 
positions. 
4. CONDUCT OF THE ASSAULT 
The artillery and aviation preparation has the 
mission of weakening enemy resistance to the great-
est possible degree. Artillery and bombardment 
units attack all known enemy fortifications on a 
front wider than the main effort sector in order to 
neutralize enemy positions which can direct flanking 
fire on the penetration area. Stormovik formations 
attack enemy personnel in trenches, assembly areas, 
and rear areas as well as firing positions and targets 
of opportunity. Fighter groups provide cover 
against enemy air action throughout the entire 
operation. Artillery and close-support aviation 
continue to neutralize enemy positions throughout 
the entire assault phase by attacking successive 
enemy defensive lines and strongpoints impeding the 
progress of the assault groups. Particular atten-
tion is directed against concentrations of enemy 
infantry antitank guns and revived strongpoints, gun 
batteries, and mortars. 
The obstacle clearing groups prepare lanes 
through minefields and wire entanglements on the 
eve of the assault and move forward during the 
artillery-aviation preparation phase to continue ob-
stacle clearance. 
Final assault group and tank preparations are 
completed during the artillery and air offensive, in 
accordance with the observed results of the prepara-
tion. 
The assault begins at the moment tank units reach 
the line of departure. Artillery fire is transferred 
against enemy positions in depth and on the flanks 
of the assault sector. The assault must follow close 
behind the artillery barrage, to deny the enemy an 
opportunity to reorganize. 
Infiltration units move forward prior to the assault 
in order to cover the assault units with submachine· 
gun fire directed against enemy infantry firing posi-
tions. Infantry and tank assault groups then pass 
through obstacles along prepared lanes, directing 
their fire on the first and second line of trenches. 
Upon reaching the first line of trenches, grenades 
are thrown and the group continues the offensive, 
keeping close to its supporting artillery and mortar 
barrage. Enemy personnel left behind in trenches 
are destroyed by the trench-clearance teams and 
units of the second echelon. The obstacle-clearing 
groups continue to remove mines and obstacles, 
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guide infantry and tanks through the gap, then fol-
low them for further obstacle clearance. Automatic 
weapons and artillery fire at revived enemy firing 
positions to facilitate the forward advance of assault 
groups. 
The offensive is intensified by feeding an increas-
ing number of supporting troops into the penetration 
area to reinforce the break-through spearheads and 
to deliver strong flank attacks from the gap. 
Those special fortification assault groups which 
have been assigned the specific mission of destroy. 
ing known enemy fortifications are placed in the 
first echelon. Other special assault groups follow 
in the second echelon in readiness to assault new or 
revived casemates or strong points as directed by 
the battalion commander in that sector. The assault 
group commander determines the direction and 
mode of attack, taking into account the location of 
supporting enemy firing positions, their sectors of 
fire, the characteristics of the fortifications to be 
assaulted, and precautions against enemy counter-
attacks. The assault group sections operate as fol-
lows: Direct-fire artillery, machine-gun and tank 
sections fire on adjacent enemy firing positions and 
infantry protecting the fort or casemate. The ob-
stacle-clearing section and the main body of the 
assault group advance through obstacles up to 100 
yards of the casemate and cover the demolition sec-
tion with submachine-gun fire and by grenades. The 
demolition section destroys the casemate in a single 
blast or piecemeal, depending on its size and 
strength. At the same time, charges are placed; 
grenade, flame-thrower and submachine gun attacks 
are directed against apertures. In some cases, em-
brasures are blocked by sand bags. (A detailed 
description is given in section V of part II.) After 
the assault is launched, artillery and machine-gun 
support is brought up behind the assault group to 
cover probable approaches of enemy counter attach· 
ing infantry. 
Powerful forts are assaulted after the advancing 
echelons of infantry and tanks have isolated the fort 
from its supporting firing positions and enemy in-
fantry. Smoke screens are often used to facilitate 
the assault on a powerful fort which has been by-
passed and is isolated from enemy support. 
After breaking through the main defensive posi. 
tion, the next positions are similarly assaulted but 
at a greater tempo. To facilitate the complete 
seizure of the fortified zone, every small breach in 
depth and on the flanks must be immediately ex-
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ploited even though the breach may not be in the 
sector of the main effort. 
Artillery and air bombardment in short concen-
trations support the deep penetration of the assault 
groups. Increasing numbers of supporting troops 
develop the penetration in depth and width. Every 
captured position is carefully secured against enemy 
~ounterattacks-by hasty minefields, firing positions, 
and wire obstacles placed by engineer groups of the 
second echelon. When enemy counterattacks are 
repulsed, the assault groups must follow on the 
heels of the withdrawing enemy for further ex-
ploitation. 
5. DEFENSE OF FORTIFIED ZONES 
The bases of organization of permanent fortified 
areas are battalion and regimental defensive posi-
tions. Special defensive battalions are often formed 
for this purpose, and equipped with a high propor-
tion of automatic weapons, medium mortars, and 
antitank weapons. (For general discussion of de· 
fensive organization see chapter VI.) 
a. Battalion defensive position. The in-
fantry battalion can defend a forward position up 
to 1 mile in width. However, in strongly fortified 
zones the front width is narrowed to 500 yards or 
less, and the battalion is echeloned in depth in con· 
formity with the lay-out of the strong point and 
prepared fortifications. The battalion must be pre· 
pared to organize the strong points for all-around 
defense, but defensive positions normally contain 
a "gorge" exposed to fire from rear positions. This 
prevents immediate utilization of the battalion posi-
tion if captured by the enemy. 
In occupying a prepared position, the battalion 
commander must analyze the defense plan which 
indicates the strength, equipment, and locations of 
individual fortifications, strong points, trenches, and 
concrete pillboxes to be manned by the battalion 
units, as well as the attached infantry support groups 
for each casemate. The system of fire, antitank de-
fenses, camouflage requirements, engineer works, 
and minefields are also indicated. The first missions 
of the battalion commander are to supplement the 
existing system of fire with the battalion and at-
tached weapons, and to continue the development 
of the position by the construction of supplementary 
communications trenches, personnel shelters, ob-
servation posts, and switch positions for personnel 
and weapons, especially mortars. All battalion, ar-
tillery, and attached mortars must be registered on 
avenues of approach, on outpost positions, and on 
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obstacles. Alternate mortar positions, observation 
posts, and command posts are prepared, wired for 
signal communication, and registered on critical 
areas within the battalion fortified sector in order 
to destroy enemy forces in firesacks should the 
enemy penetrate into the battalion sector. 
Artillery and mortars are organ ized for counter-
preparation fire. During enemy artillery prepara-
tion, destructive enemy fire against fortifications 
and firing positions may be immunized by laying 
protective smoke screens. This is done on orders 
of the regimental commander. 'When firing posi-
tions are neutralized or destroyed, the system of 
fire is reorganized by moving forward machine guns 
and other weapons to reserve positions. When the 
assault phase begins, all destroyed weapons in firing 
positions must be replaced by reserve weapons. 
Soviet casemates are always provided with a rear 
exit and ramp to facilitate rapid movement of 
artillery in and out of the position. 
During the assault, enemy penetrations are iso· 
lated by machine-gun and mortar fire from rear 
and flank positions; counterattacking groups then 
destroy the isolated enemy. Tanks are engaged by 
antitank guns, casemates, and open emplacements. 
When tanks break through the forward defensive 
position, they are destroyed at the next defensive 
position while mortar fire and automatic weapons 
separate enemy infantry and tanks by antipersonnel 
fire. Revived pillboxes are supported by artillery, 
mortar, and machine-gun fire while fortification 
support groups and tanks counterattack the enemy 
to reestablish the position. Deep enemy penetra-
tions are resisted by maintaining heavy fire against 
the enemy flanks and preventing the isolation of 
individual strongpoints. Artillery fires from open 
positions when necessary, and all weapons deliver 
the maximum fire to restrict enemy movement and 
to enable regimental reserves to organize an effec-
tive counterattack. 
h. Regimental defensive position. Although 
the battalion organizes strong points for all-around 
defense, the regiment is responsible for intermedi-
ate defensive positions and switch positions which 
may be occupied upon orders from the division 
commander. The regimental defensive position is 
characterized by extensive development of firesacks 
and ambushes, well camouflaged infantry positions, 
and highly maneuverable artillery and mortar fire. 
The regimental reserve consists of at least one infan-
try battalion, reinforced by tanks and artillery. The 
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reserve is deployed to the rear of the battalion 
strong points with the missions of reinforcing the 
battalion positions by fire and counterattacking 
enemy assault forces which penetrate or by-pass the 
forward battalion positions. The regiment must 
be prepared for all-around defense if encircled. 
The regimental position has considerable defensive 
strength, due to minefields and intricate obstacles 
erected by the engineers. The regimental smoke· 
laying group is organized for screening the position 
from observed enemy artillery fire. 
Counterpreparation fire by divisional and attached 
artillery has been a decisive factor in weakening 
large-scale enemy attacks on the fortified zone. 
Fortified zones are the key positions which deflect 
the attacking enemy into channelized sectors in 
which he may be isolated and destroyed. Massed 
artillery fire is concentrated on enemy forces which 
penetrate between strong points into a firesack. 
Then a powerful tank and infantry counterattack 
destroys the enemy salient. These tactics are char-
acteristic of the centralized type of defense. A 
notable example of this was the destruction of Ger-
man forces in their attempt to penetrate the fortified 
zone of the Kursk salient in 1943. 
Section III. CITY WARFARE 
1. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
Since the nature of city fighting gives an advantage 
to the defense, Soviet doctrine, like U. S. doctrine, 
favors isolating and by-passing cities rather than 
attacking them directly. Numerous large cities were 
encircled by the Red Army during the latter part 
of the war, thereby cutting off large enemy field 
forces defending them. The organized German 
defense of encircled cities continued when the battle 
lines of the front were 20 or more miles beyond them. 
Soviet doctrine teaches that the rapid and eco-
nomical assault of defended cities is achieved by 
thorough and continuous reconnaissance, and by 
isolation of centers of resistance which are reduced 
by infantry-artillery assault groups. The attack on 
a city may be compared to the assault of a fortified 
zone, but with certain advantages. The civilian 
population, particularly women and children, im-
poses a burden on the defending military forces with 
respect to food, water, health, and shelter, as well 
as providing a negative morale factor. The main 
disadvantages of defense derive from the inherent 
tactical weakness of city building. Streets constitute 
corridors which restrict movement and prevent the 
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organization of a continuous system of defense. 
Buildings are not uniform)n strength and size, and 
many are highly inflammable. In addition, they 
afford little opportunity for mutual fire support at 
close ranges, impose a perimeter type of defense in 
each structure, and can be used as shelters for attack. 
ing forces. Further disadvantages to defending 
forces are the restricted fields of fire and visibility. 
On the other hand, the offense also encounters 
disadvantages in city warfare not found in open 
terrain. The extreme compartmentation horizon-
tally and vertically makes progress slow and costly. 
The rubble of destroyed buildings affords the de-
fenders easily adaptable defensive positions with 
excellent camouflage. The ease of mining, booby-
trapping, and flooding by the defenders; the pres-
ence of traps for armor and artillery; the danger 
of collapsing structures-all these factors favor the 
defense and must be overcome by specially trained 
assault groups. The presence of unsuspected pas-
sages, such as subways and sewers, and the ease of 
interior communication facilitate infiltration coun-
terattacks and breakout offensives by the defending 
forces. Offensive operations also involve difficult 
problems of direction and control. 
Two basic types of attack are employed: the 
systematic attack against continuous defensive lines 
in depth, and the accelerated attack against weak 
sectors such as large city parks or open spaces. 
Seizure of the latter divides the defending forces 
into smaller pockets. 
a. Reconnaissance. Detailed intelligence must 
be prepared concerning the enemy fire plan, the 
main fortified city zones, firing positions and prin-
cipal weapons, and approaches affording the best 
cover. The deadly effect of hidden fire in city war-
fare makes location of enemy firing positions 
especially important. 
In Red Army practice, combat reconnaissance is 
the chief means of obtaining information about 
the enemy in cities. In the assault of large cities, 
reconnaissance detachments of every arm and of 
the combined arms may operate for 6 days prior 
to assault. Combat reconnaissance continues dur-
ing the assault to determine all new firing positions, 
especially on the flanks of the penetration. Combat 
reconnaissance is supplemented by other methods 
of obtaining data. City plans are studied in detail, 
particularly with regard to the location of utility 
systems, subways, sewers, and the like. Observers 
are located at posts which permit overlapping vis-
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ibility; each observer is assigned a sector covering 
not more than 150 to 20° of vision. Special patrols 
are organized to capture prisoners for interrogation. 
These patrols consist of a seizure group of seven 
men and two support groups of six men, each armed 
with grenades and submachine guns. When full 
information cannot be obtained by other forms of 
reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force is conducted 
both day and night to draw enemy fire. 
h. Assault formations. The basic operating 
unit in city warfare is the rifle battalion, reinforced 
with armor and antitank gups. When enemy reo 
sistance is intense, one city block is designated as the 
objective for each battalion. The variations in 
enemy defenses necessitate considerable flexibility 
in supporting artillery and armor. 
The battalion is deployed for assault in column 
formation composed of four distinct groups (fig. 
63) • The advance guard or the infiltration group 
consists of a rifle company of two or three platoons 
and an antitank section. It is armed with auto-
matic weapons, grenades, antitank rifles, and anti-
tank rocket launchers. The second echelon or main 
body is the assault group, and is similar in strength 
and composition to the regimental assault group 
organized for the assault of fortified zones (see sec-
tion II, part III). It consists of a rifle company, 
about half of the battalion heavy weapons, and a de-
tachment of demolition engineers and smoke layers 
from the rifle regiment. Supporting weapons are 
two to three battalion or regimental direct-fire guns 
and a platoon of self-propelled guns. The third 
group is the support group which includes the 
balance of the battalion heavy weapons, three to four 
regimental or divisional direct-fire guns, and one 
platoon or medium tanks or self-propelled guns. 
The last group is the battalion reserve of one rifle 
company, which provides flank-security patrols. 
Subgroups of varying size and composition are 
detached for separate assault missions on isolated 
structures. A typical subgroup consists of seven 
submachine g'unners, five engineers, three to four 
heavy machine-gun crews, and two antitank rifle-
men. Two to four regimental or divisional guns 
may be placed in support of each subgroup. 
c. Conduct of the assault. The two basic arms 
on which the burden of city warfare chiefly falls 
are the infantry and the artillery. Engineers sup-
plement infantry combat by extensive de-mining 
work and by executing demolitions. Tanks use their 
mobile fire power to supplement artillery. Prior 
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to every assault, coordination plans are developed 
between the rifle battalion commander and the com-
manders of artillery and tank support on the basis 
of their combined reconnaissance. Visual and radio 
signals are established to indicate when phase lines 
are reached and for the subordination of supporting 
artillery and tanks to small subgroups. 
ASSAULT TECHNIQUES. Specific techniques have 
been developed by infantry and supporting arms 
in city warfare. In the assault of a strongly de-
fended city block by a rifle battalion, the support 
group opens concentrated fire on the windows, doors, 
and along the flanks of the buildings. Mortar crews 
fire on intersections and areas to the rear of the 
block to prevent the enemy from organizing new 
firing positions. Automatic weapons direct their 
fire on the upper floors and roofs of buildings, 
while artillery fire is directed at the lower floors 
and cellars (fig. 64). Smoke-laying crews throw 
smoke grenades to cover the approach of tanks and 
self-propelled guns whose fire is directed toward 
the center of the block. As soon as a breach is 
made in the center of the block, the infiltration group 
dashes through the breach under cover of smoke. 
Small parties of the infiltration group expand their 
operations in all directions, taking positions inside 
the neutralized buildings to ward off counterattacks. 
Artillery fire shifts to the enemy position on the 
flanks. Tanks and self-propelled guns move into 
the neutralized sector out of the line of enemy 
direct fire, concentrating their attention on the 
corner buildings. The assault group, coordinating 
its operations with tanks and self-propelled guns, 
enters the remaining buildings· in the block and 
destroys the enemy garrison. 
An engineer mine-clearing company follows the 
rifle battalion into newly occupied positions. Each 
platoon consists of special mine-clearing subgroups 
organized as follows: a mine-reconnaissance sec-
tion of five to six men, a mine-clearing section of 
eight to ten men, a mine-clearance checking section 
of four to five men, and a collecting and storing 
section of two to three men. The engineer company 
clears one to two large buildings or 20 to 30 small 
buildings per day. De-mining assignments are 
planned and controlled by the engineer staff of the 
formation in charge of the city sector. Tacti-
cally important buildings, streets, and blocks are 
given work-order priority. Trained engineer crews 
double-check all important areas, giving special 
attention to time bombs. 
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Figure 63. Combat formation of the rifle battalion for ofJensive operations in city warfare. 
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Figure 64. Fortification and fire attack 0/ a building. 
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In the event that a block is neutralized and seized 
rapidly, the reserve is committed at once to consoli-
date the position and to carry the assault to the 
next block, denying the enemy time to reorgani2!e 
his system of fire. The support group is displaced 
forward to engage new enemy firing positions, and 
the sequence of the operation is repeated. Tanks 
and self-propelled guns never move ahead of the 
infantry, to avoid entering firesacks or striking land 
mines. The signals of de-mining engineers and 
infantrymen guide the movements of armor. 
ROLE OF ARTILLERY. The mission of light artil-
lery is to destroy enemy firing positions by direct 
fire. In the assault of Berlin~ up to 80 percent of all 
batteries attached to infantry units conducted direct 
fire from open positions. In Budapest, artillery 
ranging from 45-mm antitank guns to 203-mm 
howitzers fired directly at embrasures, windows, and 
every type of firing position. In addition to neu-
tralizing enemy firing positions, direct fire is used 
to create breaches in buildings, walls, and barri-
cades. 
Guns are displaced forward alternately under 
heavy fire cover of other guns and infantry auto-
matic weapons. Large-caliber howitzers, 152-mm 
and 203-mm, are used to destroy buildings com-
pletely. Tanks with large-caliber guns, self-pro-
pelled artillery, and large-caliber howitzers act as 
rams to make gaps in the enemy defenses. 
Mortars of all calibers cover possible channels 
of enemy troop movements, such as street inter-
sections, trenches, and alleys. Mortar firing posi-
tions are placed behind walls or inside buildings 
-close to their objectives. Their mobility and effec-
tive fire from concealed positions provide strong 
fire support for the assault groups. 
Artillery firing at high angles from concealed po-
sitions exercises great care in registration. The 
exact locations of friendly troops must be known~ 
and each burst must be observed in firing for de-
struction. Registration shifts are made in two to 
four graduations from computed firing data, 
gradually approaching the target. 
Rockets are used in closely congested building 
areas where direct artillery fire is restricted. The 
Soviets have used improvised launchers for firing 
rockets from the second and third floors of buildings. 
The mission of the artillery reserve is counter-
battery and countermortar fire. Massed fire from 
heavy batteries of the artillery reserve is used 
against citadels or other strong enemy fortified po-
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sltlOns. Separate missions of the artillery reserve 
include interdiction and destruction of enemy supply 
dumps, headquarters, communication centers, and 
other important objectives. The artillery reserve is 
retained under centralized control under the corps 
and division artillery commanders. 
COORDINATION. For effective coordination, the 
regimental command post is placed close to bat· 
talion command posts. Battalion combat formations 
become broken up to a great extent in city warfare. 
Staff officers are therefore given more authority 
to make decisions in areas under their control. 
Infantry units must be well trained in close-in com-
bat, in the employment of grenades and demolitions, 
and particularly in coordinated fire and movement. 
To keep command posts constantly informed con-
cerning the progress of local missions and troop 
dispositions, radio communication, signal flares, and 
messengers supplement and duplicate telephone sys-
tems which cannot be relied upon for uninterrupted 
operation. 
Radio communication is often the only means of 
maintaining contact. Each battalion has one radio 
set; there are two in the regimental command post; 
two are located near the regimental Chief of Staff; 
and one set is kept in reserve. Stations are located 
on the top floors of buildings or in concealed, open 
areas to avoid the interference with transmission. 
Wire communication is maintained between the 
regimental command post and the battalions operat-
ing in the direction of the main effort. For close 
coordination, the regimental commander's observa-
tion post is at the forward battalion command post. 
SECURITY. Convenient interior lines of communi-
cation give the defending forces the advantage of 
rapid troop concentration for counterattacks and 
particularly for large-scale break-out offensives. 
Large mobile reserves of infantry, artillery, and 
armor must be held in readiness to support any sec-
tor which may be assaulted by the enemy, especially 
the sectors in the direction of other enemy forces 
outside the encircled city. In local actions, every 
seized enemy building and block must be completely 
cleared of the enemy from cellar to roof, then forti-
fied and protected against enemy counterattacks by 
automatic weapons, mines, and supporting fire. A 
specially trained security detachment in every assault 
group has the specific function of organizing de-
fensive positions in newly captured buildings and 
block sectors. Mortar fire and self-propelled guns 
are particularly effective in repelling enemy counter· 
attacks. 
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Figure 65. City defenses in depth. 
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2~ DEFENSE OF CITIES 
The Red Army has employed highly effective de-
fensive tactics in the defense of cities. The strategi-
cally vital cities of Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalin-
grad were successfully defended despite full-scale 
enemy offensive operations. Leningrad was under 
heavy long-range artillery fire for 2V2 years, while 
Stalingrad was completely destroyed but never fully 
occupied by the enemy. 
a. Tactical doctrine. Basic principles char-
acteristic of Red Army tactics in the defense of 
cities are the mobilization of the civilian population 
for defensive city combat, the development of deeply 
echeloned defenses extending far forward from the 
city, and the concentration of large bodies of troops 
on both flanks of the city (Figure 65). 
The civilian population is politically indoctrinated 
to take part in the organized and active defense of 
the city. Civilian military training in elementary 
tactics, rifle marksmanship, and defense against air 
attack were organized in peacetime by the Osso· 
viahim Society and the Komosomol League. When 
the battle front approaches a city, the civilian popu· 
lation organized into combat and service units in 
accordance ",-ith individual ability, assists in the 
construction of field fortifications, street barricades, 
and shelters. Intensive counter-intelligence screen-
ing of all civilians prevents any subversive activities. 
Defenses are organized in depth in order to resist 
effectively the enemy massed-tank attacks which 
follow extensive air bombardment and artillery 
preparation. Particular attention is directed to 
antitank defenses consisting of obstacles, traps, and 
numerous concealed antitank guns. Heavy losses 
are inflicted on the enemy by permitting his forces 
to penetrate bet\veen strong points and thereby 
channelizing his attack into firesacks. A destroyed 
city is even more suited to prolonged and stubborn 
defense than one with all its buildings intact, since 
the debris offers greater opportunities for camou-
flage, surprise, and ambush than do standing build-
ings. Furthermore, debris is not as likely to be af-
fected by subsequent bombardments and is invul-
nerable to incendiary attack. Troops are taught to 
improvise fortified positions among ruins and 
charred remains of houses as quickly as possible, 
and to provide a number of switch positions which 
are interconnected by a system of deep trenches. 
The primary mission of troop concentrations on 
both flanks of a defended city is to prevent encircle-
ment of the city by reinforcing the flank fortifica-
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tions. Soviet combat experience has demonstrated 
that an enemy brought to a halt when already deep 
into the city's defenses and forced to wage exhaust-
ing combat for a prolonged period is a ready target 
for encirclement and destruction by fresh, con-
stantly reinforced flank forces. 
h. Defensive technique. The conduct of de-
fense in city warfare is similar to that of fortified 
zones. Emphasis is placed on applicable defensive 
techniques, such as the elimination of dead spaces 
by enfilade fire and mobile groups of submachine 
gunners, which operate from under improvised cover 
and attack enemy assault groups in the flank and 
rear. Large numbers of snipers are used with the 
special mission of picking off officers and noncom-
missioned officers. Evacuation to the rear, as well 
as forward movement of supplies, reinforcement, 
and replacements, takes place at night. 
The principal defensive objective is to force the 
enemy to abandon large-scale armored attacks by 
making the penetration of the deep defensive posi-
tions too costly. Operations will then revert to in-
tense house-to-house combat between relatively 
small infantry and engineer assault groups sup-
ported by direct-fire artillery, automatic weapons, 
demolitions, and flame throwers. 
The transformation of individual houses into 
strong points involves the following measures: 
Digging firing, shelter, and communication 
trenches (including at least one hidden 
exit trench) in the basement. 
Breaking through firing embrasures. 
Reinforcing the foundations with earth-and-
rubble filled buttresses behind chicken 
wire, or plank retaining walls. 
Constructing safety underpinning as re-
quired, and covering the floor of the first 
story with a foot of earth for fire- and 
splinter-proofing. 
The upper stories are used for observations, radio 
communications and sniping. 
Defensive 'warfare has two overlapping phases, 
each with its o\vn system of organization. In the 
first phase, prepared defenses which extend through-
out the city and its approaches are organized as in 
the defense of a, fortified zone, with particular 
emphasis on all types of antitank weapons. As 
enemy artillery and air attacks destroy city struc-
tures, a progressive transition in the organization 
of the defense takes place until the city is a con-
tinuous mass of rubble. The defenses now consist 
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of a complicated tangle of trenches, deep dugouts 
under blasted buildings, and strongholds in ruins 
or in remains of large and strongly reinforced con-
crete buildings such as abound in faotory areas. 
Large quantities of direct-fire artillery are emplaced 
in hidden firing positions to limit the progress of 
enemy assault. Rear areas contain many batteries 
of heavy artillery which support the city defenses. 
The defensive system of Stalin grad was typical of 
such an organization and proved that the ruins of a 
city can constitute one of the most formidable types 
of fortifications in modern warfan~. 
Section IV. OPERATIONS AT RIVER 
LINES AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERA· 
TIONS 
1. RIVER CROSSINGS 
The Red Army crossed every major river in Europe 
between the Volga and the Elbe during the course 
of the war. Successive operations of many types 
resulted in improved techniques and new methods, 
such as the underwater bridge. 
a. Basic doctrine. Soviet doctrine in river-
crossing operations places great emphasis on cer-
tain tactical measures which differ from U. S. prac-
tice, although the general principles of river-crossing 
operations are basically identical. All of the most 
successful Soviet river assaults in W orId War II 
were carried out on broad fronts. By restricting 
the crossing area to a narrow front, the Red Army 
appreciates, surprise is lost and enemy forces con-
centrate in the selected area. Diversionary or feint 
crossings in considerable strength are normally made 
to provide alternate crossing sites to which the main 
forces can be diverted, should the main crossings 
fail or be held up. The planning of the operation 
is detailed and intricate, and orders are given in 
wrItmg. Concealment of crossing equipment and 
troops is carried out under the strictest discipline. 
The greatest single difference between Soviet and 
Allied river-crossing operations, however, has been 
in large-scale employment by the Red Army of rafts, 
bridge sections, and boats or ferries to transport 
armor, artillery, and loaded vehicles across water; 
whereas Allied forces generally waited until bridges 
".-ere built. 
Because of its superior accuracy, the Red Army 
places far greater reliance on artillery fire than on 
air action in river-crossing operations. Consider-
able artillery strength is concentrated, ranging up 
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to 240 to 320 pieces of all calibers-including 
120-mm mortars-per miles of front. The greatest 
emphasis is placed on the use of local materials for 
the construction of boats, rafts, and bridges. The 
tempo of river-crossing operations is highly variable, 
depending entirely on the tactical location of the 
river line with respect to the offensive operations. 
Ma j or water barriers were often reached at the end· 
of extensive advances; and long periods of prepara-
tion were required, due not so much to the lack of 
crossing capabilities as to the need for consolidating 
the newly won territory and for bringing up troops 
and supplies. Rivers within the range of offensive 
objectives constituted no serious obstacles and were 
usually taken in stride. 
h. Role of various arms in river-crossing 
operations. 
ENGINEERS. Engineers play the dominant role 
in river-crossing operations. There is no essential 
difference between U. S. and Red Army doctrines 
with respect to the command responsibility or the 
functions of the engineer arm in the organization, 
the assault, or the construction phases. As in the 
U. S. Army, the maintenance of bridges, traffic con-
trol, and forward displacement of engineer equip-
ment are also engineer functions in the Red Army. 
River crossings on broad fronts require the con-
centration of far more equipment than the organic 
engineer units of the formation and attached GHQ 
engineer units can provide from their organizational 
equipment. The Red Army engineers have the 
tremendous task of constructing crossing equipment, 
ranging from wooden boats to heavy bridge sections, 
out of local materials. For example, 10,000 wooden 
boats were built entirely of local materials, except 
for nails, in 10 days prior to the crossing of the 
Vistula. In such situations infantry units do the 
work under engineer supervision. In addition, the 
operation of signal .stations and troop regulating 
points by Red Army engineers involves operational 
control of large bodies of troops and equipment on 
a broad front. 
ARTILLERY. Artillery has three basic missions in 
river-crossing operations: to destroy enemy defenses, 
to cover the crossing of troops, and to transport the 
artillery across the river. In Red Army practice a 
river crossing requires the same amount of artillery 
as the assault of a fully developed defensive position. 
The density of artillery and 120-mm mortars re-
quired is 240 to 320 barrels per mile of front. To 
obtain this concentration, about 120 to 200 extra 
guns are usually required per mile of front. This 
1 Nov 45 
presents the difficult problem of concentrating large 
artillery units and at the same time maintaining sur-
prise. Usually a concentration point is selected 10 
to 16 miles from the proposed firing positions of the 
guns. Routes to the firing positions are carefully 
planned and covered in several night practice 
marches by all battery commanders. Strict control 
of fire is enforced during the concentration phase 
by permitting only two batteries per corps to en-
gage in counterbattery fire, by restricting antiair-
craft artillery to a limited number of duty batteries1 
and by using roving guns for deception. Great im-
portance is attached to direct artillery fire; 70 to 80 
percent of the regimental artillery is used in direct 
fire. A considerable portion of the antitank and 
regimental guns designated for direct-fire missions 
are dug in by night close to the river bank, and 
completely concealed by masking with shrubbery or 
tarDaulins with sand cover. 
The preliminary bombardment of enemy posi-
tions by air and artillery is directed against enemy 
defenses and firing positions which can interfere 
with. crossing operations. The first assault echelon 
occupies the line of departure positions 3 to 4 hours 
before H-hour. 
The full intensity of tht:: bombardment is de-
veloped as the first echelon moves its assault boats 
to the river for embarkation under cover of direct-
fire artillery. The fire density is two to three bursts 
per minute on a front of 10 to 15 yards, lasting from 
10 to 20 minutes. This is followed by less intense 
bombardment for 30 to 40 minutes, during which 
time the first assault echelon crosses to the opposite 
bank. The creeping barrage begins on both visual 
and radio signals from the assaulting infantry; time 
systems are considered unreliable. Forward ob-
servers and artillery observation posts direct barrage 
lifts of from 50 to 100 yards. The barrage is held 
at main objectives, which are usually at about 500-
to 700-yard intervals, until the advancing infantry 
is observed to be 200 to 250 yards from them; then 
the barrage creeps forward in short intermediate 
lifts to the next objective. Surprise night crossings 
are made without artillery preparation. All direct-
fire guns are held in readiness in their firing posi-
tions to neutralize enemy weapons, should the cross-
ing be discovered. Supporting medium and heavy 
artillery and 120-mm mortars are held in readiness 
to fire on previously registered enemy positions and 
assembly areas. 
Infantry guns and mortars, as well as four addi-
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tional antitank guns per· battalion, are sent across 
with the first echelon. Artillery crews are rein-
forced by 50 percent personnel reserves. 
Artillery crosses on ferries and improvised rafts 
until the floating bridges are in place, but no more 
than one-third of the artillery is ever in motion at 
one time. During a pursuit, the time element is 
considered to be of such vital importance that for-
ward units never wait for the arrival of bridging 
equipment if there is a chance to seize a bridgehead. 
All artillery units are trained in ferrying their guns 
across rivers by various improvised methods using 
local materials. 
ARMOR. Armored units carry bridging equip-
ment adequate for crossing rivers up to 300 yards 
in width. The motorized infantry generally crosses 
first to establish a bridgehead. Tank units enlarge 
the bridgehead, and wait until the main forces have 
crossed before continuing offensive operations. 
Amphibious tanks and ducks accompany the first 
infantry assault wave. Tanks approach river lines 
on a wide front and avoid concentrations. Recon-
naissance for fords and undamaged bridges is always 
carried out. On many occasions tank spearheads 
and advance reconnaissance detachments have seized 
bridges intact as the result of unexpected wide out-
flanking maneuvers. 
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY. During the assault 
phase, antiaircraft batteries protect the crossing area 
from the friendly side of the river; in some cases 
antiaircraft guns are mounted on rafts. As soon as 
possible, additional batteries are also emplaced on 
the far side of the river. Airborne troops have not 
been used on a large scale in any Red Army river-
crossing operation. Parachute troops of battalion 
size are used against enemy communications 5 to 
10 miles from the river to hamper enemy movements, 
or are given missions of destroying bridges, flood 
gates, locks, etc. 
c. The preparation phase. Thorough ground 
reconnaissance is organized as soon as a river is 
reached. Aerial photographs are continuously made 
to supplement ground observation. Engineer recon-
naissance gives particular attention to local material 
for use in the crossing; to the characteristics of the 
river, its banks, and most suitable approaches; and 
to enemy obstacles and defensive installations across 
the river. Artillery reconnaissance determines the 
location and strength of enemy firing positions and 
plans the artillery system of fire for the preparation 
and assault phases. Observation posts manned by 
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officers are usually placed 1,000 yards apart with 
mobile observation posts covering intermediate posi-
tions. Patrols of specialist troops operate along the 
whole front on the enemy side of the river to gain 
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concentration of forces in the area selected for the 
assault. This concentration is never hurried, due 
to the extreme emphasis placed by the Soviets on 
very thorough concealment. 
Figure 66. Deplo:vment of troops prior to crossing operations. 
further and more detailed information, and to re-
move underwater obstacles such as wire entangle-
ments, posts, and mines. 
During the preparatory stage~ a period of at least 
2 or 3 weeks is required to carry out the necessary 
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The organization of troops for the crossing opera-
tion follows a definite pattern (figs. 66 and 67). 
The division concentration areas lie from 2 to 5 
miles from the river, wherever the greatest conceal-
ment is available. The forward assembly area is 
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situated from 2h to 1 mile from the river bank on 
a wide front. Thoroughly concealed dumps of 
medium and heavy pontons and bridging materials 
are placed from 300 to 900 yards from the river 
bank. Assault boats and spare equipment are con-
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assistants are the chief engineers of subordinate 
units down to company level. The immediate re-
sponsibility of every engineer officer is that sector 
of the crossing operation to which his unit is as-
signed. Three categories of crossing points are 
Figure 67. Organization of crossing control. 
cealed under foliage or buried in sand in the forward 
zone 100 to 200 yards from the water tfig. 681. 
The Commander of the entire river-crossing oper-
ation is the chief engineer of the formation. The 
Commander controls all troop movements from the 
forward assembly area to the opposite shore. His 
organized within the general crossing area. These 
are the assault-boat crossing points, the ferr) ing 
points, and the bridge crossing points. Assault-
boat equipment is concealed along a wide front, 
, .. -hile ferrying and bridge equipment are concen-
trated further to the rear in concealed areas adjacent 
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to approach roads leading to the river (figs. 69 
and 70). 
d. Assault phase. The assault phase is usually 
launched at night, although daytime crossings under 
smoke cover have also taken place. 
The rifle battalion is the basic unit for which 
assault-boat crossings are established. One or two 
cros~ing points are established per battalion as re-
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where slit trenches are dug to conceal them. Trails 
marked by tape or wire lead to the assault boat dis-
persal area and thence to the line of embarkation. 
Signal points for regulating the troop movements 
from the assembly areas to the line of departure 
and to the loading line are operated by engineer 
personnel. Engineer guides and signal control sta-
tions regulate the movement of each wave in con· 
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Figure 68. Assault·boat crossing point. 
quired by the terrain and by taotical considerations. 
At the beginning of the assault, boats are placed at 
intervals of 15 to 30 yards along the line of embarka-
tion, making the battalion front 200 to 550 yards 
wide. Equipment consists of organizational in-
flated rubber boats, pontons, and folding canvas 
boats; local fishing boats; or rafts and boats spe-
cially constructed to make up for deficiencies in 
requirements. 
The organization of battalion personnel in assault 
waves is completed in the forward assembly area 
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formity with the established assault time schedule. 
The first wave loads into the boats which are manned 
by engineer crews. Artillery preparation against 
enemy defenses and firing positions usually pre-
cedes the assault, but on many occasions the ele-
ment of surprise was considered to be sufficiently 
important to attempt silent crossings. 
Machine guns, mortars, and light regimental 
artillery-as well as pioneers 'with a large supply 
of mines-accompany the first echelon. The pio-
neers clear minefields and wire obstacles, and lay 
1 Nov 45 
their own mines in the most likely approaches for 
enemy counterattacks. Upon debarking, the in-
fantry ,,,,,ith their supporting weapons organize to 
attack the enemy screening forces. The artillery 
barrage across the river moves forward in jumps to 
support the assault. 
Assault boats crossing a 500-foot river with aver-
age current make one round trip in 10 minutes, 
with oars; or one round trip in 6 minutes, with 
outboard motors. The number of boats required 
vanes with the tactical decision concerning the 
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Use of fords is made wherever possible. Water 
depth, and not the character of the river bed, is the 
determining factor. If bundles of fascines and rock 
fills are not adequate to cover channels, holes, or 
soft spots at the proposed fording point, flexible 
wooden mats interwoven with rope are sunk in place 
by driving short piles along the edges or by weight-
ing the mat down with rock. 
e. Ferrying Phase. Ferrying operations begin 
after the assaulting infantry consolidates a small 
bridgehead-about 600 yards in depth-and con-
(( 
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REGULATING~9ST 
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Figure 69. Ferry crossing point. 
llumber of assault waves per battalion. The rifle 
battalion without its artillery ~,5-ton load) may 
cross in a single wave in 36 A-3 large pneumatic 
boats or light pontons, in 12 heavy pontons, or 
over 9-foot bridge sets of eight sections. The 
to-foot footbridge section on four floats can carry 
10 men; the light collapsible boats and pneumatic 
boats, 12 men; the light pontons, 25 men; and the 
heavy ponton sections, 50 men. Amphibious tanks 
and other amphibious vehicles accompany the first 
assault wave. In the crossing of the Svir River, 
U. S. lend-lease ducks were used effectively in the 
assault phase. Recent trends in river-crossing oper-
ations indicate an increased employment of amphib-
ious vehicles. 
tinue during all crossing phases, even after a secure 
bridgehead has been established and bridges are in 
operation. Ferries supplement bridges in trans-
porting the maximum traffic across the river in the 
shortest time, and serve as reserve bridge sections 
in repairing combat damage. The ferry point is 
organized like the assault-boat crossing point. 
The troop assembly area is located 500 yards to 
1 mile from the river. A floating equipment dump 
is concealed about one-half mile from the river, 
and superstructure materials are hidden in a second 
dump about one-quarter of a mile from the river. 
The approach road or trail to the ferry loading 
point is controlled by engineer signal control sta-
tions. An upstream ferry construction point is 
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Figure 70. Ponton bridge crossing. 
selected to supplement the crossing point~ while a 
rescue station site is established downstream (fig. 
69). Ferries constructed of organizational floating 
bridge sections carry from 5- to 16-ton loads for 
light ponton sections, and from 16 to 100 tons for 
heavy ponton sections. Carrying capacity is in-
creased by adding additional pontons and by cou-
pling two bridge sections. Two-lane coupled bridge 
sections on heavy pontons may carry four trucks 
or the equivalent weight of tanks or artillery pieces. 
Generally, two single-lane bridge sections carrying 
two vehicles are used in the initial phases to facili-
tate the rapid movement of ferries. 
Small power launches, outboard motors, poles, 
or cables are employed in ferrying operations. 
Five round trips can be made per hour across a 
SOO-foot river by a motor-drawn ferry as compared 
to two to three round trips without power. The 
greatest single factor in determining how rapidly a 
unit may be transported at anyone ferry crossing 
is the ferry capacity. A rifle battalion with its com-
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plete supply train may be loaded in 19 sixteen-ton 
ferry loads or 48 five-ton ferry loads. Using the 
larger ferries, in a single crossing, the battalion 
can cross a SOO-foot river in 75 minutes, ·whereas 
using the smaller ferries over 3 hours are required. 
A rifle division generally crosses in two echelons~ 
requiring 2 to 6 hours, depending on the number 
of ferry crossings and the size of ferries used. 
Ferries are assembled in 15 to 50 minutes depend-
ing on their size; docks are constructed in about 
20 minutes, and unloading requires 10 to 15 min-
utes. As in the case of assault boats, extensive 
improvisation with local materials has taken place 
in the construction of ferries. Tables of buoyancy 
for all types of wood, barrels, drums, etc. are car-
ried by engineers to facilitate rapid calculations in 
designing improvised ferries. 
f. Bridging phase. The bridge crossing sector 
is identical in organization to the ferry point sector 
with the exception that bridging equipment is con-
cealed farther from the river. The approach road 
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is capable of carrying heavy traffic, and runs from 
the rear assembly area of the main body (about 3 
miles from the river) to the bridge site. 
Bridging begins at the earliest possible oppor-
tunity, generally when the bridgehead is about 2 
miles deep. Initially, the bridging is of light pon-
ton construction to facilitate rapid passage of light 
equipment and infantry. Later, heavy ponton 
bridges or fixed wooden bridges are constructed by 
GHQ engineer troops. Large reserves of bridging 
equipment are at hand under the control of special 
repair units. Every precaution is taken to insure 
the oontinuous flow of troops and equipment across 
the river. 
Strong mesh wire is hung upstream to stop floating 
mines; emergency and rescue stations are located 
down stream; look-out stations and flood-warning 
posts are placed upstream; alternate ferrying points 
and bridge sites are established and cables or 
hawsers are stretched across the river at various 
points to facilitate supplementary boat and raft 
crossings. 
Upstream, an emergency patrol station, armed 
with machine guns and artillery, is on the alert for 
floating mines, floating incendiary materials, and 
enemy river gunboats. Camouflaged emergency 
floating bridge sections are anchored upstream, 
ready to replace a damaged bridge section. On the 
downstream side is located a rescue station, equipped 
with boats and rafts, as well as a reserve bridge 
crossing site. Floating bridge capacities range from 
5 tons to 16 tons for light ponton bridges, and from 
16 tons to 100 tons for heavy ponton bridges. Con-
struction time varies from 75 minutes for a 450-foot, 
5-ton bridge to 4 hours for a 100-ton bridge of the 
same length. 
Construction time for floating bridges compares 
favorably with U. S. practice. Some categories of 
heavy ponton bridges are assembled in less time 
by the Red Army engineers than comparable U. S. 
floating bridges, with the notable exception of the 
treadway bridge of U. S. armored units. Red Army 
Engineer units use about 50 percent more men for 
assembling comparable floating bridges. 
With the exception of bridge-laying tanks and the 
trestle spans of floating bridges, no prefabricated 
organizational fixed bridge equipment has been in 
evidence. The Red Army relies entirely on its highly 
developed technique of constructing wooden fixed 
bridges from materials brought forward, supple-
mented by lumber found locally. Six hours for the 
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construction of a two-lane, 430-foot, 60-ton capacity 
bridge is considered normal. The railroad bridge 
across the Dniepr at Kiev was built in 12 days, with 
7,000 men and women engaged in the construction. 
Red Army practice in wooden bridge construction 
is unique in its preference for wide piers. Rock-
filled wooden cribs, piers formed by inclined trestle 
and pile bents, and square trestle piers are common 
(figs. 71 and 72). Piles are driven with heavy 
cross-lagging in temporary construction, and the 
unsupported span is strongly reinforced by inclined 
struts anchored on the piers (fig. 73). 
g. Underwater bridges. Three types of under-
water bridges have been developed by the Red Army 
engineers (fig. 74). In one case, four-pile bents 
at IS-foot spans were driven with muffled pile 
drivers and cut by special underwater saws 4 feet 
below the surface. Special caps with metal straps 
were then floated out and bolted to the piles. Log 
stringers and plank decking were easily bolted to 
the caps. All work was done at night so that the 
bridge was not discovered by the enemy. Under-
water bridges of spans up to 36 feet are built on 
underwater rock-filled timber cribs anchored to 
corner piles. Steel I-beam stringers rest on the cup, 
to which the decking is securely fastened by bolts 
running through the guardrails. Short rail struts 
support a cable at the water surface to indicate the 
edges of the bridge. For shallow-river underwater 
bridges, short piles are driven for anchoring timber-
grillage (cross layers of trimmed logs) piers to 
which stringers weighed down by rock are fastened. 
At Voronezh, during the Red Army offensive in 
the spring of 1943, the underwater bridge served to 
deceive the enemy as to the offensive capabilities of 
forces in a relatively small bridgehead to which the 
bridge was secretly constructed. Large armored 
formations crossed the bridge at night, and surprised 
the enemy with a powerful and successful offensive. 
h. Crossings of frozen rivers. The tech-
niques for crossing frozen rivers have been thor-
oughly developed in the Red Army as the result of 
years of experimentation on the supporting strength 
of ice. Specific regulations are prescribed for allow-
able loads, spacing of vehicles, and the proper 
manner for placing plank roadways to distribute the 
load. Thin ice is crossed by infantry on long 
boards; loads on flat sleds are pulled across by ropes. 
For vehicles and artillery, bridges are quickly built 
by driving piles through the ice, using the ice to 
support the working crews. Such piles are almost 
V-I3S 
TM 30-430 1 Nov 45 
Figure 71. Grillage-type pier. 
Figure 72. Inclined bent type oj support. 
always cross-lagged several feet above the point so 
that little settling will take place and driving can be 
done ,dth large "ooden mauls. 
2. DEFE:\SE OF RIVER LINES 
In the early years of the war, river lines constituted 
a vital part of the Red Army's defensive position~· 
·at the most important sectors ··of the front. The 
successful defense of the Voron~zh positions along 
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the upper Don prevented the enemy from outflank-
ing Moscow from the· south in August 1942. The 
historic' defense of Stalin grad and the Volga River 
·line for 106 days prevented the enemy from splitting 
the Red Army's continuous front in late 1942. 
, The outstanding tactical characteristic o.f the Red 
Army doctrine in the defense of river lines is that 
one or more powerful bridgeheads must be retained 
on the enemy side of the river. Such' bridgeheads 
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deny the enemy control of the river and restrict the 
maneuverability of enemy forces on their side of 
the river because of the constant threat of counter-
attacks from the bridgeheads. River gunboats 
supplement the defensive power of artillery and deny 
the enemy control of the river. Medium and heavy 
FRONT SIDE 
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artillery support the bridgehead defenses across the 
river. The units defending the bridgehead have a 
large amount of direct-fire artillery as well as tank 
support. Replacements and supplies are brought 
across the river at night to maintain the maximum 
combat strength of the defensive position. Reten-
FRONT SIDE 
TOP 
Figure 73. Piles with cross.lagging. 
LONGITUDINAL VIEW CROSS SECTION 
Figure 74. Underwater bridge on piles. 
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tion of the bridgeheads makes it possible to build 
up a concentration area from which offensive op-
erations can be advantageously launched when the 
military situation warrants. 
3. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 
A number of medium-scale amphibious operations 
were successfully carried out by Soviet forces dur-
ing the war. The outstanding tactical characteristic 
of every amphibious operation was coordination of 
the assault by sea with an offensive thrust on land 
converging on the same objective. The lack of 
strong naval support and armored landing craft for 
amphibious operation forced the Soviets into com-
plete dependence on the element of surprise. In 
the capture of Petsamo, a sudden motor-torpedo-
boat landing disrupted the shore defense system, 
permitting slower craft to land the main body of 
the assault units unmolested. The assaults on the 
Kerch Peninsular (1942-43) moved across a rela-
tively narrow channel, facilitating surprise. The 
most extended amphibious operation took place in 
the capture of Constanza. In this operation, de-
moralized Rumanian units were in full retreat fol-
lowing a breakthrough of the Red Army on a wide 
front. The amphibious forces struck when enemy 
reserves were committed elsewhere and captured 
Constanza, thus outflanking the last defensive po-
sition available to the enemy. 
Section V. OPERATIONS IN WOODS 
AND SWAMPS 
1. GENERAL 
Combat in wooded and swampy terrain is conducted 
by small self-sufficient Soviet units in a series of local 
actions. Tactical objectives are roads, clearings, 
road j unctions, small woods, heights, and inhabited 
places. Engagements occur at short distances; visi-
bility is limited; observation is difficult; and infil-
tration by small units is relatively easy. Movement 
of large forces is channelized; supply and evacuation 
must take place over the same routes. This necessi-
tates strict control of road movements and carefur 
planning. The effect of weather on road and ground 
cOllditions is magnified by the scarcity of roads and 
suitable deployment areas for heavy weapons. 
Combat in woods and swamps demands great physi-
cal effort from personnel and animals. The employ-
ment of motor vehicles for hauling supplies and 
pulling heavy equipment is limited to roads; else-
where, horses and more frequently men have to carry 
extra loads and move heavy equipment. 
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Wire communications are used for all but mobile 
units. In forward areas whistles and signal lamps 
are also used. Because more time is required to 
string wire in woods and swamps than in open ter-
rain, wire is not laid to the new position of a com-
mand or observation post prior to its displacement. 
Maintenance of wire communications is insured by 
frequently placed control stations and duplicate 
circuits. A signal construction platoon (28 men) 
can lay 3 to 4 miles of all-wire circuits per day. 
2. USE OF WEAPONS 
Combat in woods and swamps is conducted at short 
distances, which increases the importance of small 
arms and automatic weapons. As a rule, low-tra-
jectory battalion and regimental weapons are as-
signed piecemeal to rifle companies, or even to rifle 
platoons. High-trajectory weapons-such as bat-
talion and regimental mortars, and divisional how-
itzers-are retained under centralized control as 
much as possible. This is imperative not only be-
cause the fields of fire of low-trajectory weapons are 
so restricted that only high-trajectory weapons are 
capable of firing general support missions, but also 
because firing general missions requires a substan-
tial expenditure of ammunition, which can at best 
be delivered to one or two places suitable for the 
deployment of massed artillery. The effectiveness 
of heavy weapons in woods and swamps depends not 
so much on their numbers as on uninterrupted sup-
ply of ammunition. 
3. TACTICS OF SEPARATE ARMS 
a. Infantry. Soviet infantry divisions with 
their light equipment, small daily tonnage require-
ments, horse-drawn transport, and readily available 
motive power {riflemen} are tactically mobile in 
woods and swamps. Infantry usually operates in 
small self-sufficient units, generally reinforced rifle 
companies. Rifle companies attack in a line of 
platoons. Reserves are drawn up close to the for-
ward lines. Particular attention is directed toward 
the protection of flanks and lines of communications. 
Submachine-gun units are used in small groups 
(platoons or less) to infiltrate within the enemy 
lines, prepare ambushes, and counterattack. Anti-
tank rifles and heavy machine guns, in addition to 
their normal employment, are used for sniping. 
h. Cavalry. Cavalry is particularly adaptable 
to operations in difficult terrain, performing missions 
which in open country are generally assigned to 
motorized infantry. These missions include distant 
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reconnaissance, flank security, wide envelopment, 
pursuit, and raids. 
c. Tanks. The Red Army considers that the 
effort expended in making possible a tank maneuver 
in apparently inaccessible terrain is fully recom-
pensed by the surprise achieved by such a maneuver. 
After careful terrain and route reconnaissance, engi-
neer and infantry detachments construct river and 
swamp bridges, fill holes, and, when necessary, lay 
corduroy roads. Tank units are assigned special en-
gineer and infantry detachments which follow the 
tanks. A typical tank assault team consists of an 
engineer squad, a tank platoon (five light or three 
medium tanks) , and from one to two rifle platoons. 
Such an assault team is followed by a second wave 
which, in addition to riflemen, engineers, and tanks, 
has light artillery or self-propelled guns. 
4. IMPROVISATIONS 
In crossing swamps the Red Army uses locl\l re-
sources as much as possible for the construction of 
improvised aids. Many improvisations devised in 
the early part of the war have been developed into 
standard methods. In crossing swamps the individ-
ual soldier uses short branches or bunches of twigs 
to make two mats about 2 yards long and 0.5 to 0.8 
yards wide. He crosses the swamp by alternately 
placing one and carrying the other. A rifle squad 
uses two similar mats 3 to 4 yards long. Floating 
bridges are constructed from light logs and branches. 
A floating bridge made of 2- to 3-yard-long sections 
of woven fence will support horses and light anti-
tank artillery when placed on large branches. Diag-
onally constructed floating corduroy roads 7 to 8 
yards wide will support 8 to 10 tons. A similar float-
ing bridge 2 to 3 yards wide can be used by a motor-
ized column. For operations in the Pripet Marshes, 
Red Army riflemen were supplied with snow shoes. 
5. DEFENSIVE USE OF SWAMPS 
Small swamps are integrated into the system of 
defensive obstacles. Medium-sized swamps are used 
to cover frontal or flank approaches to the main 
defensive position. In this case, the line of outposts 
is placed within the swamp. Artificial islands of 
logs and branches are used to float security detach-
ments and forward observation posts. Large 
swamps may be used in the same manner as me-
dium-sized swamps, or the main defensive position 
may be established within the swamp area. From 
moss, turf, bushes, or branches, the Soviets construct 
corduroy communication roads and branch trails; 
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elevated gun, command post, and observation post 
positions; and communication trenches. 
Section VI. WINTER W ARF ARE 
1. GENERAL 
The long and severe winters of the U. S. S. R. have 
compelled the Red Army to develop effective doc-
trines and techniques for winter operations. 
The basic tactical principles for the employment 
of troops under winter conditions are the same as 
those developed for the conduct of operations in 
other seasons. However, low temperature, heavy 
snowfall, frozen ground, and changes in the relief 
and appearance of local objects create additional 
problems which the Red Army has successfully 
solved, and even capitalized, as testified to by the 
success of winter operations against the Germans. 
The difficulties of winter conditions do not de-
crease the activity of the troops. On the contrary, 
the Soviets make skillful use of the cold weather and 
snow. Fortifications are built of snow and ice, and 
frozen rivers are used as airfields. The long nights 
in which snow lessens the degree of darkness are 
advantageously used for maneuvering and regroup-
ing forces. The logistics-the movement of troops 
and supplies-is of greatest influence. The Red 
Army successfully employs tracked vehicles in snow, 
uses tractor-drawn sled trains and, for light opera-
tions and infiltrations: highly mobile motor sleds. 
The Soviets are also well aware of the fact that 
winter climate increases the effectiveness of persist-
ent chemical agents, keeping them active for several 
weeks. 
Camouflage is of particular importance; all troops 
are issued white camouflage suits. All weapons are 
camouflaged either with white paint or by white tape 
to break the silhouettes. The concealment of tracks 
is particularly emphasized. 
2. EMPLOYMENT OF ARMS 
a. Coordination. Coordination of the various 
arms under winter conditions is complicated by the 
difficulties involved in the identification of land-
marks and, in spite of the increased range of radio 
and wire communications in cold weather, in the 
utilization of communications equipment. 
The rate of movement of tanks, infantry on skis, 
and cavalry is equalized to a considerable extent. 
As a rule, the maneuvering of troop~ is slowed up hy 
the necf'ssity of keeping to the road~. 
The joint action of artillery with infantry is nor-
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mally hindered by snow cover, in proportion to its 
depth and powdery condition. The cooperation of 
infantry with tanks is equally complicated. In pur-
suit of the enemy, the Soviets consider it is usually 
more advantageous to use infantry on skis than to 
employ cavalry. The necessity of careful use of 
camouflage often exerts retarding influences on the 
time factor of operations. In general, transporta-
tion, evacuation, and bringing up of supplies are 
associated with great difficulties. 
The Soviets have found it necessary to make their 
operational plans for winter warfare flexible~ pro-
viding alternatives to meet sudden changes in 
meteorological conditions. The operations culmi-
nating in the crossing of the Vistula in the winter 
of 1944--45 offer a good illustration of provisions 
made for possible changes in weather conditions. 
The Red Army developed two plans. One called 
predominantly for air support while the other de-
pended mainly on artillery support. When the 
heavy overcast completely prevented the employ-
ment of aircraft, the second plan was available for 
successful execution. 
b. Infantry (ski troops). Winter conditions 
not only restrict the movement of mechanized equip-
ment, but also generally decrease the mobility of 
regular infantry troops. To overcome this diffi-
culty, the Red Army equips part of its infantry with 
skis. The bulk of the infantry, however, is left 
without skis and depends on the use of good roads 
or sled transportation for mobility. A special 
adaptation of this principle of transportation is the 
use of tank-drawn armored sleds for infantry. In-
fantry on skis are found either in independent ski 
battalions or in ski units which are part of a rifle 
division. The normal armament of the ski battal-
ions consists usually of rifles, submachine guns, light. 
machine guns, and light mortars in the three rifle 
companies; heavy machine guns in the heavy-
machine-gun company; and antitank rifles in the 
antitank-rifle platoon of the battalion. The lack of 
heavier mortars is explained by the tendency to 
keep the armament light in order to increase the mo-
bility of this specialized unit. Depending on the 
particular mission and the combat situation, tem-
porary ski formations of varying strengths are or-
ganized. 
The use of skis greatly increases the mobility of 
the infantry. The individual skier can travel 4.2 
to 7.2 miles per hour; small units can travel 2.4 to 
5.4 miles per hour. The travel rate of a larger unit 
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usually does not exceed 3.6 miles per hour. Ski 
troops are also independent of the road net, a fact 
which makes ski troops well adapted for independent 
missions, such as penetrations to the rear of the 
enemy, destruction of installations, and cutting of 
communications. 
As a rule the Soviets employ small groups of ski 
troops for reconnaissance, for raiding parties, for 
outflanking maneuvers, and for exploitation imme-
diately after a break-through, when the regular in-
fantry is limited to use of roads. 
c. Motor-sled battalions. In addition to the 
ski battalions, the Red Army has organized numer-
ous motor-sled battalions, some of which are combat 
battalions, while others are employed predominantly 
for transportation. 
The combat motor-sled battalion is believed to be 
organized into three combat motor-sled companies, 
each with three platoons. One company has a total 
of ten sleds (three sleds per platoon and one for the 
company commander). The combat motor sled has 
one 7.62-mm machine gun "DT" as fixed armament. 
The battalion also has a supply company with ten 
transport sleds, three to four trucks, one tractor, and 
a maintenance platoon. 
Combat motor-sled battalions stage surprise raids 
against enemy road columns or against an enemy 
who has no opportunity to deploy or to take up posi-
tions. They attack the flank or rear of deployed 
enemy troops and pursue the retreating enemy· in 
cooperation with ski troops. They find employment 
as covering forces for troops dismounted from mo-
torsleds, on open flanks of marching units of occu-
pied islands and coastal sectors, and at the junctions 
of larger formations. Motor-sled battalions are· 
used as reinforcements for motor-sled reconnais-
sance detachments; for reconnaissance in steppes, 
lakes, rivers, and coastal areas; and as lateral patrols 
behind their own defensive lines in a wide defen-
sive sector to prevent the infiltration of enemy troops. 
In the defense they are committed in cooperation 
with infantry transported by sleds against enemy 
ski troops attempting outflanking maneuvers. They 
also maintain command communications ana pro-
vide security for command posts. Their mobility 
makes them suitable for combat against enemy para-
chutists and for exploitation of a breakthrough in 
the enemy position, in close coordination with tanks, 
infantry, and ski troops. 
Motor-sled transport battalions transport infan-
try cooperating with combat motor-sled units. They 
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carry infantry to the rear of the enemy and also 
bring up replacements and supplies. The return 
trips are utilized for evacuation of casualties and 
captured materiel. The transport battalions trans-
port machine-gun, ski, submachine-gun, and close 
antitank-combat troops; and provide transportation 
for the command personnel of larger formations. 
Finally, they are used as searching parties looking 
for damaged tanks and planes, and for bringing up 
maintenance crews and guards. 
The Soviets give careful attention to a wide va-
riety of factors when employing motor sleds. Motor-
sled battalions must be employed either as a unit or 
in not less than company strength. Their employ-
ment requires thorough preparation and smooth 
coordination with infantry, tanks, aircraft, artillery, 
and engineers. Weather and terrain conditions have 
to be taken into account. Loose snow decreases the 
speed of motor sleds; low temperature makes the 
starting of the motors more difficult. At least 4 
hours in daylight are required to prepare the sleds 
and crews for commitment. Ravines, woods, and 
brush land increase operating difficulties. 
On the march, the Soviets employ unloaded sleds 
at the point of the column to make tracks and mark 
the path to be followed. The normal daily travel 
capacity of motor sleds is 60 to 72 miles on average 
terrain. Forced ma:.ches can achieve daily dis-
tances of 120 miles. The Soviets calculate on 12 
to 15 miles per hour as an average speed'. when de-
termining the time required for a given distance. 
Roads with two-way traffic may not be used by 
motor sleds, which are confined to parallel r?ads or 
to cross-country movement. The sleds must not be 
overloaded when transporting men and material. 
The normal load consists of four armed men plus 
the driver and 880 pounds of material. The great-
est economy of fuel and oil is required. The fuel 
tanks should' always be at least one-third full. 
d. Artillery. The movement of horse-drawn 
and motorized artillery in snow more than 12 inches 
deep is usually confined to roads, even though the 
Soviet artillery is mounted on sleds. Occasionally 
the roads have to be specially prepared with mats 
and logs to secure movement of the artillery. Trac-
tors are often equipped with grousers. Occasionally 
the infantry helps by hand to bring its supporting 
artillery into position. . 
In snow less thari 12 inches deep, cross-country 
movement is possible, although engineers often have 
to break ~ path. 
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Mortars, rockets, and pack artillery pieces, hav-
ing greater mobility than regular artillery, find 
extensive employment. Artillery observation is 
greatly influenced by the weather. Observation on 
clear days is normally good, while in a foggy haze 
the range of observation is greatly decreased. 
Ground bursts on forward slopes normally show up 
as black spots on snow background. Air bursts 
are barely visible. Smoke shells are frequently 
used for adjustment. Winter conditions llsually 
create favorable conditions for the operation of 
sound ranging units which the Red Army freely em-
ploys to counteract, at least partly, the limitation of 
visual observation in foggy weather. 
Whenever possible the Soviet troops clear the 
ground for their gun positions to avoid displace-
ments when firing. 
e. Tanks. Tanks and self-propelled artillery 
may, up to a certain degree, replace field artillery 
in supporting infantry because their maneuverability 
is less hindered by an equal amount of snow, al-
though it is affected by the character of, the snow. 
Ammunition supply, however, is a serious problem. 
Heavy and medium tanks are able to pass through 
snow 20 to 24 inches deep; equipped with grousers 
they can pass through a maximum of 28 inches. 
Light tanks can move through snow 12 to 14 inches 
deep. Soft snow does not impede tank movement 
seriously because it is compressed by the weight of 
the tank to below tank-clearance level. Hard snow 
breaks under the weight of the tracks, and fol1owing 
tanks are suspended wi,thout contact of the tracks 
with the ground. Thus, tank movement in column 
formation is impossible over deep, hard snow. 
The Soviets equip tanks with grousers for move-
ment over slippery terrain. In addition, special 
mats are used for movement over snow slopes. 
Froze'1 rivers and lakes cease to be an obstacle for 
tanks when frozen to a certain thickness: 28 to 40 
inches of ice can carry a heavy tank; 24 inches is 
necessary for a medium tank; and 12 inches for a 
light tank. Infantry can cross on ice 4 inches thick. 
Since tank tracks are clearly visible in fresh snow, 
the Russians emphasize the movement of tanks in 
column, during the night, or in a snow storm. Often 
the last tank in the column will drag sleds or trees 
~ehind to erase the tracks and create the appearance 
of an ordinary trail. 
When tanks reach an inhabited populated sector, 
they are always well dispersed and are brought into 
barns or destroyed buildings, or alongside walls of 
buildings. In the open they are covered with snow 
V-141 
TM 30-430 
or other natural camouflage material, depending on 
the locality. Efforts are made to make warm shelter 
available for the tanks. To assure constant combat 
readiness in wintertime, tank units are provided with 
water and oil heaters and other technical equipment. 
f. Engineers. The work of the Soviet engineers 
becomes especially important in winter operations. 
They are responsible for road repair and construc-
tion; the erection of warm shelters for men, horses, 
and materiel; employment of special kinds of winter 
camouflage; and for other normal engineer respon-
sibilities. One of the main tasks~ however, is the 
construction of winter obstacles~ using snow and ice. 
The procurement of drinking water ~ particularly for 
horses, occasionally presents difficulties. 
g. Cavalry. Under winter conditions. the 
Soviets often encounter great difficulties in employ-
ing their cavalry units as prescribed by Red Army 
doctrine; that is, in combination with supporting 
tanks and artillery as an independent striking force 
in terrain not accessible to motorized equipment. 
In deep snow the mobility of cavalry is often reduced 
to 2.4 to 3 miles per hour; movement is often re-
stricted to roads or to the tracks made by tanks. In 
snow up to 12 inches deep, cavalry attacks of brief 
duration are possible after thorough terrain recon-
naissance. Successful operations have been con-
ducted jointly by infantry on skis and cavalry. 
The Soviets are well aware of the special care that 
horses require during winter operations. They 
therefore make as much use as possible of inhabited 
communities for bivouac. In uninhabited re-
gions they construct protective shelters from local 
materials. 
3. RECONNAISSANCE 
_Thorough ground reconnaissance, the Red Army 
teaches, is of the greatest importance for winter op-
erations. Reconnaissance must, in addition to its 
normal missions, reconnoiter the terrain in regard 
to special weather and visibility conditions. The 
Soviets normally assign this mission to ski infantry 
units, although cavalry and motorized units may also 
be used when the terrain conditions permit. Cavalry 
and motorized units are usually limited to recon-
naissance along roads. 
Distances considered to be within the capabilities 
of units of varying strength assigned to reconnais-
sance missions are: 21 to 30 miles for a strong re-
connaissance detachment of approximately battalion 
strength; 9 to 18 miles for reconnaissance com-
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panies; up to 6 miles for reconnaissance platoons; 
up to 1.8 to 3 miles for reconnaissance sections. In 
snowstorms, the distances are shortened by one-half 
because of the difficulties of observation and 
reporting. 
Aerial reconnaissance in wintertime is considered 
extremely effective and furnishes valuable informa-
tion as to the locations of enemy installations, obsta-
cles, and troop concentration, and the enemy dispo-
sition on the front. 
4. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
The objectives of offensive operations in winter re-
main the same as in other seasons, though the seizure 
of inhabited areas and road nets is of increased im-
portance. 
In the early part of the war the Soviets carried 
out attacks against the enemy lines of communica-
tion. This was facilitated by the German defense. 
Soviet infiltration in force by units up to a cavalry 
corps in size was possible through wide gaps be-
tween strongly fortified centers of defense. In the 
latter part of the war, when German defenses ~re 
organized in continuous lines of defensive positions 
built up in depth~ the Red Army was forced to de-
velop its offensives into operations of combined arms 
\fith all the characteristics of well planned and largp. 
scale attacks. 
The Soviets carefully time their offensive opera-
tions. They do not hesitate to conduct their attacks 
during blinding snowstorms which promote over-
whelming surprise. In East Prussia, the Soviets 
outflanked the strongly fortified German position 
with large tank formations, which they moved across 
the ice during a heavy snowstorm, attacking the 
German position from the flank next to the sea, 
where they were least expected. 111 the interest of 
achieving surprise, the Soviets also do not hesitate to 
begin their attacks during the night. 
Characteristic of Red Army winter offensives is 
the proximity of the line of departure to the front 
lines to avoid tiring the troops before contacting the 
enemy. Infantry on skis normally advances first, 
supported by heavy infantry weapons mounted on 
skis or sleds and by artillery and tanks which, how-
ever, are often limited in their advance to existing 
roads and sections of favorable terrain. Other ski 
units, cavalry, and tanks are used whenever possible 
for outflanking maneuvers, in order to block the exits 
of inhabited areas and thereby prevent the enemy 
from destroying bases useful for further operations 
by friendly main forces. 
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5. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
The same organization of stabilized defense is used 
throughout the year. However, extensive use of 
snow and ice obstacles is made in constructing de-
fensive positions in wintertime. The selection of 
the defensive area is influenced by the location of 
inhabited areas, forests, and groves, which, with 
adaptations, may become important strong points. 
The Soviets also emphasize the necessity of adequate 
shelter for the troops to keep them warm and main-
tain their combat efficiency. They make extensive 
use of dummy installations, which they secure with 
mines and booby traps. 
The Red Army prepares heavy weapons for un-
ubserved fire into previously registered areas, cov-
ering the gaps between strongpoints to avoid suc-
cessful enemy offensive operations during periods 
of limited observation. When the enemy succeeds 
in breaking into the Soviet defensive zone, with the 
intention of seizing built-up areas, the Soviets strive 
to halt him by previously adjusted artillery fire and 
by counterattacks. 
During an enemy attack, artillery tries to slow his 
advance by forcing him off the roads and thus com-
pelling him to advance crosscountry. Counterat-
tacks are carried out in previously studied and pre-
pared directions, usually on the flanks of the enemy 
units. Whenver possible, the Soviets counterattack 
with skiers, who move downhill, with the wind and 
sun in the face of the enemy. Counterattacks with 
shock troops without skis and supported by heavy 
infantry weapons and artillery, are carried out only 
for short distances. 
When enemy pressure forces the Soviets to with-
draw from action, they try to disengage themselves 
from the enemy during the night. In daytime they 
make extensive use of smoke. Ski troops are nor-
mally assigned as covering forces. 
Section VII. MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS 
1. BASIC PRINCIPLES 
The tactical employment of troops, weapons, and 
equipment in mountain warfare is dictated by terrain 
and weather conditions, and the attendant logistical 
problems. Operations in the mountains impose 
great strain on men, animals, and materiel. Rapidly 
changing weather, road and soil conditions, and 
mountain altitudes necessitate the issuance of special 
equipment, additional clothing, and increased ra-
tions. Greater organizational weights and the 
decreased loads which can be carried by men and 
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animals require larger unit trains. Whenever ter-
rain conditions permit, narrow-gauge railroads are 
built for divisions and higher organizations. Trac-
tors are assembled along the route to haul supplies 
over difficult areas. When other forms of transpor-
tation fail, air transport is used. Regimental and 
divisional supply and evacuation installations are 
placed closer to forward units. The divisional field 
hospital and service area must not be more than 2 
hours' journey from the corresponding regimental 
installations. Contrary to normal Soviet practice, 
signal communications for the purpose of regulating 
traffic are established along supply routes 111 
mountains. 
Antiaircraft plays a prominent part in mountain 
operations. Both in the offensive and defensive, 
antiaircraft guns are placed at critical positions 
where traffic is channelized. Organic antiaircraft is 
supplemented by GHQ units which are assigned for 
duration of the mountain operations. Searchlight 
units are assigned for the defense of important rail-
heads and supply dumps. 
Mountain combat lacks the unity which char-
acterizes combat on rolling terrain; the inaccessi-
bility of certain areas and the lack of sufficient roads 
prevent the organization of continuous fronts. 
Combat in the mountains assumes a piecemeal char-
acter, resolving itself into separate, more-or-Iess 
isolated conflicts by small, self-sufficient units diffi-
cult to retain under centralized control. This neces-
sitates initiative, within the expressed intentions of 
the higher command, on the part of subordinate 
commanders, as the appropriate actions of even 
individual units and elements often lead to decisive 
tactical success. 
There are often gaps between friendly front sec-
tors which may be occupied by the enemy. The 
appropriate disposition of second echelon and re-
serve troops is of utmost importance for coping with 
enemy attempts at envelopment, outflanking, and in-
filtration. Up to one-sixth of the entire infantry 
forces and up to one-fourth of cavalry should be 
designated for this purpose. 
The abundance of dead spaces and areas of non-
visibility in the mountain lowers the effectiveness 
of arms for grazing fire at far and average distances, 
and gives added importance to high-trajectory 
weapons (howitzers and mortars). Snipers and 
submachine gunners play an important role in pre-
paring ambushes and infiltrating through enemy 
lines. Direct fire, interdictory fire, bayonets, and 
hand grenades are used to great advantage. 
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2. CONTROL OF COMBAT 
For uninterrupted control of combat in the moun-
tains, command posts must be located closer to the 
troops. The security of command posts is provided 
for by advance and fla~k detachments which occupy 
heights commanding approaches to them. 
In order for the commander to maintain constant 
contact with rapidly changing mountain combat 
conditions, he must not leave his command observa-
tion post unless under the severest necessity. For 
uninterrupted personal observation of battle prog-
ress, the commander moves forward to a new com-
mand observation post immediately after the seizure 
of crests and spurs obstructing his observation. 
When direct communication bet\reen command 
posts and operating units is impossible, forward 
message centers are moved out along the axis of 
communications. 
In spite of dead spaces and periodic bad recep-
tion due to mountain relief and atmospheric con-
ditions, radio is the basic means of communication 
in the mountains, especially for communication with 
isolated units and aviation. The Red Army in-
creases the employment and reliability of radio in 
mountain operations hy careful training in the se-
lection of frequencies, the siting of radios, and the 
adjustment of antennas. Visual sigllalling is also 
widely used because of the simplicity of setting up 
posts and stations. Liaison planes, foot and 
mounted messengers~ and dogs (for communication 
over distances up to 1 to 2 miles i are also used. 
Lse of wire is limited by such factors as time con-
sumed in laying it (t\,-O times that on rolling ter-
rain), possibilities of enemy tapping, damage to 
wire due to weather conditions, and difficulties of 
replacing damaged circuits. 
3. THE OFFENSIVE 
The offensive in mountains resolves itself into a 
series of attacks on successive objectives such as 
heights, ridges, passes, and valleys. The plan of 
maneuver generally consists of the isolation of 
separate tactical objectives and their annihilation by 
double or single envelopment; thus, the main ef-
fort must generally he suppleinented by several sec-
ondaryefforts. Successive displacement of support-
ing weapons hetm"en succpssiye phase lines is im-
perati\'e. In attackillg enemy positions arranged 
ill altitudinal leyels. the fire of all ,,-eapons is first 
concentrated on tJw lmn'st level. ~Thile infantry 
attacks that le\'el. artillf'ry and Illortars shift their 
fire to the firing positions of the ~xt level. 
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The offensive in the mountains is conducted either 
along the mountain chain or across it. 
An offensive along a ridge combines a break-
through in the valley with an encircling maneuver 
over the mountains, and the seizure of commanding 
heights and road junctions in the enemy rear and 
flanks. The break-through is accomplished by a 
heavy concentration of artillery, tanks, and aviation. 
In the development of the hreak-through by mobile 
formations, the seizure of road junctions in the 
enemy rear may lead to the surrounding and defeat 
of his forces on important sectors of the front. In 
continuing the advance along a valley, friendly flanks 
and rear must be' secured by airborne troops and 
mountain-infantry units who seize heights command-
ing the valley. Advancing troops must support flank 
security units by aerial attacks, artillery fire, and 
maneuvers into the rear of the enemy defending the 
heights; at the same time, these flank security units 
assist the advancing main body by fire and maneuver 
in the flank and rear of enemy units barricading the 
valley. 
An offensive across a ridge is based on the posses-
sion of mountain passes. Mountain passes may be 
secured by the seizure of heights commanding them, 
by attacking the enemy's rear on the reverse side of 
the ridge in a rapid outflanking maneuver, by land-
ing airborne troops in the rear of enemy units 
defending the pass, and, simultaneously with these 
actions, by launching an aggressive frontal as~ault, 
usually in coordinatio'n with aviation. Offensive 
operations assume the characteristics of close 
combat. 
4. THE DEFENSE 
Mountain terrain provides favorable locations for 
defensive positions ,,,,,hile at the same time irregular 
relief, deep and hidden approaches, and the isolation 
of commanding heights and crests facilitate out-
flanking and enveloping maneuvers by the enemy. 
A successful defense depends on thorough reconnais-
sance, well organized outpost zone action, and timely 
and sudden counterattacks by second echelon and 
reserve troops to prevent these maneuvers. 
Ohservation posts are established up to 9 to 12 
miles from the defensive front line; communication 
with them is maintained by radio and visual signal-
ling-relay points are established when necessary. 
In the outpost zone, security elements cut off roads 
and approaches; secure flanks, intervals between de-
fensive positions, and salients; and hold the enemy 
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until the approach of support troops. Support 
troops in the outpost zone parry enemy outflanking 
maneuvers; destroy small groups attempting infiltra-
tion; and, when necessary, cover the withdrawal of 
friendly elements. In defense of the outpost 
zone, ambushes and flank fire barrages are used 
extensively. 
The main defensive positions may be organized 
, either along or across the mountain ridge; in either 
case the front line is situated on forward slopes, al-
though a portion of the forces must be disposed on 
reverse slopes. Firing positiolls are echeloned ver:. 
tically as well as in depth. In defending a moun-
tain valley, strong points are echeloned on adjacent 
heights to cover the valley with cross fire. In 
wooded terrain, defens'ive positions are organized 
at the front edge of the woods or on commanding 
heights. In the latter case, the woods are used as a 
natural obstacle to trap the enemy. Elevated plat-
forms are built in trees for heavy machine guns and 
observation posts. In all cases, antitank and anti-
personnel mines, obstacles of all types, and artificial 
rock and landslides are widely employed. 
The artillery and infantry antitank fire plan is 
developed to cover approaches to defensive posi-
tions and dead spaces by both frontal and flanking 
fire. Divisional artillery is always centralized when 
operating in broad valleys and foothills. It is par-
tially centralized in support of the main defensive 
positions, and decentralized in support of secondary 
defensive positions. Submachine-gun teams are a~­
signed to each artillery and mortar position for 
protection against infiltrating enemy units. 
Even if the enemy succeeds in breaking into the 
defensive zone and begins developing his initial 
success, isolated heights must be firmly held. The 
second echelons of the army (corps) and divisional 
(brigade) reserves, in cooperation with tanks, then 
counterattacks to support threatened points as soon 
as the enemy drives over the crest; at this point his 
observation is limited and he is deprived of artillery 
support. . 
5. ROLES OF THE VARIOUS ARMS 
a. Infantry. The infantry carries the chief 
weight of combat in the mountains. Under condi-
tions where the support of other arms cannot always 
be relied upon, and where units often operate with 
open flanks and even without rommunication ,,,ith 
adjacent units, unsupported infantry is best adapted 
to conduct successful mountain warfare. It is cap-
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able of filtering independently through d 
. . enemy e-
fenses; reachmg hIS flanks and rear from the most 
unexpected and weakly defended areas; and, by 
using bayonets, hand grenades, and point-blank 
fire, of destroying him. 
To provide for uninterrupted artillery support 
when possible, the infantry must assist it in getting 
through inaccessible sectors and, by the seizure of 
heights, provide it with necessary observation. 
:for combat in high mountain ~ectors, where the 
reli~f is sharply cut and communications are un-
reliable, special mountain elements may be attached 
to regular infantry. Often, infantry units which 
have received special training-orientation in fog, 
night, and snow; camouflage techniques; construc-
tion of light defensive fortifications-and have spe-
cial attached equipment .are designated for combat 
in high mountain areas. If road conditions are 
bad, or roads are lacking altogether, infantry must 
be strongly reinforced with engineers and additional 
pack animals. 
h. Cavalry. Cavalry is the mobile arm in moun-
tain operations. It usually operates offensively, 
most often in meeting engagements and in attack. 
It often conducts mobile defense, using ambushes 
and surprise attacks, but is used only in special in-
stances for stable defense. 
Specifically, it is well 'adapted to surrounding 
enemy main groupings; developing a break-through 
made by the infantry by disrupting enemy attempts 
to stabilize the front; and pursuing the enemy 'with 
the intention of reaching rear areas and blocking 
his retreat. It is capable of supporting army opera-
tions by covering the concentration and deployment 
of forces; seizing and holding especially important 
tactical features before the approach of the main 
forces; securing flanks; covering retreat in the most 
threatened areas; and conducting reconnaissance 
and partisan activities in the enemy rear. 
Cavalry divisions, assigned to armies or infantry 
corps, usually function independently for the exe-
~ cution of _specific missions to which they are adapted. 
In sectoi~; along wide valleys and in low mountains, 
larger cavalry units may be used. Cavalry is re-
inforced ,dth tanks, infantry, artillery, and special 
units according to the mission assigned to it. 
In areas in the enemy rear or where there are not 
sufficient roads, forage and provisions are supplied 
by air transport. 
c. Artiller~·. Mountaill relief f('stricts the 
movement of artilleq and limits its flexibility of 
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fire. Artillery is, therefore, attached directly to the 
individual units it is to support. Regimental anti-
tank artillery and, in certain instances, divisional 
artillery guns are employed by platoon or even 
separate pieces in direct support of infantry groups. 
Infantry and pioneer commands are assigned to ar-
tillery units to secure their movement. Pack moun-
tain batteries accompany infantry in high mountain 
areas. 
An extensive network of vertical and lateral ob-
servation posts must be set up to ensure wide fields 
of observation. Command observation posts are 
moved out to forward units and located not only 
within their own sectors but, if necessary, also in 
adjacent sectors. Reserve observation posts are 
located in close proximity to the firing positions. 
Radio and visual signals are used for communica-
tion between observation posts and firing positions. 
Mountain terrain and sharp changes in the direc-
tion and speed of wind hinder the use of artillery 
jnstrumental reconnaissance. Observation by paired 
observers is widely practised for determining the 
exact location of targets, and aviation is used for 
reconnaissance of enemy batteries and adjustment 
of fire. 
The choice of firing positions for light field artil-
lery batteries is governed not only by the minimum 
range of the guns but also by the fact that dead areas~ 
ahundant in mountain terrain, must be avoided as 
far as possible. Thus, firing positions are located on 
adjacent sectors and heights for flanking fire, and 
are moved back to use other trajectories. 
Firing positions for high-trajectory guns (mortars 
and howitzersl may be located behind high natural 
covers and in deep valleys, thus bringing into range 
areas which are inaccessible to other batteries and 
permitting fire over the heads of advancing friendly 
infantry for longer periods. Firing positions and 
approaches to them should be carefully camouflaged 
by engineers. 
Since the lower atmospheric pressure in high 
areas strongly affects the flight of shells, special aux-
iliary firing tables must be provided. 
d. Tanks and armored cars. Tanks may 
operate in mountainous terrain if slopes do not ex-
ceed 30°. In areas not permitting the massing of 
tanks, they are distributed among infantry and cav-
alry units. The employment of tanks must be 
preceded by terrain and route reconnaissance. Spe-
cial obstacle-dearing groups are assigned to each 
tank unit. 
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The basic mission of tanks in the mountains is the 
direct support of infantry. In close cooperation 
with infantry, and together wi~h artillery and avi-
ation, tanks operate as part of the main forces or on 
the flanks and in the rear of the enemy as part of 
outflanking units. Tanks also seize phase lines, in-
habited points, defiles, road j unctions, and passes; 
pursue the enemy; and cover the withdrawal of 
friendly units. Light tanks may be used in small 
independent groups. 
One and one-half to two times the normal amount 
of fuel and lubricating oil is required in the moun-
tains. Each tank must be provided with spare fuel 
drums; tractors are used to drag them on steep slopes 
and across wide passes to conserve fuel. Reserve 
spare parts must be provided. Two crews for each 
tank are necessary to eliminate overfatigue. 
Armored cars are used on hard soil or wherever 
passable to them. They execute reconnaissance; 
seize inhabited points~ narrow passes~ road junc-
tions, and crossings; and guard rear roads and 
communications. 
e. Engineers. Each independent unit or ele-
ment, regardless o'f its composition, must be rein-
forced with engineers for assistance in overcoming 
terrain obstacles, for building bridges, laying cordu-
roy and other types of roads, forcing rivers, getting 
through swamps, conducting terrain reconnaissance, 
etc. 
f. Airborne troops. Airborne troops (espe-
cially parachute troops) are used effectively for 
mountain operations in the enemy rear and on his 
flanks in coordination with land forces. Even small 
airborne groups equipped with automatic weapons 
and explosives can often decide the outcome of battle 
by seizing commanding heights and passes and dis-
rupting the enemy system of communications. 
Where level plateaus and valleys are not available 
for landing airborne troops of other types, para-
chutists are used. Landings must be preceded by 
careful and secret terrain reconnaissance. 
Support aviation cooperates with airborne troops 
and parachute groups by bombing mountain roads 
and mobile enemy units. 
Due to the lack of sufficient roads, combat with 
enemy airborne troops is chiefly the mission of sup-
port aviation, which destroys enemy equipment and 
personnel at their loading airdromes or attacks th~ 
('nem) in the air before troops can land amI 
disembark. 
